What Will the Baltic States Do?

CANON WOODCOCK: As I review the career of our distinguished guest today, I realize perhaps why it is that I am here, and not the President of this Club. He probably saw how difficult it would be for him to give even a cursory idea to the audience of the very distinguished career of our guest of honour!

Our guest-speaker today, as you see, is not an old man. When I think of what he has done, I expected to find a very old man, because he has compressed into those few years of his life some very wonderful achievements. In the first place, he is a scholar of international reputation. Having been born in Warsaw, of course he solicits our sympathy immediately, and we are delighted to welcome him for that reason, if for no other. He represents that war-stricken city, that city of heroic people who are martyrs in this our cause, as well as theirs. He represents them before us today and we welcome him because of that. He was Lecturer of Economics in the University of Geneva in 1932. He was a Fellow of the Rockefeller Foundation of the United States of America, 1933-35, and Assistant Professor in International Economic Relations of the Graduate Institute of International Studies at Geneva in 1935-38; and visiting Lecturer in Economics at the University of California in the spring of 1939. He was Consultant Expert at the 1937 and 1938 sessions of the International Studies Conference. He has published several books, well known to students of economics. His latest is one that has "come out in the spring of this very year, entitled, "International Monetary Economics", published in the spring of 1939.

Dr. Heilperin is very interesting to us because he has just come from a long journey, visiting the chief cities of Europe, and so he has something to tell us that is very fresh concerning the state of affairs in Europe. We welcome him here today, not only because of what he is, but also because of himself. His charming personality, I am sure, will impress everybody as he proceeds with his speech. I have the very great honour, as well as pleasure, of introducing to the Empire Club of Canada, our guest of honour, Dr. Michael Heilperin. (Applause)

DR. MICHAEL HEILPERIN: I thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman, for these warm words of welcome, and you gentlemen for your expression of sympathy with my country. This is a very great comfort to me for which I am most grateful.

My subject today deals with what, until recently, we would have supposed to be the backwater of major international conflicts-the Baltic Sea and the countries that surround it.

The Baltic region had for a long time past lost its strategic role in international affairs, yet now, in the past few weeks it has almost monopolized the headlines. The subject on which I am to address you reads: "What will the Baltic States do?" What I will speak about will perhaps be better expressed by another question, "What may happen to the Baltic States?", because very much may happen to the Baltic States, but perhaps there isn't very much they can do about it themselves.

What are the Baltic States, in the first place? They are a number of small countries; some of them are known to be democracies; they have not very much military power; they are located around the Baltic Sea. I would consider as Baltic States Denmark and Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, not to forget Poland, and not to forget Germany and Russia. They are all States of the Baltic. Nevertheless, when one speaks of the "Baltic States", one usually refers to the three small states that have together a population a little smaller than greater New York, or greater London, and which are the centre of diverse cultural and linguistic interests-Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and, more recently one is inclined to include Finland, which I think is quite legitimate, because not only are the Finns first cousins of the Estonians in origin but they are today facing a very similar type of problem. To this I would like to add that Poland should also be considered as one of the Baltic States, on account of centuries' old connections and associations which I will try to explain presently.

You may ask quite legitimately, not only what are the Baltic States? but also, why are the Baltic States? Why are there on the map these small, separate countries--the Baltic countries--which were not there before the war of 1914-18 and which have emerged as independent political units after that war? Why are there so many of them and why are they so small?

Well, all these countries have an old history and even though until the post-war period they never have had a full-fledged political independence and were controlled, now by Danes, now by Swedes, now by Poles, now by Russians, they have maintained their particular characteristics, their language, their culture.

Now, who are they? The Estonians are very closely related to the Finns; they came to this part of Europe from Asia and are a part of a Mongolian group which has become very strongly assimilated with the people of Europe proper.

The Latvians and the Lithuanians are of a very different origin but they are not Slavs, either. They constitute, amid Slavs and Germans, a very determined and distinctive ethnic and cultural group. The Latvian and the Lithuanian languages have perhaps more in common with each other than they have either with Polish or German or Estonian. The Lithuanian language is considered ^by scholars to bear a closer relationship to the old Sanskrit than any other European language.

Now, those groups fell in the 12th and 13th centuries, under the domination partly of the Danes, (who were at that time expanding), and partly of the Order of Teutonic Knights. The Danes controlled part of present Estonia, surrendering later to the Swedes. Estonia, after many changes of fate, finally passed from the Swedish to the Russian domination in 1721.

Latvia also had a very disturbed history. Having been conquered by the Teutonic Order it was, for a time, part of the same political unit with Estonia. Eventually while Estonia passed under Swedish rule, Latvia was largely incorporated into the Polish-Lithuanian Federation. Livonia-part of present-day Latvia-was annexed by Sweden in 1621 and by Russia in 1710. During the 19th century, all of present Latvia was under Russian rule.

With regard to Lithuania, its history was rather different from that of Latvia and Estonia, because in the 14th century, it became united with Poland by personal, monarchic union, and in the 16th century, Poland and Lithuania became a Federation. From then onward Poland and Lithuania were a federal state. This is important in view of certain possibilities in the future.

Through all this history these States retained their personalities as social groups. During the World War their territories were occupied in turn by Germans and by Soviets and by Germans again and finally liberated. After the War, they organized into independent democratic states. They all started by adopting an advanced model of democracy and each of them developed very soon, with the exception of Estonia, perhaps, a certain "crown of democracy" along with accentuated nationalistic tendencies. This was unfortunately a corollary of the growth of nationalism in the post-war era. However, they improved their economy, which is mostly agricultural. They developed their cultural life. They embarked, for the first time in their history, on a fuller independent existence.

The foregoing observations furnish an answer to the questions, what and why are the Baltic States.

Let me now say a word about Finland. For 110 years previous to the Treaty of Versailles, Finland was an autonomous duchy under the control of Russia. All these four countries and Poland, (to the extent to which she was under the Russian rule before the World War), were the victims of the Imperialism of the Czars, which in the 17th and particularly the 18th century spread very widely to the west as well as to the east. Gradually all the aforementioned countries fell under its domination.

This was not all. In addition, these countries were exposed to the eastward expansion of the Germans. The so-called Baltic Barons were heirs to the Teutonic Order; after the secularization of the Order, its lands became a vassal duchy of Poland and later of Prussia. Thus came into being the so-called East Prussia. Owing to the German memories which were very much alive in these countries, they were aware in the post-war years not only of having freed themselves from the Russian domination, but also of having avoided being taken over into the orbit of German influences.

So, after the war, the history of all these small countries was one of trying to consolidate, to develop their national life, while at the same time there was a mounting fear of further difficulties and invasions. The fear, I should say, was growing as time went on, especially from 1933 onward, and particularly with respect to Germany. Germany had developed. a tendency to take under the protective wings of the Reich all Germans, wherever they lived, so that some alarm was felt in those countries. With the passage of time, this has developed into a serious menace.

Now, those various groups of countries around the Baltic Sea, the Scandinavian group and the Baltic countries proper, have made various attempts after the World War to draw more closely together, realizing that for economic reasons, as well as for political reasons, reasons of safety, union might increase their strength as well as their prosperity. This co-operation as regards the Scandinavian countries, resulted in the establishment of the "Oslo Group", started as an attempt to lower tariffs in their reciprocal trade relations, and developed into a system of regular consultations among their Foreign Ministers and, more recently on certain occasions, among the heads of their States.

Finland occupies in this picture a somewhat particular position; it is a Scandinavian country, on account of its Swedish minority and general affinity and common ties of interest with Sweden and Norway (particularly as regards their Northern sections). On the other hand, it is a Baltic country on account of its close affinity with the Estonians, and political dangers to which both are exposed. It is a fact that geographically Finland and Estonia face each other across the Gulf of Finland, which is the outlet leading from Leningrad into the Baltic Sea.

Now, this is the situation and it must be said that the Scandinavian countries have on the whole been as successful in their co-operation as the "Baltic States" have been unsuccessful. Various formulae were adopted, various methods of approach were chosen in turn; it is impossible to describe and analyze them within the time limit of this address; it suffices to mention that none was crowned with success.

Successful or not, these various attempts expressed an inherent desire for greater unity, a feeling of solidarity and were indicative of a certain trend toward closer association. Now, Poland, situated as she was between Germany and Russia, that is to say in the same position as that of the small Baltic States, felt that there was a good case for a general unity of policies among that group of countries, Poland considered herself a Baltic State an, I think, rightly so. Not only her past history but her present situation makes Poland a member of the "Baltic States". Living as it were, between Scylla and Charybdis, Germany and Russia, all these countries must find it imperitive to collaborate closely with one another to maintain their independence.

It may well be that the only formula that could have had a real chance of success would have been one going the whole way toward unifying those countries into a Federal State. Maybe there was in recent years too many minor frictions and petty jealousies-and a regrettable lack of mutual confidence. In brief, one didn't succeed in bringing about a closer collaboration in spite of that line of efforts which started very soon after the war and didn't finish until recently. Even last year, it was one of the endeavours of the Polish Government to bring a closer union of the Baltic States with Poland and to extend it to Roumania and to the Black Sea and form in this way a block of countries which would control a sufficiently large area and dispose of a sufficient strength to be able to put a real barrier to both the Russian or the German expansion.

The history of all of this part of Europe is a history of a struggle against that eastward expansion by Germany and the westward expansion by Russia.

Now, how about the Scandinavian countries? They are not situated between Germany and Russia. Have they anything in common with the Baltic countries? Well, for various economic and strategic reasons, Denmark is threatened by Germany, entirely apart from the problems of the small Baltic States. Norway is out of such danger as regards her southern and western parts. The north of Norway, however, contains ice-free harbours, and ice-free harbours have long been coveted by the Russian Imperialism. Also in the North-east, there are the very rich iron ore deposits of Sweden. Both northern Sweden and northern Norway are neighbouring on Finland. Thus they are necessarily concerned with the fate of Finland, because anything that happens to Finland is likely, in the end, to affect their own position. This is the background for the recent conference of the three Scandinavian Kings with the President of Finland.

Now the picture becomes more complete, because we see that the problem of the Baltic States is one that extends directly or indirectly to all the small states in the Baltic. Denmark, as I said, is threatened for other reasons, but would be a necessary victim of an expanding Germany.

A new element in the picture was afforded by the adoption by Soviet Russia of an active expansionist policy. This modified profoundly the scope and gravity of the Baltic problem. Until last September the only fear of the Baltic States was an expansion of Germany, and they may have even considered that Russia might under certain conditions help to protect them against the German expansion. What they envisaged as more likely than that was their becoming a battle-field in a conflict between Germany and Russia. What they did not envisage was a simultaneous expansion, without conflict, of both Germany and Soviet Russia, that is to say, a revival of the situation existing in the 18th century. We don't know whether it is the Imperialism of the Czars that has revived, or whether there are other explanations for the policies of the Kremlin. But it looks very much like a reversion to the pre-1914, and even to the pre-19th century tendencies.

Poland was the first victim of the return of Russia into the orbit of active politics. Were it not for Russia's entrance into the war with Poland, probably there would still be a very substantial defence front along the Bug and Narew Rivers. According to the available information, there were even in the middle of September, very serious extensive preparations for the establishment of such a defence-line east from Warsaw. So that after losing perhaps Warsaw to the invading German army, the Polish army might have entrenched itself along such a shorter front, which, on account of natural conditions and the winter climate more favourable to defensive warfare, would be much easier to defend than was the long western front. However it may be, this plan was broken the moment Soviet troops crossed Poland's eastern borders. It would have been impossible to fight at the same time against the German attack and against a Russian attack. So, if Poland has been partitioned and unable to defend the rest of its territory, it was in part due to the change in the orientation of the Russian policies.

This same change of orientation has caused the Kremlin to issue invitations in turn, to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and to acquire peacefully, since there was nothing else for the smaller countries to do than to accept Russian terms, naval and aerial bases in all these countries, and full control over various small but strategically highly important islands, as well as the right to fortify the southern border of Lithuania. Now an invitation has been extended to Finland, and if she should yield to similar demands, Russia will be in practical control of the area that she controlled before the war (except for a certain section of central Poland, including Warsaw and Lodz, which is under German occupation now, and was under Russian occupation before the war). If this is not Imperialism, I am not quite sure by what name I should call it. Anyhow, we shall have to wait and see.

Now, let us revert to the opening question: what can the Baltic countries do? From what I have said until now, it follows very clearly, I think, that there is not much they can do. I don't quite imagine how Estonia or Latvia with their little over two million inhabitants could have waged a war. Why, even the 20,000 Russian troops which are going to be lodged as garrisons in those countries are supposedly larger than their peace time standing armies, so they can't do anything else, but give in and hope that their cultural independence will be preserved. History will show whether that hope will be fulfilled or not. Anyway, it is the only hope under the circumstances.

If one were to draw a contrast between the position of those countries and that of the smaller countries in the west of Europe--Belgium and Holland--one would find that the latter have a much greater freedom of action than the small Baltic States. If they are menaced by Germany, Belgium and Holland can find help in a close co-operation with the two friendly democracies of Great Britain and France, and they know that even if they are overrun in the conflict, as Belgium was in the last war, they will be re-established after the victory of their democratic friends.

Imagine Lithuania asking Germany to protect her against Soviet Russia! Would this mean that Lithuania would keep her independence? No. It would only mean

having Germany as her master, rather than Russia. There is a choice in the case of the western countries. The small states in Eastern Europe are, in the short run, entirely helpless against the Imperialism of both Germany and Russia. What they can do is to maintain as much of their cultural life as possible and hope that the ultimate outcome of the conflict will restore them to free life, which is indeed also the only hope of my countrymen, and of all the other victims of expanding Germany, including Czechoslovakia.

All of this puts the problem of the small states of Europe in its proper perspective. The small states in Europe today cannot do very much. There are forces in action beyond

their own strength and beyond their combined strength, and the moment for a unification of their political, economic and military resources and bringing them under joint command, has been sadly missed.

So, today, the problem of those countries is essentially the problem of the future of international relations in Europe and, generally speaking, in the world. Will Europe

be thrown back to power politics at their crudest, and the reign of force at its most brutal? Or is the future to be the restoration of an international order in which all countries would combine their strength to guarantee the existence and the freedom of each? The latter was the formula adopted in establishing the League of Nations, the formula of collective security. For various reasons, the analysis of which would require more time, the system of collective security has not lived up to expectations in the last years. This was largely due to the fact that one cannot have a system of international organization that would mean something unless every country makes certain sacrifices of sovereignty, and those sacrifices were not made.

The history of the past twenty years that will be written some day will be indeed a very tragic history. The future of all the small states of Europe rests essentially on the outcome of this war, and this war can only lead to one of two solutions. Either the victory of powers that would establish brutal force, which would be a catastrophe for all of us, or the victory of the great western democracies. And this must result, if that is to have any lasting effect, in the restoration of a system of law in the world, or, of a system of collective security. Those countries which either have lost temporarily their independent life, on account of the system of collective security not having worked--Czechoslovakia and my own country, Poland-and countries which are losing much of their independence like the Baltic countries, and countries which may any day be invaded by fighting armies, like Holland and Belgium--all these countries must know, and all of them I am sure do know, that whatever ordeals they are going through now are sufferings in the noblest cause that there is: the cause of establishing order and freedom in the world.

So, what can the Baltic countries do? I think they can only try to understand where their present plight came from and, as soon as they are able again to act, become supporters of a general system of law and order. This may mean for northeastern Europe, for the Baltic countries, and perhaps for Czechoslovakia, a federal solution. A federal solution involves fundamentally three factors-an economic union, a joint foreign policy, and the pooling of military resources. If those countries can realize a sufficient degree of solidarity, they will enjoy much more security and will be able to achieve a higher degree of cultural and economic progress than they could realize otherwise.

All this is a matter for the future, and for the moment I am afraid there is nothing else for these countries to do than to keep abloom their cultures,, their ideals, their social

and community life, and hope that this war will be won by the Powers that will use victory for the re-establishment of law, order and freedom in the world. I thank you. (Applause)

CANON WOODCOCK: Dr. Heilperin, I am sure everybody is very grateful for this calm, reasoned, exposition of the situation in the Baltic States. I have myself admired your restraint, that, having been born in Warsaw, a native of that stricken country, you could stand here and so calmly, so quietly and so reasonably describe the situation that is existing there today. We feel that we are under obligation to you for giving us this authentic and authoritative information regarding the situation in the Baltic States.

I know it might be interesting to the Members of this Club if I mention that at the head table today we have guests who are representative of many nations, particularly concerned with the subject of the address. We are glad to welcome them here today.

We regret very much that the Committee in charge of broadcasting has not permitted this address to be broadcast today. It had to do with international affairs and was not submitted to the authorities and therefore could not be broadcast. We regret that very much indeed. We also regret that the speech to be delivered to this Club next Thursday by Mr. Cameron will not be broadcast.

On your behalf, I wish to thank Dr. Heilperin most heartily for his address today. (Applause)