Canadian Diplomacy and Responsibility

In talking to you on this subject I thought myself faced with the alternative of being rhetorical or to be charged with being dull, and I decided to take a risk of being dull, because rhetoric is generally bounded with sentimentality, and the discussion of these questions has suffered a great deal from sentimentality. On the one hand we have the sentimentality of nationalism, and on the other the sentimentality of imperialism. Both are silly; both are mischievous; and each, I think, is as silly and mischievous as the other; so you are not to expect me to rhapsodise on the national greatness of Canada on the one hand, or on the glory of the Empire on the other. Of course I do not mean that sentiment has not its proper place provided it is rationally simple and its implications are understood. At the same time I would like to say that these two sentiments-nationalism and imperialism -should not, in my mind, be placed in opposition to one another. I believe as strongly as anybody in the national greatness, the national consciousness, of Canada, and I believe at the same time that, in preserving the unity of the Empire, that nationality will find its fullest expression and its surest guarantee.

There is one more thing I have to say in my own defence. I am afraid that as I go on some of you may think that I am a little pedantic, a little lawyer-like, a little professorial, if I insist somewhat strongly upon accuracy in the use of words; but I will do so, because this discussion has suffered very much from loose and inaccurate language, and the loose and inaccurate use of technical terms. Words are important only because they indicate things, and if we are careless about our words it generally means that we are loose in our ideas about the things for which they stand.

Many centuries ago there was a famous theological controversy which turned upon two words which were only separated by one letter of the Greek alphabet; and Gibbon, the historian, poked fun at them, saying that it was perfectly ridiculous that people should work themselves up into such a state about the differences over a single letter. Well, to my mind such criticisms are very cheap, very easy, and very foolish. It is very much as if a man living in Ottawa were to say that there was only the difference of one letter between going to Hull and going to Hell. So will you forgive me if at times I seem to be a little pedantic in my insistence in the right use of words.

I am going to put what I have to say today in the form of two questions. First of all, how far has Canada already gone along the path of independent diplomacy? Secondly, how far are we prepared to go? The first is a question of fact; the second is a question of policy. I put them in that order because I know from experience that there is much misunderstanding about the facts; and unless we get our facts right our policy is very apt to be wrong.

Let me begin, then, by saying that the word diplomacy covers many things. It covers, in the first place, and the most obvious place, the making of treaties and other international agreements; and in the second place, and more important, it covers a vast amount of dull routine work which the newspapers tell you nothing at all. I insist upon that because, to judge from newspaper discussion-and I hope the pressmen will forgive me for saying this-one would almost think that diplomacy had nothing to do but to make treaties, because we never hear of Canadian diplomacy except in connection with a treaty or agreement. The routine work of diplomacy is very inconspicuous, but it is extremely important.

What is a treaty? In the strict sense of the word it is an agreement couched in a certain solemn form, between two sovereign states; and a sovereign state is one which is known as such by other sovereign states. There is no other meaning to international sovereignty, and there is no other meaning to the word treaty. From that it follows that Canada, not being so recognized by other nations, is not a sovereign state at present, and therefore cannot make a treaty. That is the first thing. She can influence a treaty; she can negotiate a treaty; but she cannot make a treaty, or be a party to a treaty.

Now, a treaty falls into three parts. First of all there is negotiation; then there is the signature; and thirdly-and most important of all-there is the ratification. Those first two stages-negotiation and signature-are conducted, under our constitution, by plenipotentiaries appointed by the king, and they cannot be appointed by any one else. Those plenipotentiaries are appointed under the King's own hand and the great seal of the United Kingdom. The Governor General of Canada has no more power than you and I have to commission a plenipotentiary to negotiate a treaty; and a document issued for that purpose under the great seal of Canada would not be recognized by any other nation in the world.

Every plenipotentiary carries a document which is called, in the technical language of diplomacy, a Full Power; and if you will pardon me I will read part of one of those Full Powers in order to emphasize what I have said, namely, that it comes entirely from the King, and that the party to a treaty is not Canada or Australia, but Great Britain. I have the text of the Full Power issued in connection with the Halibut Treaty, which you all know very well: -

And it ends up by saying:-

IN WITNESS WHEREOF We have caused the Great Seal of Our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to be affixed to these Presents, which We have signed with Our Royal Hand.

That treaty concerned Canadian waters only, yet there is not a word about Canada in the whole of it; it is purely a treaty between the King on one side and the United States on the other. Of course it is quite possible for the King, as in that particular case, to nominate a Canadian Statesman as his representative, just as he might nominate a Scotchman; but in the eye of the law that nominee would represent not Canada or Scotland or Ireland, but the King of the British Empire, as a whole.

Now, so far we have reached the stage at which, in cases where circumstances permit,--that qualification is very important, and I will call attention to that later--in cases where circumstances permit, Canada's Dominion Representatives may be commissioned to negotiate and to sign treaties. The Halibut Treaty is an example of a treaty signed by a Canadian representative because the Canadian Government, I think unwisely in that instance, objected to the British Ambassador being allowed to sign it at all. In cases like the Five Peace Treaties negotiated in Paris in 1919, or the group of Disarmament and similar treaties negotiated in Washington in 1922, the Dominion representatives and the British representatives joined in the signature of the treaty. But, whoever they are, and whomever they represent in a public sense, it is the British Empire which is bound in the eyes of international law.

Then when a treaty has been negotiated and when it has been signed you come to ratification. Again I have to insist a little upon the accurate use of words because in the public discussion you will find phrases speaking of the treaty being ratified by the Canadian Parliament or the British Parliament or some other Parliament; whereas, under our constitution, a treaty can be ratified by the King and by the King alone under his own hand and the great seal of the United Kingdom. That is very important. The Canadian Parliament or any other Parliament may pass a resolution recommending ratification, but that is all we can do in the eyes of international law. And further, remember that a treaty does not become binding by a signature, but only by ratification; until it is ratified it is not binding on anyone at all.

Now, there is another point, about our diplomatic practice in the Empire. For the last thirty years or so it has been the practice, in negotiating general treaties which affect the Empire as a whole, to insert saving clauses which reserve to the Dominions the right of saying that it shall not apply to this Dominion or to that until the Dominion in question has consented. That has been the common practice for the last thirty years, and the best and most recent example of it is the Treaty of Locarno which was negotiated last year.

There, again, is a definition which requires careful attention. The fact that it does not apply to a particular Dominion until the Dominion has consented does not mean that it is not binding on that Dominion. Every treaty negotiated by British representatives is binding on the British Empire as a whole, although its text may only apply to certain parts of the Empire. The distinction is very important, because if you consider such a case as the Locarno Treaty, in which obligation may arise upon Great Britain to go to war with some other power in pursuance of the terms of the Treaty, the result is this-that if war is declared by Great Britain, under the terms of the Treaty of Locarno, the whole Empire automatically becomes at war; the only privilege reserved to the Dominions being one which is already well understood-that they need not take an active part in that war unless they feel inclined to do so. But they are subject to all the other circumstances of belligerents; that is to say, that Canadian commerce would be attacked on the high seas, that Canadian property in enemy countries could be confiscated, that Canadian citizens in enemy countries could be treated as alien enemies and interned. All those consequences follow, whether we like it or not. All that is open to us today is to say that we shall not take any part or send any active belligerents.

I should notice, in passing, that there are certain kinds of informal national agreements which are not treaties, and to which what I have said does not apply. A very good example of this is the agreement which was negotiated between the Canadian and German governments in 1910 relating to the tariff. The discussions were conducted by Mr. Fielding for the Canadian Government and by the German Consul-General in Montreal on the other side. Neither of those gentlemen carried any Full Power, and they had no diplomatic status, and they had no power to make a treaty binding upon Canada alone. A breach of an agreement so made would not have been a breach of treaty, and would not have given any ground for international complication. All that it amounted to was an undertaking on the part of certain officials that they would use their best efforts to induce their respective governments to take certain action.

The next year Sir Wilfrid Laurier negotiated a somewhat similar agreement, perhaps more well-known in our history, with certain Canadian Ministers at Washington, which is known to you all as the Reciprocity Agreement. That agreement was very shortly followed by a change of government in Canada; and of course there was no obligation upon Sir Robert Borden and his government to continue the personal policy of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. If that arrangement had been a treaty it would have been binding on the country, irrespective of any change of government; but, being no more than a personal agreement, it was open to the succeeding government to change its mind.

So far I have been speaking of treaties and other international agreements. Now I want to look, for a moment, at what is really the more important business of diplomacy-the daily duties which attract very little attention. Upon that I shall say very little. As things stand at present that is practically entirely done for us by Great Britain. It is work which takes the full time and undivided attention of a large body of exceptionally well-trained men. It is not a part-time job. It cannot be done by a minister in the intervals of other duties. The British Foreign Office retains a very large staff of highly-trained and well-paid officials who are intimately conversant with the affairs of practically every country in the world; and the size of that office may be indicated by saying that the annual cost of maintaining it is about $1,500,000. In addition to that Great Britain maintains for the benefit of the Empire as a whole, a complete diplomatic staff at her own expense, the cost of which is about $8,500,000. The total cost of British Diplomacy, borne by Great Britain alone, is about $10,000,000. In Canada at present we do practically none of that part of the work. We have a very small department of External Affairs in Ottawa, which consists, I think, of two chief officials, one a very eminent man, Dr. Skelton, as you know, and a young lawyer and a few clerks. The cost is very small. Outside of Canada we have nothing at all except commissioners who are sent to various countries, but who are not diplomatic officials and have no diplomatic function.

A few years ago we obtained from the Crown permission to nominate a Resident Minister-not an Ambassador as the newspapers so frequently say-at Washington, if we should desire to do so, to assist the British Ambassador in relation to Canadian diplomatic work. So far no advantage of that position has been taken by Canada, although the Irish Free State has already nominated such a Resident Minister. But whoever he is, whether he is Canadian or British, he carries credentials granted by the King, and represents the King, not the Irish Free State or the Governor-General of Canada.

I must come back to the qualification I made about Canadian Dominion representatives being recognized in Paris in negotiations, so far as circumstances permit. At Paris in 1919 and at Washington in 1922 the Dominion representatives were invited to take part in the negotiations as part of the British Delegation. In a case like that of the Halibut Treaty the negotiation was conducted entirely by a Canadian representative. At Lausanne in 1923 Dominion representatives were not invited. What is the reason for the difference? The answer to that question can be given in a word or two. The treaty of Lausanne was a matter of emergency. The treaties of Versailles and Washington were not. The Treaty of Versailles and the other treaties which went with it called the Treaties of Peace. But that is only technically true. The real Peace was made on Armistice Day in November, 1918. On that Armistice Day the enemy was disarmed, his country was occupied, and he was helpless. Peace existed in fact, and the only work that the host of plenipotentiaries at Paris had to do was to define the terms upon which peace should continue, not the terms upon which it should be made, for that existed already. When you come to Lausanne in 1923 you find a very different sate of affairs. At Lausanne we were face to face not with a conquered, disarmed enemy, but with a victorious enemy who was in actual occupation of conquered territory and was willing to go considerably further. Our opponents were led by a man who, whether we consider him as a statesman or as a soldier, must be reckoned, I think, as one of the few very great men who by the circumstances of this war have been able to stamp their personality permanently upon the world. In the space of a few weeks Mustapha Kemal had driven his enemy from the gates of his own capital into the sea; Asia Minor was under his rule already, and the neighboring part of Europe was practically at his mercy. In those circumstances the making of peace was not a matter of leisurely discussion during seven or eight months, but was a matter of immediate and vital urgency. Well, Dominion plenipotentiaries were not invited to assist in that conference; and why? Because their presence there would have been either superfluous or embarrassing. If we were to go and listen and do nothing but agree with the British plenipotentiaries their presence was superfluous. If we were to go there and advocate a somewhat different policy, the only result would have been to make the discussions more difficult and more prolonged. The moral of this story is obvious-that we cannot press the precedents set at Versailles and at Washington too far; we cannot spread them to cover every possible case.

Where there is ample time for discussion, and where the interests of the Dominions are concerned, Dominion representatives can be and should be invited to take part in the discussions, and the result of the discussions can be and should be submitted to the judgment of the Dominion Parliaments. But where the circumstances call for immediate, decisive and united action we must then either be prepared to follow the lead of Great Britain, or to accept the responsibilities of independent action. I see no other alternative.

Let me sum up what I have said so far. I think we have reached these points-first, Canada has obtained, as things stand, the right to nominate her own representatives to negotiate and sign-subject to the King's ratification-any treaty in which her interests are solely concerned; it being of course understood, as a matter of courtesy and unity, that she keep the British Ambassador concerned fully informed of the progress of the negotiations.

Secondly, Canada has obtained the right to be invited to take part in the negotiations and signature of general treaties which affect her interests, provided that the circumstances of the particular case will permit.

Thirdly, Canada has obtained the right to demand that general treaties shall be so drafted that they will not apply to her without her consent, unless they involve questions of war or peace; and in case of war she has the further right to abstain, if she so desires, from active participation.

Fourthly, Canada has obtained the right to nominate a Resident Minister to assist the British Ambassador at Washington if she desire to do so.

Fifthly and lastly, I may say that Canada has obtained the general right to be kept as fully informed of the general course of British Foreign Policy as is possible in the circumstances.

That, I think, is as far as we have got at present. Now I come to the second point-How far are we prepared to go? Many suggestions are made, some of which are more worthy of attention than others.

The first suggestion I will not dwell upon very long It is endorsed by one very well-known name-Mr. J. S. Ewart, of Ottawa,-who considers that Canada ought to have a separate voice upon questions of war and peace. Of course that means-and I think Mr. Ewart understands that it means-independence, separation complete; because there is no unity of any kind unless there is unity in the face of external danger. You can have unity that admits of a great variety and internal diversity and internal autonomy: but if you have no external unity you have no unity at all. Now, I do not think I need take up your time in discussing that at length, because I gather that the name of your Club indicates that you would answer that suggestion in the negative.

Next suggestion is this--that we should maintain, so far as we can do so, separate diplomatic services of our own. That, again, seems to me to be open to objection. To begin with, there is the question of expense. I do not dwell upon that, because I imagine that if we thought it worth having we would be prepared to pay for it. But there is this further question: What is our diplomatic Service at Ottawa and abroad to do? It must either agree with the British Ambassadors or it must disagree. There, again, you have the old dilemma. You know the old story of the burning of the library at Alexandria many centuries ago, when Caliph Omar laid down the rule that either the books agreed with the Koran, in which case they were superfluous, or they disagreed, in which case they should be destroyed. We are faced with a similar dilemma; if our representatives are only to say "Ditto" to the British Ambassador on every occasion they are superfluous. If, on the other hand, they disagreed, you get the question are you prepared to push the disagreement to the point of independence, or are you prepared, after a certain amount of grumbling, to come in? You cannot get away from that dilemma. Great Britain has raised no objection to our nominating a Resident Minister at Washington, but I can see that she might raise objection to it. We are in fact saying to Great Britain, if we insist upon it, " We would like to have a Resident Minister at Washington because it happens to suit us to have one there;" and the reply might be, "Will you please have one and go on paying for it?" That is the position we have taken up. No formal objection has been raised by Britain on that question, but I think it might well be raised.

But surely this is the most serious objection-that the Dominion should be called into continuous consultation; that they should have what Sir Robert Borden describes as an adequate voice in the moulding and control of British Foreign Policy. Sir Robert Borden's phrase was taken up by the Imperial Conference in 1917, which passed a resolution in favour of the Dominions having an adequate voice in foreign policy and foreign relations; and it has been left at that for nine years; nothing has been done to translate that generality into effect, the reason being that once you depart from the region of generalities and come down to facts you find it extremely difficult. The difficulty is not so much theoretical as practical. It lies in the nature of the j practical work of diplomacy. Look at Lord Grey's recently published Memoirs, and you will find Lord Grey's office hours, when there was no crisis on and when Parliament was not sitting, were something like these:-he was in the foreign office usually from 11 in the morning till 7 in the evening; then he had two hours' work a after dinner, and another hour and a half before breakfast in the morning. If the House of Commons was sitting, or there was anything special on, he had to work harder. Now, will you please try and imagine how, in the course of that day, Sir Edward Grey could have worked if he could not take a single step of importance without consulting all the representatives of the Dominions?

Suppose the French Ambassador or the American Ambassador comes into the Foreign Secretary's room and these things happened not at long intervals, but every day-and says, "Upon this problem this is the view of my government; what is the view of yours?" The British Foreign Secretary would have to answer like this, "I am very much obliged to you for giving me such a clear and concise statement of the views of your government; and I will tell you the views of my government when I have consulted the representatives of Canada, Australia, India, New Zealand and South Africa. "

Obviously the thing cannot be done. I mean if you insist that British Diplomacy is never to take an important step until it has obtained the consent of all the Dominions you are in effect saying that British Diplomacy must work with its hands tied behind its back. That is what it comes to; and that is why no scheme has been devised or can be devised which will enable the Dominions to take an active part in the daily routine business of diplomacy. Of course you can say that Canada should be consulted when her interests are affected. So far as possible that is done already, but the difficulty about diplomacy is that you never know where it begins and where it ends. Something may arise in China or Turkey today which may seem to have nothing whatever to do with Canada; but it may have a great deal to do with Canada a month hence. Take, as an example, that recent outbreak between Greece and Bulgaria. There was a war just starting, which was nipped in the bud by the League of Nations. If it had not been nipped in the bud it might have involved the whole world. But what did that war start with? It started from this simple circumstance-that a Greek corporal and Bulgarian soldier were making love to the same girl; and they pushed the disagreement to the point of one of them shooting the other; and that simple thing might have involved the whole world. So you can never say where diplomacy will stop when once it has begun.

That is why I say that it is very difficult, once you come to deal with action as distinct from theory and advice, in conceiving of means by which the Dominion representatives can take an active and continuous part in British foreign policy.

So far as consultation is possible, consultation exists already. The British Foreign Office do their best, I think, to keep us informed of such things as interest us, so far as the circumstances of cases admit. The machinery of consultation might possibly be improved, but it cannot be very substantially altered in its nature. That is the reason why I feel skeptical about these continual suggestions that are made to the effect that the Dominions ought to be consulted, or ought to have an adequate voice in the whole of British Foreign Policy. The--thing is not so much a theoretical impossibility as a physical.

Well, that is really all I have to say. In conclusion I would just like to mention two different movements which, since the outbreak of the war, have been brought to birth-two quite distinct movements in the world. One movement has resulted in the creation of a vast number of new small states, bringing with them new problems of all kinds, new citizenship, new cultures, new passports, new tariffs, new government officialsall kinds of development.

On the other hand you have the great unifying forces drawing nations together in the League of Nations and in the World Court and various activities connected therewith. The one tendency to a large extent counteracts the other.

Now, in the British Empire, which existed before the League of Nations, you already have an organization, rather casually formed, but still an organization of some kind, which has realized, in fact, the difficult possibility of reconciling those apparent opposites-of national independence and external unity; and all I would suggest is this, that while insisting to the utmost upon our national dignity, upon our national consciousness, we would be extremely unwise to press our claims to a point which would imperil that greater unity upon which, in the last resort, the existence of our own nationality depends.

MR. WILLIAM DAVIDSON, K.C., expressed the hearty thanks of the Club for the instructive and inspiring address.