Canada's Defence

MR. LANGLEY:

We were all terribly shocked by our tragic losses of last week and no words of mine need be added at this time, to the heartfelt sympathy expressed so well by so many. I did want to report to the members that on Saturday I called at the U.S. Consulate on behalf of the Club and that in the name of all our members, we have forwarded our condolences to the Consul General-The Hon. Park Armstrong. As many of you know, at almost the same time we were performing similar sad duties in memory of our late Mayor.

INTRODUCTION

It would be almost impertinent to pretend to have to introduce Paul Hellyer to this audience when he is a Toronto M.P. and a Cabinet Minister to boot. Par ticularly so, not only because he holds the vital Defence portfolio--but because he has been a valued member and director of the Empire Club for many years. The members of the Board and of the Club, of every political persuasion, have followed your career with great interest, Sir, and we are delighted to have this opportunity of welcoming you back to the rostrum of your Club.

Gentlemen-The Minister of National Defence.

MR. HELLYER:

First of all may I say how honoured I am, as a member of this Club, to have this opportunity to address you in our 60th Anniversary Year. I accepted your invitation, Mr. Chairman, with some trepidation because I am aware of the extra effort you are exerting to make this Anniversary year the most outstanding in the history of the Club. We all appreciate the energy and devotion which you apply to your duties and wish you well in your task.

Will you permit me, at the outset, to pay tribute to two great men who died recently in their country's service? Here in Toronto, Mayor Summerville, a veteran of the Royal Canadian Air Force, was stricken while characteristically taxing his strength over and beyond the call of duty. In Dallas, Texas, President Kennedy was struck down while riding in a cavalcade, midway through a heavy schedule of activities commencing with a breakfast address. Each died in the service of his country just as surely as those who fell in battle. We thank God for men of their character and calibre, who are willing to accept the risks associated with their unbelievably heavy responsibilities.

You have asked me to speak to you today on the subject of Canada's defence and, I might say, that it comes at an appropriate time as we are now in the process of preparing a long-term policy for the future. I think you will agree that this is a very complex subject. There are many controversies and differences of opinion in respect of the path we should follow. It is our job, notwithstanding the controversies or the difficulties, to consider the problems that face us in the broadest context and, having considered them, to make intelligent judgments in the best interest of the Canadian people.

We are a nation dedicated to the cause of peace. It is a profound aspiration. At the same time, we strive to preserve with the people of other nations whose objectives are similar to our own. To this end we have allied ourselves with like-minded nations in a common pursuit-the preservation of peace and the maintenance of freedom.

At the end of World War II, it was hoped that the United Nations would be able to do what the League of Nations had failed to accomplish. There was a universal desire that national boundaries and integrity could be preserved with the help of this great new international organization. Subsequent events in Eastern Europe, however, proved beyond peradventure that the United Nations did not have this capability.

As a consequence, and partly as a result of Canadian initiative, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed in 1949 and it has been since that time the principal guarantor of the freedom of the Western world. Its success has been proven by the fact that not one square foot of European territory has fallen to communist subversion since that time, regardless of the numerous crises that have arisen. In spite of the many problems, the NATO Alliance remains today the protector of freedom for the free world. There has been, and probably always will be, points at issue within the Alliance. Complete unanimity is really too much to expect amongst 15 nations whose interests, although often similar, are seldom identical.

One of the paramount issues at the moment is the question of strategy. It is no secret that some disagreement exists between members of the Alliance as to how best to deter war and maintain freedom. Some, remembering well the devastation of their territory during two world wars in this century, abhor the possibility of a third experience of any dimension. They prefer to deter both nuclear and nonnuclear attack by the threatened immediate use of tactical atomic weapons and to accept the risks inherent in this strategy. Others, in view of the changed circumstances of the last few years, prefer a more flexible strategy. They suggest that two major developments of the last 10 years must be taken into account:

Firstly, the Western monopoly of nuclear weapons has been broken and the Russians now have large stockpiles of strategic and tactical nuclear devices, the latter deployed in quantity with their troops along the central front;

Secondly, the conventional strength of the Western Alliance has increased substantially during this decade while Russian non-nuclear force has declined.

The disparity in the conventional capacity between East and West, it is argued, is not nearly so great as has been the case in the past and as is still alleged by some observers. No one suggests that there is an equality, but merely that the difference is not so great as it was, and is declining. The proposal, therefore, implicit in this strategy, is that the nonnuclear force available to the Western Alliance should be increased in order to permit a wider spectrum of decision in meeting varied threats. In some quarters this proposal is viewed as an invitation to Soviet adventure.

Frankly, there is much to suggest that this difference in strategy is more apparent than real. On the side of flexible response, I do not think that its supporters believe for a moment that any sizeable invasion could or would be permitted without some form of nuclear response. On the side of the "Tripwire" proponents, it is doubtful that they really envisage the launching of World War III over what could be an accidental or localized action of minor proportions.

From an Alliance point of view, however, it is important that an agreed strategy be achieved soon because, quite obviously, the problems of planning are very much more difficult in the interim.

You will recall the decision taken at the NATO Ministerial meeting held in Ottawa in May, that the Council undertake, with the advice of the NATO military authorities,

a comprehensive review of the inter-related questions of strategy, force requirements and the resources available to meet them, in order to achieve a satisfactory balance between nuclear and conventional arms.

Although those responsible have been applying themselves diligently, this review has not been proceeding as quickly as we had hoped for. Some nations have not recognized the need for a thorough logical reappraisal to the extent suggested by others. The United States which has had in the past, and continues in the present, to supply the major elements of force available to the Alliance, feels strongly that Alliance capabilities and procedures should be subjected to the same careful review and scrutiny to which their own forces have been subjected. They are, no doubt, convinced on the basis of their own national experience, that they can expect that NATO review to reveal a number of substantial inconsistencies which can be reconciled in the interests of increased efficiency.

There is no doubt in my mind that the American straightforward approach is both logical and reasonable. The difficulty arises from the nature of the Alliance itself. Often national political and economic interests do not coincide, or seem to coincide completely, with the interests of other members of the Alliance. National positions tend to become entrenched. In an Alliance where the strength of the whole is dependent on political solidarity, however, compromises and accommodations become necessary.

The government of Canada is very much interested in the NATO review. In particular we had hoped that an initial report would have been available before our Canadian defence review is complete. Our position is made considerably more difficult as a result of the delay. We do have some advantages, however. Due to the fact we are a relatively small nation we have a fairly broad spectrum of choice available to us. This gives us some degree of flexibility in our planning even under present circumstances.

Our present contribution to NATO forces in Europe consists of an Air Division employed in the strike and reconnaissance roles, and a Brigade Group which is part of the Northern Army Group. There are some outstanding problems in respect of these units, and I hope to submit recommendations concerning them in the very near future.

One half of our Air Division is stationed in France, where the nuclear ammunition for the strike role is not available. This is clearly not a satisfactory situation. Our Brigade Group is limited in its operations by the lack of an armoured personnel carrier. This is particularly serious when one considers the heavy armour available to the opposing force. It would not be proper to leave the Brigade in its present exposed position without providing the modern equipment which is urgently needed.

The cornerstone of Canadian defence policy has been to provide land, sea and air forces to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At the same time, however, we have given full support to the United Nations in its peace-keeping operations.

As you will recall, in November 1956, the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East was formed to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Egypt. Since the inception of this force, Canada has made a major contribution of Army personnel and an air transport unit operated by the RCAF. Some of these personnel are now in Yemen in an effort to help stabilize conditions in that country. In contrast to the type of forces required for these duties, the Canadian Army has supplied a signals unit to provide communications facilities for the United Nations Headquarters in the Congo, some of the staff officers for the Headquarters and a provost section. The RCAF too has played a significant role in the Congo operations.

In addition, there are Canadian service personnel serving with the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, and with the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization in Palestine. Others, though not under the auspices of the United Nations, are with the Truce Team in Indo-China.

It has been suggested that, in order to strengthen the international peace-keeping ability of the United Nations, there should be a permanent peace-keeping force, and that Canada should participate by contributing its armed forces. Neither the Secretary-General, nor any major power group within the United Nations, has shown any enthusiasm for such a permanent force.

A more realistic approach to provide improvements for the immediate future was that suggested by the Prime Minister in his address to the UN General Assembly in September last. He said that there should be a compact planning team of military experts to provide the advice and assistance which the Secretary-General should have for organizing peace-keeping operations; there should be an examination by interested governments of the problems and techniques involved in such operations. This could lead to a pooling of available resources and the development, in a co-ordinated way, of trained and equipped forces to meet possible future demands for UN action.

Experience has shown that no two situations produce exactly the same requirements. It would appear then that the most satisfactory solution is to have well-balanced, broadlytrained forces to draw from as required.

I have discussed briefly our contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to the United Nations. I have not discussed our forces assigned to the Canada-U.S. region and to North American air defence. This omission is not due to the lack of importance but to the lack of time, and I believe you already have considerable knowledge of the job these forces are doing.

In the few minutes remaining, I would like to refer to the general review which has been under way as a prelude to the formulation of a new defence policy for Canada.

We are taking this basic approach: to get maximum operational effectiveness for the money available for defence. This is no easy goal to achieve, but I am confident that significant progress can be made.

To this end, we are studying the various options available to us and evaluating the cost effectiveness of equipment programmes. These cost effectiveness studies have inspired several stories. One which I like is the analysis of the broken watch versus the one 10 seconds slow. The cost effectiveness study showed the broken watch was better since it was right twice a day, while the slow one was right only once in eight years. In think we can do better than that!

To assist us in doing our job, a series of studies have been, and are being, carried out. These completely review our activities, our procurement programmes and our policies. In all of the major studies, a concept of joint planning has been introduced. Members of each of our armed forces pool their thoughts with civilians and scientists. The mingling of individual streams of experience into a single reservoir is producing interesting results. We have encompassed a wide range, starting with an analysis of the spectrum of wars in which we could become engaged, down to the type of forces Canada should have to provide a contribution to collective defensive and peace-keeping alliances. I expect that this composite review, placed against a backdrop of our foreign policy, the developing international situation, the changing technology of warfare, our national aspirations, and the anticipated economic resources available to defence, will provide a long-range guide for planning purposes.

Inevitably, many of the decisions which will be taken will be unpopular in some places. This cannot be avoided. If we are to make recommendations in the best interests of Canada's contribution to collective defence and with the object of obtaining good value for your money, we cannot yield to all the various pressures which will be applied. If we did, nothing of a constructive nature would be accomplished. The changes which count are usually the ones which require significant shifts in thinking and organization, and consequently meet the greatest resistance.

Often we do things unthinkingly by habit, without any reference to the rationale on which they were originally begun. If you have visited the House of Commons and watched members bowing to the Speaker, you would assume that the reason was based on a deep respect for the high office of first commoner. No doubt this is a conscious factor with some, but the origin, I am told, is far removed. In the old Westminster, the Chapel of St. Edward was directly behind the Speaker's Chair. Members, on entering the Chamber, paid homage to the Cross. The ritual has continued long after its original meaning has been almost forgotten.

Please do not get the impression that we intend to change everything for which the origin is obscure. On the other hand, I feel we are perfectly entitled to ask pertinent questions because, with the almost unbelievable change that has occurred in military technology during the last few years, there is great concern as to whether our defence mechanism is able to adjust rapidly enough to keep up with new developments.

Every opportunity must be given to the students among the military, and the researchers and developers of military equipments, to develop the concepts associated with their special field of study. If properly organized and directed, they can prevent military stultification and lead to progressive development of the military apparatus. Run-of-the-mill work, such as polishing-up procedures, is necessary in peace time but much of it produces results which are of relatively little importance when considered in the context of overall strategy.

Our recommendations, which will result in the first White Paper on Defence since 1959, will be subject to consultation with our allies and review by government, Parliament, and finally by you, the taxpayers.

We are all working towards a common goal -a better Canada. We live in a great country with unlimited resources, the greatest of which is our people who have come from many ethnic backgrounds to make this their home and enjoy the freedom which is so much a part of our way of life. We must recognize that we cannot stand alone in a hostile world and that not only within our own boundaries must there be unity, but so too in our alliances in order that there be real strength.

The late President Kennedy has set an example of devotion to duty that we ignore at our peril. We can well profit from his now historic advice to his fellow countrymen to "ask not what your country can do for you-ask what you can do for your country".

Let us as United Canadians, a mari usque ad mare, think first of what is good for our country and by so doing ensure our continued strength as a nation. In other words, let us truly say, with all its deepest meaning, "Canada, we stand on guard for thee".

Thanks

Thanks of this meeting were expressed by Past President Lt. Col. Bruce J. Legge.