A United States Policy for the Pacific
Publication:
The Empire Club of Canada Addresses (Toronto, Canada), 6 Apr 1944, p. 405-421


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Rogers, Hon. Will. Jr., Speaker
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Text
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Speeches
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The speaker's contention that what we do in the Pacific after this war is far more important than what we do in Europe, and why he believes this to be so. Asia about to take a great leap across the centuries, from medievalism to modernity. Population changes in the next 20 to 40 years. The lack of preparation by the Western Nations for the changes that will occur. The possibility of establishing a stable basis for international cooperation and trade between the Oriental and Occidental nations, and upon what that depends. Assumptions for a discussion of United States Policy in the Pacific: that the Japanese war will be won; that the U.S. will participate in Pacific affairs with sufficient energy and tenacity to carry out a policy; that co-operation between the four key powers, Russia, the U.S., China, and England, is possible. Five points that the speaker believes should be incorporated in a U.S. Foreign Policy in the Pacific, with a discussion of each. First, that the U.S. and the United Nations should issue a declaration embodying the principle of equality of all races and peoples. Second, that the U.S. should work for a strong, unified China. Third, a weak Japan. Fourth, that when quarrels arise between the Imperial Powers and their colonies in the Pacific, the U.S. should not take the side of the Imperial Powers. Fifth, Hawaii should become a State of the Union, and the U.S. should take over the Japanese Mandated Islands, and the Bonin Islands. The issue of an international organization in the Pacific, or elsewhere. The responsibility that will belong to the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and all of South America after the war in terms of the Pacific.
Date of Original:
6 Apr 1944
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English
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Full Text
A UNITED STATES POLICY FOR THE PACIFIC
AN ADDRESS BY HON. WILL. ROGERS, JR., MEMBER OF U.S. CONGRESS.
Chairman: The President, Mr. Eason Humphreys.
Thursday, April 6, 1944

MR. HUMPHREYS: The late, beloved Mr. Will Rogers, a philosopher of our time, used to say: "You know, Percy, everyone is ignorant only on different subjects."

It is on that philosophy, gentlemen, that The Empire Club has thrived for forty years.

Today, we do honour to Congressman Will Rogers, Jr., a member of the United States Foreign Affairs Committee, and distinguished son of the late Mr. Will Rogers.

Lieut. Rogers is Congressional Representative for the 16th Division of California, and although born in New York, he resided most of his life on the Pacific Coast travelling the while through Europe the Orient and Russia.

The Pacific has occupied a great deal of Mr. Rogers' attention, and so today he discusses with us: "A United States Policy for the Pacific"-a matter of much concern to a Pacific Ocean nation like Canada.

By profession, Will Rogers, Jr., is an editor and publisher, and he owns the largest weekly paper in the West, The Beverly Hills Citizen.

Congressman Rogers was graduated from Stamford University where he distinguished himself in many ways. He captained the debate team there and also the polo team. He is, by the way, a four-goal player. He was also a national swimming champion (perhaps he still is).

Mr. Rogers entered the United States Army as a private in 1941, being promoted later to lieutenant in the Tank Destroyer Corps, but while in the army he was elected to Congress. By the way, I believe Mr. Rogers is distinguished as being the only politician elected to Congress without having made a single speech beforehand.

An hour ago, Mr. Rogers, you were accorded a civic welcome to the City of Toronto by His Worship, Mayor Conboy, and others. Now it is our pleasure to warmly welcome you to The Empire Club of Canada.

By the way, sir, the warmth of our welcome, if not climatic, is, nevertheless, spiritual and sincere. We wish our climate was like yours--a climate that inspired your revered father to say: "I never expected to see the girls sunburned where they are nowadays." Gentlemen: I have pleasure in introducing Congressman Will Rogers, Jr., who will now address us on "A United States Policy for the Pacific."

MR. ROGERS: I am more honoured than I can say at being invited to speak before The Empire Club of Canada. And I hate to admit it, but the other time I came to Canada was also to make a speech. That was almost ten years ago when I was a member of the debate team for Stamford University. We went to Vancouver to debate the University of British Columbia.

As your Chairman has said, my subject is, "A United States Policy for the Pacific." This is a subject important to Canada, for Canada joins the big three, Russia, Eng land and the United States, in having vital interests in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Every day a new book comes out on what to do with Germany, or how to solve the problems of Europe. There is a great intellectual probing going on to find a solution for Europe. I see no such equal effort being directed to Pacific problems.

Yet, the point can be made, and I think sustained, that what we do in the Pacific after this war is far more important than what we do in Europe. In Europe, the peoples, the populations, the cultural traits, the psychological attitudes, are well frozen. They are set; they are solidified. In Europe, after the war, there will be more socialism or less, more nationalism or less, a boundary will be drawn here instead of there. There will be no great population increases; migrations of people will be numbered in the millions, not the hundreds of millions; scientific advances will continue, but it will not come as a great jolt, because Europe has been accustomed to over a hundred years of scientific advancement.

Asia, on the other hand, is about to take a great leap across the centuries, from medievalism to modernity. The whole character of Asia's people, their attitudes, their psychology, is about to change. Asia will be moving from the hand-loom into the age of plastics, without ever going through the conditioning experience of the early industrial revolution. As education and scientific knowledge spread, the Pacific peoples will be moving from rickshaws to electronics.

Then too, there will be some startling population changes in the next twenty to forty years. The population of this planet is roughly two billion, of which one billion live in Asia, excluding Asiatic Russia. In the ten year period between 1940 and 1950, and including all the deaths from war, famine and flood, India will have added around 30 million to her population, and China will have added around 40 million.

Population curves in most European countries and in the United States and Canada have started to slowly level off. A higher percentage of the people are moving into the older age groups. As Prime Minister Churchill said in his last world-wide broadcast, England may be looking forward to a period of population decline.

But in Asia there is no such trend. In the last 60 years, the population of Asia has doubled. Even more important, the rate of increase has been going up each year. As proper medical care becomes more prevalent, and as the growing and distribution of food becomes more efficient, the rate of Asiatic increase may continue to rise for another generation or so. The only Asiatic nation that shows any indication of levelling off is Japan, and it will not be levelling off for another fifty years or so. The changes in Europe after this war will be minute, compared to those in Asia and the Pacific. I am afraid that the Western Nations are not prepared, nor are they preparing for such tremendous changes as will occur. That is why what we do in the Pacific is so desperately important.

The Orient and the Pacific is still maleable. Its patterns and forms are still fluid. It is our actions, after this war, that will give the Orient the mold in which it will harden.

The Oriental Nations can grow to power and maturity in an attitude of fear and hate and racial tensions. They can come to believe that what they have achieved has been "won" from England and the United States, that their advance has been "wrested" from the Occident and is not a gift of the Occident.

On the other hand, a stable basis for international cooperation and trade between the Oriental and Occidental nations can be established. A stable peace in the Pacific can be established. It all depends on the post-war actions of the United Nations. Important as our post-war policy will be in Europe, I submit that it is even more important in the Pacific.

Now if we are going to discuss United States Policy in the Pacific, we must start with a few assumptions. First of all, we have to assume that the Japanese war will be won. That, I believe, is a safe assumption.

Then, we have to assume that the United States will participate in Pacific affairs, with sufficient energy and tenacity to carry out a policy. That assumption is not quite so sure. However, American isolationism is having to retreat before the clear fact that unless we do actively co-operate with the rest of the world, there can be no lasting peace. Our isolationism has mainly been directed at Europe. I think most Americans recognize the necessity for a vigorous participation in the Pacific.

Thirdly, we have to assume that co-operation between the four key powers: Russia, the United States, China, and England, is possible. That assumption is the most shaky of all. Some people say that the differences between a Soviet system and a capitalist system are so great that no co-operation between them is possible. I don't believe that. Some people say that the empires in the Pacific are so important to the home countries that the home countries cannot afford to stop exploiting them. I don't believe that. Some people say that American desires in the Pacific, and China's desires in the Pacific are so mutually antagonistic that they cannot be reconciled. I don't believe that.

I believe that while the United States' idea on the Pacific might differ from the Chinese, which may differ from the Russian, nevertheless co-operation is so obviously essential to peace, that these differing desires can be worked out. It will be difficult, but not impossible.

With this background then, this view of Asia as a great ferment, a great wild yeast, ready to startle the world with the rapidity and direction of its growth, and with these assumptions that a peace is possible, I suggest that a United States Foreign Policy in the Pacific should incorporate, among others, these five points

The first point, and the most important, is that the United States and the United Nations should issue a declaration embodying the principle of equality of all races and peoples.

This does not mean any nation will have to change its immigration quotas. It does not interfere with the internal affairs, or sovereignty, of any nations at all. But it does mean that we announce that one of the aims, one of the goals, one of the ideals toward which we struggle is this principle of equality of races.

We in the United States say, and you here in Canada say, that you are working toward Democracy. We do not have a perfect democracy in the United States. We still have a poll-tax and other franchise restrictions. You in Canada do not have a perfect democracy either. But that does not mean that we drop the principle of working toward democracy. Democracy is an ideal difficult to achieve. The equality of all races is also an ideal, and, also difficult to achieve. But they are both well worth working toward.

This idea of a declaration on equality of races is nothing new. It is in the United States Constitution. It is in our Declaration of Independence. In principle, it is writ ten in most of the laws of most of the Democracies of the world. It is implied in the doctrine of the Four Freedoms, for which we say we fight.

While there has not been as many books on Pacific Policy as there has been books on what to do with Germany and Europe after the war, there has, nevertheless, been a few. In reading some of them, and in reading magazine articles and pamphlets, I have noticed one startling thing.

If the magazine article, or book on Pacific Policy is written by a Chinese, or an Indian, or a Korean, or a Philippino, almost without exception, somewhere in that article you will find this question of issuing a declaration on racial equality. This whole matter was thoroughly discussed here in Canada, at the Institute of Pacific Relations Conference at Mont Tremblant in 1942. This is a most important matter and for harmony in the Pacific, such a declaration should have been issued long ago.

A similar declaration was proposed and refused in the peace treaty after the last war. In the last world war Japan was our ally. The one thing it worked for, at the Peace Conference at Versailles, was to have included in the Treaty of Versailles, 16 words recognizing the principle of the equality of races.

England, with American acquiescence if not support, refused to put those 16 words in. Japan, surging with newly discovered power and pride, was intellectually slapped down, and at a time when such an intellectual slap would sting most.

It is no wonder that twenty-four years later, when the Japanese took the surrender of Hong Kong from the British commander, they made it as humiliating as possible, and quite pointedly held the final formal surrender in the Grand Ballroom of the Peninsular Hotel into which no Oriental had previously been permitted to set foot.

Right here, I think it is appropriate to tell a little story. I came up on the overnight train from Washington. This train crossed into Canada at Buffalo in the early hours of the morning. I don't know when, for I was asleep. No one bothered me, everything went smoothly.

But some three or four months ago, an American woman of Chinese ancestry, was travelling on a similar train. She was going from New York to Detroit and she just happened to take one of those trains which travel part of the way in Canada, instead of all the way in the United States.

When this young lady got to Buffalo in the early hours of the morning, she was awakened in her berth and told by a Canadian Immigration Officer that she would have to get off the train as no Chinese (who, incidentally are our allies) were allowed to travel across Canada. The young lady presented her documents showing that she was a native born American citizen, but the inspector said that even so she was still Chinese and had to get off.

So she got dressed and got off the train with her luggage, and had to wait half a day at the station for another train which travelled totally within the United States. I submit, gentlemen, that if we are to have peace in the world, such an attitude cannot continue. Such an attitude is completely unnecessary. On this same trip some eight months ago, I also visited Phoenix, Arizona. I went into the cocktail bar of the city's largest and finest hotel. The place was jam-packed, and a good three-fourths of the people there were young Chinese aviation cadets. Nice looking young men, neatly dressed in their snappy uniforms. Hundreds of them have been trained at nearby Thunderbird Field and they get along just fine. It is the attitude of Thunderbird Field, even more than the men they train, that will bring peace to the Pacific.

The United Nations have issued enough high sounding phrases, and the United States is always exchanging platitudes and compliments with other countries. I do not see why a statement embodying the principle of the equality of all races could not be issued. Race tensions do exist, but if we are to have a stable world order, we must work to diminish them.

The second point, which I submit for a foreign policy, is that the United States should work for a strong, unified China.

I want that to be our base policy in Asia: to restore to China its ancient position as the unquestioned leader in its part of the world. That necessitates a change in both Britain's and America's past policy. For previously, neither country has spent too much effort in helping China become strong. This idea of a dominant China will meet with considerable opposition both in the United States and in the United Kingdom. Many people are afraid of a strong China.

In general they are the people who want us to maintain a "balance of power" in the Pacific. Their theory is that we should maintain a fairly strong Japan to balance against the growing strength of China. The two countries would oppose each other, tend to neutralize each other, and thus make the United States more secure.

In my opinion, such a policy would be disastrous. It would lead to insecurity, conflict and war. By trying to use Japan as a lever against China, or China as a lever against Japan, we will only gain the enmity of both. I am not in sympathy with the old fashioned predatory American industrialist who wants to keep China weak for exploitive purposes. Nor do I fear a strong China as an economic competitor of the United States. A strong China is an economic asset to the United States. Half a billion paupers are no good as customers. But half a billion people starting to use radios and transparent plastic tooth-brushes, become a possibility for trade and material advancement.

I want the alliance between the United States and China in the Pacific to be as complete and unquestioned as the alliance between the United States and England in the Atlantic. In the Atlantic, England the United States stand or fall together. The world knows it. The world knows we are not going to fight each other. This has been one of the greatest assets the United States has had. Only now, I feel, we are in the United States and perhaps you in Canada, starting to realize the great debt both our countries have owed to the British Navy for the last 100 years. If the world understands that China and the United States will stand or fall together, and will not fight each other, then we have a stable basis for a lasting Pacific peace.

This naturally leads us to the question of Russia, for there can be no stable Pacific order unless the United States and Russia can come to some agreement, not necessarily written, but roughly understood by both parties, concerning the future of China and the future of Japan. It was only a few years ago that Russia was supporting the Communist armies, and we were supporting Chiang Kai-Shek. These two factions were fighting each other with the arms our two countries were supplying them. That is the sort of thing which the two countries should not start again after this war. And that is going to be the sort of thing most difficult to avoid.

China is arriving on the industrial scene without a set pattern of capitalism or socialism. China today has elements of both, and elements that are purely Oriental. It is going to be difficult enough for china to evolve her own economic and political system. If we start supporting one faction in China and Russia starts supporting another, China will never be able to achieve unity.

Even should the United States, England and Russia have a "hands-off" policy towards the internal structure of China, it is going to be most difficult for China to rapidly become a stable country. Some shrewd observers feel that even with the best international good-will, China will face a period of four or five years of bloody civil war.

These observers point out that China needs great agrarian, industrial and social reforms, The old economy, where wealth drained off into Shanghai and the coast cities, and where the provinces were periodically swept by famine and flood, will no longer satisfy the people.

One of the reasons these observers predict civil war in China is because so far, the Kuomintang, the party of Chiang Kai-Shek, has not made the distinction between those who are its enemies and those who are simply its opposition.

It is my hope however that the governmental base of China can be widened. A nation of 500 million cannot forever be ruled by a few families, The conflicts in China are great, but the pressure for unity is greater. I feel that a few years after this war, China will emerge on some unified path. When it does, it will show a rapidity of growth that will startle the world. I want the United States to be closely allied with this coming giant.

To implement this policy of a strong China, I have a few suggestions: When we land on the mainland of Japan, Chinese units should be in all the landings. When the United Nations parade in Tokio, Chinese units should be in the first place of honour. The Chinese should participate in the invasion and policing of Japan as much as possible, because this war must not have any connotation of a race, or conquering white man's war. It must be shown to Japan that this is a United Nation's victory.

In the atrocity courts, which I hope will be set up in Japan, there should be Chinese judges. And in the re-education process which I hope will begin in Japan, Chinese should be in the highest positions.

The Japanese Navy--or what is left of it (if anything)--should go to China. Japanese armament factories should be dismantled and sent to China. The Japanese merchant fleet--or what (if any) is left of it should be transferred to Chinese registry and ownership. That is in line with the third point.

The third point I suggest for an American policy in the Pacific is a weak Japan.

My attitude is best summed up by the remarks of a radio commentator. He was asked what to do about keeping down post-war Japan. The answer was, "Well, I haven't heard very much news from Carthage lately." I want our Pacific Policy to be crystal clear: strong China, weak Japan. In proposing this, I am following the doctrines laid down over 500 years ago by Niccolo Machiavelli. If anyone wants to know how to treat Germany or Japan, I commend a reading, or a re-reading of Machiavelli's Discourses and The Prince.

In the treatment of enemies, Machiavelli states, "This is the way the Romans took in the settlement of Latium, which ought to be observed and imitated by all wise Princes and States. They gave sentence town by town, according to the nature of their deserts; but in all extremes, without any mediocrity; for some they not only pardoned, but loaded them with benefits, made them free of their own city, and gave them many other privileges, and exemptions, and thereby secured them not only from rebelling, but from ever conspiring again. The rest whom they thought fit to make examples, were brought prisoners to Rome, punished with all kind of severity, their houses destroyed, their lands confiscated, their persons dispersed, so as it was not possible for them any way to do any mischief for the future.

"And things being so, we conclude, according to our proposition in the beginning of our discourse: That upon any great sentence to be given against a people or city that has been formerly free, the surest way is, to waive all moderation, and either to caress or extinguish them. . . . It will be expedient, therefore, whilst they are in amazement in suspense, to settle their minds one way, either by punishment or pardon."

To keep Japan from becoming a military menace in the Pacific, is not going to be as difficult as some people think. Here is what I think is a very sensible suggestion. It is simple and direct. For fifteen years, but Japan on probation. During that period, Japan will not be allowed to have any merchant marine. Japan may maintain some small fishing boats and a few inter-island steamers of small tonnage. But that is all. Japan can neither build, own, nor man, any merchant freighter or passenger ship. For fifteen years, the only way a Japanese can go to sea is as a passenger on someone else's boat.

The elimination of Japan as a maritime power will not bring about the hardships that most people suppose. Japan is almost self-supporting. She imports only ten to twelve per cent of her food, and most of that is Korean rice. Japan, if she put the energy and technique which she has squandered in making armaments, into the production of foodstuffs, could be self-sufficient.

The startling fact of Japanese economy, and the thing which has made Japan appear so subservient to foreign trade, is that the ruling class of Japan has never made any effort to develop the home market. They kept the standard of living incredibly low so that they could export goods, and in turn buy machine tools, oil, and scrap iron. Once the Japanese economy is freed of the burden of armaments, Japan can become self sufficient and with a higher standard of living than she has enjoyed during the war. I think we can be quite ruthless with the shipping, armament factories, and foreign trade of Japan, because I believe that they have not helped raise the standard of the Japanese people, but only the standard of Japanese armaments.

Taking away all her ships, does not mean that we withdraw and leave Japan to her own internal devices. By no means. We must set Japan on the path towards Democracy and international co-operation. This brings up the question of the Emperor.

The Japanese Emperor is unique among the dictators against which we fight, in that he represents a continuity with the past. He does not stand for a repudiation of the previous regimes. He is also unique in being a spiritual leader, and the head of his nation's organized religion. He is a god, the head of an organized religious structure that is an essential part of the national structure.

Because of this, some Far East experts want the United Nations to retain the Japanese Emperor as a puppet, after we have captured the country. They say that the Emperor's role is traditionally that of a puppet; when big business ruled Japan, the Emperor was a puppet to big business; when the military took over, he became a puppet to the military; and when we take over, there is no reason why he should not be a puppet of ours.

At first this sounds like a good idea. But it is not. I am becoming convinced that we cannot deal with the Japanese within the frame-work of their fairy-land ways of thought. It is rather like trying to re-educate Germany with the structure of the Nazi ideology. You are not getting anywhere if you try to confute an absurdity within the confines of an absurdity.

We should treat the Emperor precisely as we would treat any other responsible leader of a cruel people. His palace should be bombed, and when we catch him, he should be publicly tried-preferably before Korean, Chinese, and Philippino judges.

It might be the best thing for the world and for Japan, if the Japanese got the intellectual shock of their life out of this war. We can't afford to have a nation of 80 million people, strategically located and technically sinfull still believing in an Emperor as God. The best way to get rid of that nonsense is for him to stand public trial and to be judged by the so-called "inferior" people he tried to enslave.

Another absurdity which we should eliminate in this process of education by the introduction of cold reality, is this idea that no Japanese ever surrenders or is ever taken prisoner of war. That is a legend perpetrated by generals to keep generals in power. We should put some effort into the elimination of that legend.

I suggest that when the Japanese surrender, as they will, we take every man remaining alive in their army and navy and make him a prisoner of war. This is especially important in the case of all the officers. We can release the men after a week or so-the officers we should hold for atrocity trials and release, but slowly. In any case, we must make crystal clear to all Japan that they did surrender and that indeed, the whole Japanese army and navy was a prisoner of war of the United Nations.

One last suggestion in the treatment of Japan. The political police must be abolished. They should be tried for the atrocities they have committed on their own people. Tens of thousands of Japanese are in concentration camps. Japan is honeycombed with the so-called "thought police" who ferret out "dangerous thoughts". This Oriental gestapo should be eliminated as ruthlessly as the German gestapo. If we do this, we shall certainly gain good-will from the common people of Japan, who have suffered at their hands.

The fourth suggestion is one I hesitate to advance, in speaking before The Empire Club of Canada. It is that when quarrels arise between the Imperial Powers and their colonies in the Pacific, the United States should not take the side of the Imperial Powers.

Asia will be in a great ferment after this war. Peoples who heretofore were content to stand aside in docility, from now on will start demanding participation in business and government. The situation will lend itself to all sorts of demagogic leaders. All the ancient errors of colonial administration will be pointed out and the corrections made by the newly returning colonial administrators will be howled at as insufficient and insincere.

Colonial problems of the Pacific are innumerable and complex. We may rest assured that the Japanese with their cry of "Asia for the Asiatics" will not have made the lot of the returning colonial administrators any easier. While each Colonial Power, and each colony controlled by the Colonial Power presents difficult problems, a few general things can be pointed out.

One of them is that in the Pacific we can now look for the start of nationalism-a disease which heretofore has not plagued that area. Another is that the Colonial Powers are going to find it increasingly difficult to maintain a foothold on the continental mainland of Asia. Those colonies which are on the mainland: India, Burma, the Malay States, and French Indo-China, are precisely those in which there has been, and probably will continue to be, the most trouble.

A third general statement is that of all the colonial questions affecting the Pacific, that of India is the most important-even though India is not on the Pacific itself. The solution, or lack of a solution to the Indian problem, will have a profound effect on China, indeed all over Asia. There is not time to discuss the problems of specific colonies. Almost each one is a separate case and will require separate handling. In the Pacific, because of its rising nationalism, and because of the upheavals created by Japan, few, if any, of the colonies are going to be satisfied with the old status quo.

On the other hand, there is no visible indication that the Imperial Powers intend to soon release any of their colonies. Unless some unforseen correction is applied, I think colonial troubles in the Pacific are inevitable. They will start as soon as the United Nations begin retaking heavily populated areas, and they will continue for years.

During these agitations and in these conflicts, I do not want the United States to ever take the part of the Colonial Power. The United States has to live in the Pacific and none of the other Colonial Powers do. We have an excellent reputation. I do not want us to spoil it. It is far more important to the future of the United States to have the good-will of the peoples of the Pacific than it is to have the good-will of the Empires in the Pacific.

My fifth suggestion is brief. Hawaii should become a State of the Union-our 49th State, and the United States should take over the Japanese Mandated Islands, and the Bonin Islands.

For a long time, there has been agitation in Hawaii for Statehood. Some people objected on the grounds of the large number of Japanese in Hawaii. Out of a total population of 423,000, there are 103,000 Caucasians, 157,000 Japanese. The native born Japanese on Hawaii have proved their Americanism in this war. The F.B.I. reports that there has not been one single act of sabotage committed by a native-born Japanese. The American method of Democratic indoctrination works. Today, thousands of Japanese are fighting and dying for the United States. The people of Hawaii, of all races, have certainly earned statehood. They should become an integral part of our Union.

I believe most everyone is agreed that the United States should take over the Japanese Mandated Islands. I think Australia and New Zealand would welcome the United States into the Japanese mandated group because what they want is security which the United States could give them.

If we take over those islands and the Bonin Islands, and the Chinese take over Formosa and Riu Kin group of islands, as is guaranteed to them by the Cairo Conference, and if the Russians should take over all of the Shakhalin and some of the northern Kurile' Islands, Japan will be left pretty well defenceless--and at the same time, we shall be removing practically none of her economic assets.

When we take over the Mandated and Bonin Islands, we must make their political position absolutely clear. The native population of the Mandated Islands is roughly 120,000; that of the Bonin Islands 5,000. The Japanese on those islands should be returned to Japan. The natives should become United States citizens, with full rights, the same as the citizens of Puerto Rico. It should be announced that these islands are not colonies. The United States should never take over a colony. These islands are bases. They should be under naval administration, the same as Guam was before the war.

Those are my suggestions of some of the points that a United States policy in the Pacific should embrace. I have purposely avoided all questions dealing with the setting up of international organizations in the Pacific or elsewhere. Questions of that intricacy, require a great deal of time to discuss and develop.

On these intricate questions, there are two major schools of thought. There are those who favor a regional federation, the type of Pacific organization hinted at in the recent Australia-New Zealand agreement, and there are those who favour an over-all Pacific organization. Closely connected with all this is the question of the international regulation of key air-bases in the Pacific. Certain islands, notably Hawaii, New Caledonia, and some of the Mariana Island group must be open to the planes of all nations if there is to be much trans-Pacific air travel.

But while these are important questions, and certainly the international organization, if any, is important, I don't think we should forget that most important will be the future direction and development of Russia and China. In looking at the Pacific, Americans are too much inclined to look at the atolls and the oceans. It is not on the atolls, it is on the mainland of. Asia that the future of the Pacific will be determined.

We--that is the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, all of South America--we who front on the Pacific, will have a fearful responsibility after this war. We must give indication to the newly developing peoples of Asia that we genuinely want to co-operate with them. We must work to relieve racial tensions, we must refrain from playing Oriental politics by pushing one nation against another, we must work to relieve colonial tensions, and we must attempt some over-all scheme of security.

In the Pacific, the age of domination is gone, and the time for co-operation is here. I am afraid that if in the next twenty years we do not set up a friendly Pacific basin, we shall not have another chance to do so for a long time to come.

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A United States Policy for the Pacific


The speaker's contention that what we do in the Pacific after this war is far more important than what we do in Europe, and why he believes this to be so. Asia about to take a great leap across the centuries, from medievalism to modernity. Population changes in the next 20 to 40 years. The lack of preparation by the Western Nations for the changes that will occur. The possibility of establishing a stable basis for international cooperation and trade between the Oriental and Occidental nations, and upon what that depends. Assumptions for a discussion of United States Policy in the Pacific: that the Japanese war will be won; that the U.S. will participate in Pacific affairs with sufficient energy and tenacity to carry out a policy; that co-operation between the four key powers, Russia, the U.S., China, and England, is possible. Five points that the speaker believes should be incorporated in a U.S. Foreign Policy in the Pacific, with a discussion of each. First, that the U.S. and the United Nations should issue a declaration embodying the principle of equality of all races and peoples. Second, that the U.S. should work for a strong, unified China. Third, a weak Japan. Fourth, that when quarrels arise between the Imperial Powers and their colonies in the Pacific, the U.S. should not take the side of the Imperial Powers. Fifth, Hawaii should become a State of the Union, and the U.S. should take over the Japanese Mandated Islands, and the Bonin Islands. The issue of an international organization in the Pacific, or elsewhere. The responsibility that will belong to the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and all of South America after the war in terms of the Pacific.