Canada and the Commonwealth

LT. COL. LEGGE: Since its formation in 1903, this Club has been addressed by nearly all the men who have been Prime Ministers, Leaders of the Opposition and Secretaries of State for External Affairs. Today we are to hear a speech by the Honourable Lester Bowles Pearson, P.C., O.B.E., M.A., LL.D., M.P., who became world famous as Canada's illustrious Secretary of State for External Affairs and is now the Leader of Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition in the House of Commons.

Mr. Pearson's father was a clergyman and he therefore had the advantage of living in many different parts of Ontario as his father moved to new appointments. While a student, Mr. Pearson enlisted with the University of Toronto Hospital Unit with which he served in Salonika in 1915 and 1916. He was later commissioned in the Canadian Army and subsequently transferred to the Royal Flying Corps.

Following the war Mr. Pearson worked for a short time with a meat packing company in Chicago but he gave up the commercial life to attend St. John's College, Oxford, on a Massey Foundation Fellowship. He obtained a degree and also his cherished Oxford `blues' for hockey and lacrosse.

In 1923 Mr. Pearson was appointed to the staff of the Department of History in the University of Toronto, and ever since then Universities have maintained a keen interest in our speaker. The list of his honorary degrees reads like a catalogue of the world's great universities--Toronto, Yale, New York, Rochester, McMaster, Syracuse, Ceylon, Maine, Clark, Oxford, Columbia, Laval, Harvard, British Columbia, Manchester and Princeton. In addition he was elected an Honorary Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford, in 1946 and was appointed Chancellor of Victoria University in 1951.

In 1928, Mr. Pearson was attracted to the Department of External Affairs and served in Ottawa with Special Missions to Washington, London, The Hague and Geneva. During the days of the Bennett Government he became an expert with Royal Commissions and was made an officer of the British Empire for his special services to the Commissions which investigated Wheat Futures and Price Spreads.

Mr. Pearson's postings in External Affairs were in the main capitals of the English speaking world, London, Washington and Ottawa. In September 1948 the Rt. Hon. William Lyon Mackenzie King summoned him to the cabinet as Secretary of State for External Affairs and he was elected a Member of Parliament for the riding of Algoma East, which he has held in four subsequent general elections. In January 1958, Mr. Pearson was chosen for his present role as leader of the Liberal Party and of the Opposition in the House of Commons.

During his years with the Department of External Affairs, Mr. Pearson has led some notable Canadian Delegations: to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in 1954; to the Commonwealth Meeting in Colombo, Ceylon in 1950; to the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference in San Francisco in 1951 and to the Geneva Conference in 1954.

For his achievements Mr. Pearson was acclaimed by Canada's Allies when he was designated Chairman of the North Atlantic Council in 1951. He was recognized by the countries of the world when he was elected Chairman of the United Nations General Assembly in 1952. He was honoured in 1957 as the recipient of the universally accepted great distinction, The Nobel Peace Prize. Gentlemen, The Honourable Lester Pearson is a leading Canadian politician and a celebrated internationalist who will now speak to The Empire Club of Canada on `Canada and the Commonwealth'.

MR. PEARSON: The Commonwealth, or the British Commonwealth, of Nations of today is a far cry from the Commonwealth of yesterday; even more from the Empire of the day before yesterday. It is important that we should understand this change; realize the problems and opportunities it presents, and that we should not be confused by words and sentiments that refer to situations which have now passed away. There still is, of course, a British Empire, apart from the Commonwealth, consisting of the United Kingdom and the dependent colonies. But that Empire is now only a small part of the great British imperial system of the beginning of this century which it now fashionable to decry in certain quarters, but which, while it had its faults, in its day did much for preserving peace and promoting progress in the world. With Communists, of course, and with even some types of Socialists, it is obligatory to decry this kind of imperialism as wholly reactionary and bad; to assume that it must soon completely disappear in the world. It is, of course, disappearing as the urge for political freedom by subject peoples expresses itself. It is inevitable that this process should go on, and that nationalism should find expression in political self-government before its limitations are realized. The ideal of national independence must run its course inside and outside the Commonwealth, before the wider political associations which this little nuclear world requires can make much headway. It would be wrong and foolish to try to dam the national urge. But it would do no harm, on the contrary it would have good results, if that urge would accept direction and guidance when this is needed; would show a greater appreciation of the permanence and the inevitability of gradualness.

There is, however, one notable exception in the world today to this process of national growth. It is the destruction of freedom and the absorption of free people into centralized, despotic, anti-national Communist empires. The Communists, at the United Nations and elsewhere, talk loud and long against imperialism. They are, in fact, with their power centres in Moscow and Peking, almost the only imperialists left in the world. As such, they are the greatest present menace to national freedom, and the worst colonial reactionaries. It is ironic, indeed tragic, to realize that some of those who parrot the anti-imperialist words of Moscow at the U.N. are representing there, as Czechs or Rumanians or Ukrainians or, above all, Hungarians, satellite foreign regimes forced on peoples, with a long and glorious tradition of freedom but now as much under outside domination and control as any African tribe which never possessed such freedom and may not be ready for its responsibilities.

The shrinking of the British Empire, the reduction of red on the map of the world, in a sense represents its greatest glory, its greatest achievement. For out of this Empire, those free nations have emerged which make up and enlarge our new Commonwealth. This emergence has taken more than one form and expressed itself in more than one way. Some of the members, Canada Australia, New Zealand, have grown from daughter colonies to independent states, with strong ties of race, sentiment, history and heritage still linking them to the Mother Country, long after they have achieved self-government. They also share a Monarchy, as the symbol of all these links, and as the focus of a common loyalty which emphasizes the continuity of their history and the depth of their roots. Other nations of the Commonwealth, and this we sometimes forget, have an entirely different historical basis for membership in the association. South Africa became a member out of defeat in war. India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya were colonies occupied by the British but with old cultures and civilizations of their own. They learned much from the British, the rule of law, even-handed justice, fair-dealing, administrative and governmental order and methods. Indeed, it was the British, even though it may not have been done consciously, who gave them a sense of national consciousness which, in some cases, they had never possessed before. It was on this basis that their freedom developed. They might or might not appreciate any of these things as nationalism drove them on to independence from Britain. But even if, or when, they did, we should not expect them to have that feeling of kinship with or sentiment for the United Kingdom which we possess; she was a mother country to them, in a very limited sense indeed, if at all, and in a sense which was often resented. At best, she was a kind of foster mother. There is also now a native African member of the Commonwealth; and soon to be another along with a West Indies Federation. Their peoples have never in the past had any national identity, or national story of any kind as we understand it, but have nevertheless now become independent, indigenous native states with only a few white Britishers to recall the previous political connection with Whitehall. All this means that not only has there been a fundamental change from Empire to Commonwealth; there has been an equally important change from old to new Commonwealth. This new Commonwealth which exists today, represents every continent, except South America; every race, clime, religion and culture. Four-fifths of the people who now make it up are Asian. It includes the second most populous country in the world and the second most populous Moslem State. It represents three of the ancient civilizations of mankind--Judeo-Christian, Hindu and Islam. What holds it together? An outsider would find it particularly hard to answer that question. There is not even an agreed name, for "British" Commonwealth is not used, for obvious reasons, in those countries in which the vast majority of its peoples live.

I remember that at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in London in 1949, when a formula was being sought for the admission of a republic into the Commonwealth, the communique announcing success began with a reference to the "British" Commonwealth and ended by a declaration of unity as "free and equal members of the Commonwealth". That confusion was not accidental. It was the British genius for evasion, or compromise, or common-sense, whatever you wish to call it. Neither name satisfied everyone there, so both were used. Nor is the Monarch the same unifying influence throughout that it once was. True, the Monarchy is a cherished bond between certain members and the fact that the Queen, as Monarch, is "Head of the Commonwealth" has its own importance though it is a little unknown to history before 1949 and even now of no legal or constitutional significance. Yet now, inside the Commonwealth, there are four monarchies by choice and conviction; three, who have stated their intention of becoming republics; two members that are republics and one, an elected monarchy, where the local monarch accepts another Monarch in London as Head of the Association. It must seem all very confusing to any logical student of political forms. So Monarchy has not the same meaning inside the Commonwealth that it once had though it still is of deep meaning and cherished value for some of the members, including Canada.

I have already pointed out that history, sentiment and traditions operate in only a very limited way, and not always indeed in favour of closer association, for the majority of the present members of the Commonwealth. It is often said that a common devotion to parliamentary democracy is now the strongest unifying bond inside the Commonwealth, as we face the pressures of totalitarianism. This is undoubtedly of great importance where it applies. But we must not assume that all the principles and practices of parliamentary government, developed in Great Britain slowly and often painfully over the centuries, can be so applied, automatically and successfully, to societies which are newly free but are without our own inherited and tested parliamentary experience.

The form of parliamentary democracy in the old Commonwealth is not necessarily that which will prove the best or the most acceptable for all the other members. India is making a heroic and vitally important effort to make it work among her nearly 400 millions of people; likewise in Ceylon, where serious obstacles remain to be overcome, and in Malaya, the same effort is being made. But Pakistan has now become, temporarily at least, a military dictatorship and some things seem to be going on in Ghana which are hard to reconcile with our own concept of parliamentary democracy. So we are likely to be disillusioned if we expect the Commonwealth to remain the Parliament of Westminster, surrounded by identical daughter parliaments in all the other nations, operating in the same way and all devoted to the same kind of government by free and full parliamentary discussion and decision. Nor is it centralized Commonwealth institutions or machinery that hold us together. We have none, or practically none. In earlier years there was an effort made to develop such but it failed. I think that failure meant success, because an association of the kind that developed out of the old Commonwealth would not have been possible if there had been central control or too much central organization. Nor indeed has this been necessary to ensure close and continuous consultation within the Commonwealth in the search for co-operation and agreement. From 1945 to 1958, and including the Commonwealth Conference in Montreal, there have been far more ministerial and prime ministerial meetings than in the period 1926 to 1939, There has also been more Commonwealth mutual assistance, both of the kind represented by Canada's dollar help, two billion's worth, to the U.K. after World War II and by that given later through the Colombo Plan to the less materially developed nations. Is it trade and commercial advantage that keeps us together? True, the preferential tariff system played an important part to this end in the twenties and thirties, but it has been much less important, at least so far as Canada is concerned, since the Second World War. Currency and import controls and quotas in the sterling area made tariff preferences of much less value to us as a dollar country. It has been a major objective of Canadian foreign policy in the last thirteen years to get these obstacles to greater Commonwealth trade out of the way, and to restore full convertibility between dollar and pound. I believe that it is also equally important to seize every other opportunity to promote freer trade within the Commonwealth, though this can never be done to Canada's advantage on an exclusively Commonwealth basis. The facts and figures of our trading position are sufficient reason why this is so.

What about mtual defence? Has that been a unifying force? In the past, when Imperial defence as such was an accepted requirement and neutrality within the monarch's domain was legally and politically unthinkable, defence obligations and the common sacrifices that they entailed, service together as soldiers of the King, all these served to keep all British subjects united in loyalty and sentiment. That situation has also drastically changed inside the new Commonwealth. There is no possible way, for instance, in present circumstances by which Ghana and South Africa, Pakistan and New Zealand could be prevailed on to accept special obligations for mutual defence. The fact is that there are now no such obligations, and that the special and formal commitments that Canada accepted in NATO to come to the assistance of say, Turkey if that country were attacked does not apply to New Zealand. They do, of course, apply to the U.K., not because she is a member of the Commonwealth but because she is a member of NATO. This may seem strange but it is a perfectly realistic and honest reflection of the present international situation. The protection of the national security interests of the North Atlantic powers, and the strengthening of peace, made it desirable to accept collective commitments of the NATO kind which entail specific obligations for action in certain circumstances. The same interests do not admit the acceptance of these collectively by all members of the Commonwealth. It would, for instance, be obviously quite unrealistic to expect India and South Africa to undertake any such commitments vis-a-vis each other, merely because they are both members of the Commonwealth. The reason why this is unrealistic is simply that members of the Commonwealth are not all in agreement over foreign and defence policies. Indeed some are in strong disagreement with each other. Certain issues between them are, in fact, so bitterly contested that it is not at the moment possible even to discuss them at Commonwealth meetings as formal items of an agenda. I am thinking, for instance, of the racial dispute between South Africa, on the one hand, and India and Pakistan on the other. Or the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. In the varying circumstances of the member states, with their different national interests, it cannot be expected that their foreign policies would normally be the same, except in the desire to secure the same broad objectives of peace and international security. As an example, take the situation today in Berlin. The United Kingdom has definite treaty rights and responsibilities there. She must protect these and I, for one, think that any attempt to eliminate them, contrary to international agreement, by the USSR acting through its East German communist satellites, should be met with unity and firmness on the part of the Western coalition as a whole. I also believe, however, that before any step is taken to this end by any one or all of the three members of NATO who have these treaty rights in Berlin, all the other members of the Atlantic alliance should be fully consulted through the NATO council. It is idle to expect, however, that other members of the Commonwealth such as India, Pakistan or Ghana or Malaya or Ceylon would adopt, or even support, any such policy of collective resistance to efforts to overthrow the existing regime in Berlin by forceful methods. There is not likely to be any Commonwealth unity in this matter any more than there is on the policy to be adopted toward the USSR generally.

What then is the value of the Commonwealth? What does hold it together even in its present loose form? The answer to that first question is found, in part, in the very differences and disputes which occur between its members and two of which I have mentioned. The Indian and South African governments, or the Pakistan and Indian governments may say hard things about each other in public. But they can meet, in London, at the UN or in Colombo, around the Commonwealth conference table or at a Commonwealth dinner and talk in a friendly and informal way to each other, even about matters which cannot be formally put on any Commonwealth agenda. In spite of some factors, and because of others, this global association consists of members who always at least try to agree; who have acquired the custom and convention of discussing together problems of mutual concern, and who, when they do disagree, do their very best to avoid bitterness and recrimination. The group has also shown a capacity for dealing with practical situations as they arise and for adapting itself to changing circumstances. These changing circumstances, associated with the emergence of free Asian countries, which is something of the greatest potential importance to the world, give the Commonwealth a new and great opportunity. It can act as a bridge between Asia and Africa and the West. The, new Commonwealth ideal, moreover, is one of helpful and practical co-operation between nations of varied races and cultures, and in varying stages of economic and industrial development. That co-operation is shown, among other things, in the Colombo plan. Its continued success. will be of the most far-reaching importance; not only to the Commonwealth but to the whole world. In the Commonwealth we members who are materially favoured, can_ give our Asian and African partners technical and capital assistance. We can do more. We can give them sympathy and understanding and support in their new national hopes and aspirations. In doing so, the Commonwealth can give an example to the world.

A somewhat cynical observer once wrote: "The Commonwealth appears . . . to be no more than an alumni association . . whose independent-spirited, self-willed members, presided over by their former headmaster, recognize no other obligations toward one another than may be prompted by the heart or by considerations of enlightened self-interest." While we may concede some truth to this analysis, it passes over too casually this pull of sentiment and custom, or enlightened self-interest, which does draw us together. Shakespeare put the Commonwealth case better when he wrote: "Those friends thou hast, and their adoption tried, grapple them to thy soul with hoops of steel." The Commonwealth has adjusted itself pragmatically and gracefully to a long series, of changing circumstances. And the end is not yet. It would be folly to become complacent about what has been done or to assume that this beneficent progress must continue. There is no certainty that it will. It would also be foolish to try to obscure the new problems in front of us by a golden haze of patriotic oratory. There are undoubtedly difficulties and there may be dangers ahead for the Commonwealth Family Association. But there are also opportunities for even greater service to its members and to the world, in the future than in the past. It should be, as indeed I think it is, an important objective of Canada's policy to help avoid these dangers and realize to the full these opportunities. It should be a privilege for Canada to work for the maintenance and the strengthening of the British Commonwealth of Nations as a strong force for peace, security and progress in the world.

THANKS OF THE MEETING were expressed by Mr. Marvin Gelber.