The Difficulties of the Axis

THE HONOURABLE G. HOWARD FERGUSON: Gentlemen, it is a matter of very great regret to me that today we open our meeting on a note of sadness. As you are all no doubt aware, the very sudden and untimely death of Lord Lothian took place last night. It is only a few days since I had a lengthy telegram from him promising that he would come and talk to us, and we were looking forward to that with a great deal of pleasure. Aside altogether from that, and much more important, of course, is the fact that a great public figure has been removed from the scene of activity and the Empire has lost a very active and influential supporter at a time when she needs all the best men it is possible to muster. Lord Lothian's career has been a most creditable one. He stands high in the opinion of the British people. He wouldn't have been sent to Washington if that had not been so. He has been doing, in the comparatively short time he has been there, a marvellously successful diplomatic service on behalf of Great Britain, and I am sure that we all regret very deeply the removal from the scene of world activity and Empire unity and action one who has been such a prominent figure. The University of Toronto intended to confer upon Lord Lothian the highest degree, the highest gift that is in its keeping. He was to have been, on the 16th, made a Doctor of Laws of Toronto University at a special Convocation called to confer this degree upon him and our friend, Air Marshal Bishop, the Lieutenant-Governor and Mr. Moffatt, the American Ambassador to this country. That Convocation, as a result of Lord Lothian's death and out of respect to him has been postponed.

Now, to come to our own problems. I have the very great pleasure of presenting to you today one of our learned and influential historians, a man who makes practical application o£ his knowledge of history and knowledge of world affairs.

We have for a long time, longer than I remember, been in the habit of drawing a fresh profusion of ability and brains from away down by the sea, and Professor McInnis comes just as close to the salt water as is possible. He comes from Prince Edward Island. Since he has been here he has been a great success, not only as a teacher, but as a really human character among the students and there is no better test of a man's worth and his capacity than to have gone through the mill of the mixed student body that are always justly critical-critical as a matter of safeguard, so they won't be overtaken by any highbrow professor.

Professor McInnis was very good in accepting our invitation to say that he would talk to us a bit about the very much tangled and uncertain war situation in the Middle East. I therefore have the greatest pleasure, without occupying any further part of his time, in presenting to you Professor McInnis.(Applause.)

PROFESSOR EDGAR W. MCINNIS: Mr. Ferguson and Gentlemen: We have been watching during the past few months a very interesting phenomena which the Nazis have chosen to call the creation of a new order in Europe. It is really, of course, an attempt on the part of a nation which has suddenly found its plans going somewhat awry to consolidate the gains which are already made and try to introduce an element of permanence into them, and at the same time to strengthen those foundations still further by drawing within its border certain smaller, apparently helpless states, which have struggled to remain outside.

I don't think any of us are likely to underestimate the significance of this process. I don't think, however, we are likely to believe that it has the same significance as that with which the Nazis so vocally try to credit it. While they regard it as a revolutionary procedure which will make an entirely new world, we must look upon it as a move which is in one sense, at least, defensive, in order to meet new and unfavourable circumstances which have arisen and upon which they had never planned.

The significance goes back to and must be read in the light of one central fact. That is the defeat of the German plans of invasion, as a result of the magnificent work of the Royal Air Force. The more you look at that phenomenon, the more it seems to take the place in the present conflict that the Battle of the Marne occupied in the last war. It isn't itself a final and complete victory. What it is is a crucial defeat of an enemy which makes that ultimate victory possible and even certain. (Applause.) So the result has been the necessity for the Axis to adjust its plans to the entirely new circumstances created by the German failure to get command of the air, and as part of that adjustment they have had to undertake a work in Europe during all the strain and hazard of a continuing war which they hoped they would be able to carry out at leisure and with full attention only when the war was over.

Now, in the process there has emerged a great divergence, and I think we can say a steadily growing divergence, between the two major parties of the Berlin-Rome Axis. Each of them, of course, entered the war purely for his own purpose. I don't think either of them had any illusions about that. But perhaps the split between them which is steadily being shown up as events progress, has already reached a point which is far greater than even we had reason to expect, however much we may have known of the initial lack of confidence by the two bandits in each other.

I would like first of all, however, before I go to the practical circumstances, to say one or two words about certain features of the mental attitude of these two partners, because I think it does show a significant difference in their whole outlook. Both of them, of course, both Italians and Germans, regard themselves as remarkably superior people, but there is a certain difference in their attitude toward all the rest of the people whom they consider themselves superior to. If you take the Germans, and particularly if you take some of the quotations from the German press during the past six months, I am sure you would be struck, as I have been struck, by the continual recurrence of one adjective, which seems to be a peculiar Nazi favourite. That adjective is the word ' degenerate. It is very remarkable, and perhaps not altogether logical, that whenever the Nazis receive a new setback at the hands of the British, the degeneracy of the British suddenly looms up to infuriate them still further.

I am a little sorry that I couldn't call in a consultant psychologist. I am sure he would have some very interesting things to say about that phenomenon, perhaps not all of them complimentary to the German people. Even without being a psychologist, you can understand that a person like Hermann Goering, who believes himself one of the leaders of the master race, would be extremely annoyed when his Air Force had to deal with a lot of degenerate Spitfires and Hurricanes every time they crossed the channel; to say nothing of the pure Nordic, Mr. Hitler, who is constantly advising Churchill to resign while there is still time and who must be deeply pained when that supreme degenerate sits there organizing British resistance and refusing to accept the fate that stares him in the face. It is true, the use of the word degenerate has not been quite so frequent in the last couple of months. It may just be that the Nazis are beginning to think that the British have a few qualities which they haven't hitherto recognized to the full.

Now, when you look at the adjectives of the Italians, they are equally amusing, but somewhat different. The Italians are so busy telling the world what remarkably fine fellows they are, that they have only a limited amount of breath to spare to tell the world how inferior their opponents are to them. I think perhaps also the Italians, in comparison to the Germans, are weakened by a certain fundamental reasonableness that prevents their rising to the frenzy of their senior partner. For example, the Italians may be a little coy about telling us what battleships have been damaged by the British fleet, but I don't think any Italian is likely to scuttle one of his own battleships and then try to tell us that this is proof of Fascist valour. They can't quite do away with the idea that in the end their opponents have some relation to the human race. I have no doubt the Italians have several words for the Greeks. They certainly regard them as low barbarians who actually use bayonets, whereas apparently the more civilized races spray their opponents with poison gas from aeroplanes, the way the Italians did in Ethiopia. At any rate, the Greeks have certain human qualities which the Italians are still prepared to admit; and whatever adjectives they are using about the British Fleet, and I am pretty sure some of them are not exactly nice, I am quite sure degenerate is not one of them.

Well, that difference in mental attitude may to some extent account for some of the difference in military effectiveness, but what I would like to discuss rather more fully is the difference in the objectives of the war between the two partners. Because Italy and Germany are really fighting two different wars, and one of the things that the Italians are beginning to realize, and one that is perhaps one of the most significant things about Hitler's new order, is that if the Germans win their war, there isn't going to be very much in it for the Italian nation, because the result of a German victory would undoubtedly be a world revolution.

Back last spring, Dr. Robert Ley, in a speech to a group of officials, said that Hitler had made Germany happy, and encouraged by that success he was now going on and make the rest of Europe happy. I think perhaps the Poles and the Czechs and the Dutch could tell us something about that brand of happiness; and we don't need even the speech by Walter Darre, which was published in Life a short time ago, to tell us what the German plans for Europe really are. Even if we didn't credit that speech at all, we still have enough indication in other pronouncements and other actions by Germany to know that the ultimate aim is a slave Europe, centering around a master German Government.

Now, Darre, according to this speech, looked forward to that very confidently. He talked about the Nazis as the master race who were predestined to rule other nations worthy of no other fate than slavery. It is quite possible that in the intervening eight months, the Royal Air Force and the British Navy may have cast a few doubts on Darre's theory of predestination, though I don't want to get into a theological discussion on that subject. At any rate, that sums up the German idea. The Nazis believe that Europe needs a master; they have no doubt who that master should be. They believe that German blood is alone sufficient to confer on the Germans not only definite rights, but rights which are supreme against any claims of any other nation. One who doesn't possess German blood has no rights whatever, as far as the Germans are concerned. If Germany wants to improve the standards of living of her people she has a perfect right to enslave all the nations around her. She has a perfect right, according to the Nazis, to say that the French shall cease to be an industrial people and shall become primarily an agricultural country, giving raw materials and food supplies to German industry. They have a perfect right to take from France such industry as she possesses and to organize her along the lines that will most suit the German people. They have a perfect right to turn to the Czechs and the Rumanians and to say they shall provide raw materials and they shall take German goods on such terms as Germany chooses, to dictate.

It isn't, you see, that the Germans prefer guns to butter. It is merely that, like all good bandits, they feel that if you have adequate guns you can get the butter that the other people have, and that has been the foundation of German policy so far.

There is the meaning of Hitler's new Europe. First of all, consolidate your conquests for war purposes. Make these people feed your war machine. Germany needs supplies. The British Navy has cut off supplies from abroad. The bombing raids of the Royal Air Force have reduced the availability of supplies at home. Very well, make that up by turning to the Danish, to the French, to the Balkans and to the Polish supplies. You need a better strategic position. If you don't trust those people to fight alongside your army, at least force them to put their defences and highways and strategic position at your disposal. So, having failed to crush England in the central theatre of action, you may try to strike her a vital blow along the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal.

Of course those war plans are only the beginning. The real significance of the new Europe is the revelation of the permanent plans which Germany entertains for dealing with Europe after the war. Obviously, if Germany is going to master the continent and make the continent serve her economic and political purposes, there can be no really independent nations left on the continent of Europe. There may be shadowy governments. You may have a government like that of General Antonescu. But all those will be instruments, channels through which Germany's orders will go to the mass of the people in Europe, who will be welded into a continental economy, operated solely for her benefit.

Now, if that is to be the reward of victory, it doesn't look like very much from the Italian point of view. Because it isn't merely that Germany is going to allow no rival on the continent. It is beyond that. She is going to allow no nation, friend, rival or enemy, to stand outside the structure which she is building up; and Italy, like France or Rumania or South Africa, must accept German orders and play her part in the structure that will be created.

But that isn't why Italy entered the war on June 10th, and her purposes are very different indeed. Italy isn't aiming at the creation of a new Europe. All Italy wants is a new map, and that is a very different thing. As I suggested, under the bombast of Mussolini and his Fascist followers, there is a hard core of realism; and however much they may exaggerate their strength in their public utterances, they haven't very many illusions about the reality. Italy knows perfectly well she couldn't aspire to dominate Europe. All she could hope for is to diminish her inferiority in comparison with other European great powers; and a type of war such as that waged by the Nazis, a type of war aim such as the Nazis entertain, is completely outside Italy's powers and Italy's conception. Instead, she is fighting a war of limited liability, almost a war of the sort you find in history in the eighteenth century. She doesn't hope to wipe out her enemies, she only hopes to get something from them as a result of victory. No doubt she, too, would like a few slaves to control for her own benefit. She has tried to get a few in Ethiopia and Albania and found them none too easy to control. She could never hope to keep the whole of Europe in subjection. If she could win a few second-hand colonies, with maybe a couple of Greek Islands thrown in, she wouldn't feel she had done badly; and if she managed to get Egypt and the Suez Canal, she would think that the clays of the Caesars were here again. That is all she wants-limited rewards. As long as England and France accept the results and do not try to get them back, Italy is perfectly content to treat the other powers of Europe as associates and equals, and perhaps even as friends.

The trouble with that is, if Germany wins, even if Italy should get Tunis, Egypt and the Suez Canal, they would be of no use to her. They would have to be turned over to uses which the Germans and not the Italians would dictate. As a matter of fact, Italy is already feeling the pinch, when with a short harvest and a winter facing her she has had to cut down her rations still further in order to provide supplies for Germany. Only from Germany can she get the industrial supplies she needs, and Germany can dictate what she must do in return. I suggest this isn't an outlook which inspires the Italians to fight with a fanatical valour. There were a good many Italians who went into this war doubting whether even Egypt and the Suez Canal were worth it. They must be still more doubtful when they realize that the only result will be to subject not only Italy's gains but the whole Italian nation to the dictation of an outside power. I think if I were an average Italian, sitting in a snowdrift on the Albanian mountainside, reflecting that I was doing all this for the sake of Hitler's new Europe, and at that stage a perfect stranger in a kilt came rushing at me with a bayonet, I think I would give him the right of way and let Hitler stop him if he wanted to.

That isn't the whole story of the Greek campaign, of course. The Italians probably still have good generals, although they seem to be getting rid of them very rapidly, in a wide variety of ways; and although nobody, not even the Italians, would pretend the Italian Army is the best in the world, I think there is no doubt they have good fighting troops. The Greeks did run into some hard fighting, and we are not giving them full credit if we don't realize that. But the Italian troops haven't been properly used, and it is now, I think, a question whether they will allow themselves to be properly used. There must be a steadily growing feeling that it would be just as well for Italy to get out of the war, which after all is coming to mean nothing whatever to her.

Now, even with the hope of success that we have today, I am not going to commit myself to the prophecy that we will knock Italy out of the war. That depends on a variety of circumstances. I think we have a reasonable chance. I certainly think that given the success we have already, we are encouraged to try still further. Certainly if she were left to herself f don't believe we would have very much difficulty, but even if the Germans decide not to leave her to herself it will be some advantage to us to engage German strength at a point where Germany obviously doesn't want it engaged, somewhere where Germany will have less chance of hitting effectively at us, and we will have a better chance of hitting effectively at her. I think there is the growing possibility that Germany may decide it is not worth while trying to save Italy and it would perhaps be preferable to let her go and clear the way for an agreement with France, such as Italy blocked a few months ago. I doubt whether the change would in the end be to the advantage of Germany. I have too much faith in the French people, but certainly that is one possibility of clearing the way in the Mediterranean, of releasing forces which can be used by us in the more vital area nearer home. We have made tremendous advances already. The possession of bases in Crete and Greece has completely altered the position in the Mediterranean from the point of view of strategy. The Italian fleet is no longer pretending that it is master of the Mediterranean, it is considering it is hardly safe even in its own harbours.

By the way, I believe the Nazi press dealt with Taranto in a delightful fashion. The Frankfurter Zeitung said: "The true happenings at Taranto are sad enough. Some devil-may-care foolhardy British pilots succeeded in firing torpedoes at Italian warships and damage was done to the Italian fleet. The strength of the Italian fleet has certainly not been increased by this."

That is probably as close to the truth as you could expect a Nazi paper to come. And now alongside Taranto we can set that brilliant and daring action at Sidi Barrani, which we may hope, foreshadows the fate of the Italians in Africa. It looks rather as if the British Army was out to show the Navy that it hasn't a monopoly of the Nelson touch.

But it is at home, of course, that the struggle is really vital, because Hitler is not only the strongest partner, he is the person whose victory really means disaster to the rest of the world. If it were a case of Italy alone, even in the most unlikely situation that Italy had a victory in sight, it would be possible to make terms which would still allow the rest of the world to live. At the most we would have to hand over some colonies which we would regret but which still would not be the most vital part of the British Empire. But if a victory for the Italian brand of war would weaken the Empire, a victory for the German brand of war would mean the end of western civilization. We can at least agree with Hitler's recent speech in this: There is no point of compromise between the Britain of Churchill and the Germany of Hitler. One or the other must disappear. Not only because the Nazi creed and our creed are different, but because our view of human rights and human values cannot live in the same world as a world in which the Nazi theory exists. (Applause.)

We have become familiar with the phrase "total war." We have learned by the past year's experience something of what that means in practice. We have learned that war must not only be total in its methods. You can't treat war as a sideline to your ordinary life, you must recognize that war is your ordinary life until victory arrives. But war must be total in its aims as well. We must make a complete end of the enemy we are fighting. I don't necessarily mean an end physically to the German people; whether you think that might be desirable or not, it is hardly a practical programme. But the power of the German people to impose slavery or the threat of slavery upon the rest of the world is something which we must bring to an end. I think we are learning too, that among the totality of methods is the use not merely of our physical resources, but of just those things which we are fighting to preserve and which distinguishes us from the enemy, that democratic spirit which has again come alive in Britain and is giving Britain that inner pervasive unity and enabling it to make its present magnificent stand.

I think of the saga of the little ships at Dunkerque and of those members of the volunteer fire fighting brigades, who were treated with a sort of friendly contempt before the bombs came over and then were one of the pillars of resistance, a totally unprecedented and unforeseen situation that was created there, and from the battered common men in the shelters there emerged the shelter marshal to give his patience and tolerance and continual cheerfulness under strain to help resistance to survive. Those are not the things that are developed by a dictatorship, and those are the things which we can make dynamic and alive.

It is not merely institutions which we are defending. If we think merely of parliament or a legal system or matters of that sort, much as we value them, we will have fallen into something the same intellectual situation as the French got into over the Maginot Line, thinking of it merely in a defensive sense, instead of as the essential foundation from which the advance might be launched which would bring victory.

The dynamic use of those qualities which are present in the essence of British democracy, the way in which that can be rallied to a government which will release those energies and show the way, the complete unity of purpose of a trusted people behind trusted leadership is the vigorous offensive part of democracy which we can use.

Once several years ago, when this war was already in sight, a statesman at Geneva made a very true statement that has almost become a platitude. "Peace," he said, "is indivisible." We are learning the truth of that from another angle. War is indivisible, too. No nation in the world stands aside from the effect of the war while it is being waged. No nation in the world but will share the results of the outcome of that war. The choice which faces the world is becoming plainer and plainer-as between Hitler's slave economy and the democracy which can survive only if Britain wins.

We can, I think, offer to the perturbed and frightened nations a prospect of victory which we could hardly claim six months ago. Hitler is destroying any illusion that any nation may be left free under his control. All that we have to do is to prove that the freedom for which we are fighting is a freedom for others as well as for ourselves. With that we rally around us the forces of free men throughout the world and that is our final foundation of sure and ultimate victory. (Applause-prolonged.)

THE HONOURABLE G. HOWARD FERGUSON: Gentlemen, I am going to ask our good friend, The Reverend Dr. Sclater, on behalf of all of us, if he will say a word of appreciation to Professor McInnis.

THE REVEREND J. R. P. SCLATER, D.D.: Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen: It only needs one word from me to express our very deep gratitude to the Professor for a very delightful half hour. He comes, I understand, from the Island. And therefore we expect something good, and expecting, are not disappointed. I suppose the reason and justification of that expectation is that the Island has so many of the right stock in it, that it produces the faculty of mind which today we have seen displayed a faculty of most charming, informative, wide, delightful understatement. You don't get any of the kind of wavings and excitement and double-barrelled adjectives that you can listen to any time you turn on the short wave to Germany, but just a quiet, strong, competent and witty, light-hearted and grave-minded statement of certain fundamental facts on which we can comfortably base ourselves.

It reminds me of two little stories, if I may just add them. They both concern extremely pious ladies in the Old Country. One of them, English, and the other, Scottish.

The English Lady not long ago was bombed. The front of her house was badly damaged and the room in which she was sleeping was reduced to some uncomfort able proportions, though the bed was left. Very shortly after the bomb had fallen these rescue squads, of which the Professor spoke, went around to have a look. They got up in the room and found the bed was empty so they went exploring to the back of the house which was all right and they found the old lady sound asleep in another bed. They said to her, "Were you in that front room?" She said, "O, yes." "Well," they said, "what did you do?" "Oh," she said, "I got up and came in here." "But weren't you frightened?", they asked. "Friends," she said, "I just said over to myself a verse of a hymn, then I said 'To hell with Hitler'; and went to sleep."

Well, we gathered from what our friend has said that Musso has his troubles. I rejoice to think of that. I don't like the chap's face, although I greatly like Italians and I wish they were out of that trouble and safe along with the decent people who have been their friends for--I don't know how long-namely, the people of Britain. They will be there one of these days all right. As for the rest, well from the quite strong statement of our Professorial friend today, and with the help of the British Empire, Hitler's progress to the place that the old lady seemed to have an interest in, no doubt in due time will be accelerated. That was the English lady.

The Scottish lady, you will observe, was much more restrained in her language. I only use the language that the first lady used because it is a quotation, and anyhow, because it is theological, and jolly good theology at that, too.

The old Scottish lady was asked, "What do you do in a raid? Do you pray?" She said, "No, I don't think so. The good Lord knows all about it and there is no question which side he is interested in. I just go on with my knitting."

The attitude of the pair is the attitude which has been expressed to us by our friend today, for whose most informative and delightful address, we all express our thanks. (Applause.)