Some Strategic Aspects of the War in 1940

THE PRESIDENT: Gentlemen: We are most pleased indeed to welcome one of our neighbours from New York as our guest-speaker on this occasion: Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin, the military and naval correspondent of the New York Times.

Mr. Baldwin has had an excellent opportunity through special circumstances to make a study of the military defences of many European countries, and was an interested spectator of the tremendous development in armaments that took place in Europe prior to the outbreak of war in September last.

Mr. Baldwin is a graduate of the Naval Academy in Annapolis. After three years with the Navy he resigned his Commission and entered newspaper life, specializing in navy assignments and accompanying the Fleet on many of its manoeuvres.

In addition to being a talented journalist, he is also an author, and has to his credit two books: The Caissons Roll, being a military survey of Europe, and Admiral Death, a book of sea stories.

In his extensive travels in the Western Hemisphere, it is interesting to note that he made a trip to Labrador with Sir Wilfred Grenfell in the course of his early newspaper duties.

It is with a great deal of pleasure that I introduce to you Mr. Hanson Baldwin, who will speak on "Some Strategic Aspects of the War in 1940". (Applause)

MR. HANSON W. BALDWIN: Mr. Toastmaster, Gentlemen of the Empire Club: I want to apologize for my tardiness today. Although it doesn't look like it here in Toronto, there is a real blizzard raging in Buffalo. In fact, after getting out on the station platform and walking 'around for a few minutes I felt, I thought, somewhat as the Russians must feel in Finland. The temperature was below zero and I never saw snow coming down so quickly, so the delay was entirely on the other side of the line.

Despite the topic of my talk, "The War in 1940", I am not going to attempt to prophesy today, because I believe phrophecy is flat, stale, and unprofitable, but I believe I can take common ground with one American negro soldier, who was a Guardsman in a regiment of Territorials. They were in a summer training camp for two weeks in the south and after several rather arduous days of training, the negro soldier wanted to go out into town one night and he came to the end of the camp border and tried to pass a sentry. The sentry stopped him, halted him and asked for his pass. "Where is your pass paper?" "What paper--I ain't got no pass paper, big boy." "You've got to have a pass paper. You can't get out of camp without a pass paper." "I ain't got no pass paper but I shure wanta go to town."

Finally he reached in his pocket and pulled out a big razor, and he said, "I'se got a mother in Heaven and a father in hell, and a girl friend in Atlanta, and I shure is agoin' to see one of 'em tonight." (Laughter) That is about the extent of my prophecy today. I am sure the war is going somewhere in 1940. There are going to be developments of some sort, but I am not going to go very much further than that. I do not think, however, we can get some general indication of the possible course of action open to either side, if we look briefly at the forces involved in this tremendous drama in Europe and the theatre of action in which it is being played, and the 'course of events to date, before even trying to determine what might possibly happen in 1940.

I am going to try to do this briefly with lantern slides because I think it is impossible to study war without "looking at maps. Briefly then, I want to survey the forces involved in the conflict before going' on to the theatre of action. (Slide 1) I have tried to do it with these tabulations, simplified, of course, which are supposed to be as of September 1, 1939, when the war opened.

I have tried to arrange the powers of Europe, including some nations now neutral, in the order of their financial, raw material and food self-sufficiency. Of course, all the difference in the world, as you know, comes into the picture if we consider the British Empre as a whole or merely the British Isles. I don't want to dwell on the picture-it is probably more familiar to you gentlemen than to me. (Slide 2) This represents a rough compilation of the army strengths of the warring powers as at September 1st, and I think what I have attempted to do is list the maximum war effort that may be put in the field in possible divisions and men, as really the most important yard-stick as far as arms and man power is concerned. I want to impress on you that these are merely estimates. They can be little more than intelligent guesses. I have set them up to be merely shot at and a guide post to the future.

As you know, the infantry division is the standard combat unit. In all armies they vary in size. In the case of Russia, a Divison numbers about 18,000 men; in Germany, about 15,224, and in the case of the French somewhat less than that, and the Polish Divisions are 12,000 men. Of course you know your own British Divisions.

(Slide 3.) This slide shows a rough summary of the estimated naval strength of the powers. This has been modified, slightly, of course, in the last four and a half 'months of war by sinkings and war casualties. Germany, for instance, has lost a large number of submarines, which were listed at sixty as at the beginning of the war. They have lost the Graf Spee, one of their battle ships, and Britain has lost one of fifteen capital ships and one of her aircraft carriers.

You notice that the overwhelming naval strength of Britain is further enhanced by that of the French fleet: (Slide 4.) Estimates of air strengths of the warring powers. This is probably the most disputed and difficult statistical summary of all, because it is impossible to get exact figures as to the Air Forces of Europe. Estimates of the German air strength and the German production capacity verge, sometimes, in my opinion on the fantastic. As you remember, even before the war started, and as long as a year ago, some estimates of the German air production capacity, at least those published in the United States, went as high as 72,000 planes a year-a figure I consider to be preposterous and impossible.

I have tried to be conservative in the estimates made here. Remember, these are as of September 1st. Since that time I would say that Germany has increased her production capacity to somewhere between 1,500 and 1,800 planes a month. Some figures are higher than. that. In Washington, some believe the figure is as high as 2,000 or above. Personally, I believe that is too high.

Of course, British capacity has increased materially and is probably over 1,000 a month. The French capacity is now probably between 300 to 500 a month. In addition, and this is a fact that I have not touched upon in this chart, the production of aircraft in the United States has increased steadily. Conservative estimates have put the output at 10,000 to 12,000 military planes during 1940. They are not all available for export. A large number will be used for the strengthening of our own air force. Nevertheless, a large number will be available for export, particularly of the type that France most needs, the same type of Curtiss pursuit plane that has done such good work against the German Messerschmitts and that is probably the closest thing to the British Hawker Hurricane.

So much for the forces involved in the war-military, naval and air. I think it is fair in summarizing these forces to say that German military strength will probably reach its maximum capacity some time during 1940, and thereafter can be expected to decline vis-a-vis the Allied strength. Just what time that will occur is impossible to state. As you know, when war opened, Germany's economy was geared to a war system, even in peace time, and naturally she was able to swing into production at a faster rate, perhaps, than the democracies were. As each month passes, that initial advantage for Germany will decrease, and I think it is safe to say that during 1940-exactly when I do not know--the production capacity of the Allies, backed by the United States, the number of planes, the number of men in training on land and, (of course, on the sea there is no comparison between German and British strength,) in any case in all three fields, land, sea and air, the Allied strength will probably pass Germany's some time in 1940.

So much for the forces involved. Let us look very briefly at the theatre of action. This map of Europe shows the principal air bases and the naval bases, and it depicts rather graphically the advantage Germany has, due to her interior lines of position between France on the west, and Poland, on the east.

On the other hand, there is of course, the position of the British Isles, with its favourable geographic position athwart German sea trade routes, which gives a tremendous advantage over Germany in the struggle on the seas.

It was due to these interior lines of communication and her interior position that Germany was able to mass troops against Poland, and shuffle them back quickly to the Western Front.

This map shows in simplified form the principal topographical features of Europe. Though the plane can surmount the mountainous ranges and fly above rivers, and is no longer limited and defined as strictly as land armies once were by topographical features, nevertheless these features will play and will continue to play a vital part in the drama of the forces in Europe.

In the north, of course, is the very flat Baltic plain, extending all the way into Poland. There is no major terrain obstacle until you have reached the Vistula, a fact that materially helped the German advance into Poland. Over here there is the old German-Polish frontier. Looking at the map you can see how important Czechoslovakia was. The Bohemian Bastion particularly emphasized the importance of the former Czechoslovakia. Here we have a wide entry to the Hungarian plain, south-eastward, and thence through the Iron Gateway, or the Diagonal Furror or down the Valley of the Danube, southeast to the oil and wheat fields of Rumania. This has been the route of the push to the east for centuries, and it is not impossible that they might try to follow the same path again.

Here are the Alpine passes into France from Italy. Notice how the passes all converge into the Valley of the Po. The industrial heart of Italy is extremely vulnerable to attack.

Further, if an invading army could negotiate the passes into France it would be faced with the obstacle of the Rhone River and the high, rocky, mountain range, the Central Massif, which would prevent the invader reaching the vital areas of France. I think that it is true that in modern times no invasion has been successfully made from Italy into France.

Also, vice versa, as you know, Napoleon and Hannibal succeeded in traversing these passes into Italy.

So much for the theatre of war, and the forces involved. Let us review the first four and a half months of the conflict. As you all know, the war opened on two fronts. Germany massing the major portion of her army and air forces to overwhelm Poland in a "blitzkrieg", or lightning war. I wish we had more time to deal with the Polish campaign. In a military sense it was one of the most interesting phases of the war to date, and also because it was one of the most important events of the first months of war.

You remember, Bismarck warned Germany that she should never fight on two fronts. You remember she opened this war by fighting on two fronts. She overwhelmed Poland in what came to be known as "The Campaign of the Eighteen Days", and the war changed, temporarily, (and I shall explain the "temporarily" later,) to a one front war.

Therefore, I think the Polish campaign was of great importance, and I think it proved the great power of the German army for a short war. On the other hand, we must remember that the Poles were very badly equipped, lacking in modern equipment of all types, and still trained, to some extent, in the tactics of Balaclava.

I visited Warsaw two years ago and I saw Poland's crack cavalry regiment stage a demonstration. The men were still armed with lances and sabres, and were charging against machine guns. If the machine guns had been firing bullets they would have been wiped out. They were literally using the same tactics as at Balaclava and that cannot be done today.

You remember how an attempt was made to divert attention to the Western Front, in order to bring relief to the hard-pressed Polish Allies, and this map shows about the extent of the French advance. They pushed cautiously into the Saar region, between the Rhine and the Moselle. There was no action on this front (illustrating) at all. The Rhine offers an almost impassable barrier through this basin. During the first sixteen to twenty days of September the French succeeded in taking this territory, most of it in advance of the main line of resistance, of the West Wall although the French did succeed in penetrating some of the outposts of the West Wall. Then, very wisely, I think, after the Polish collapse the French decided they should go on the defensive and they very wisely assumed positions about as they were when the war started, with the main line of resistance running pretty close to the frontier, a little on German soil, but mostly on French soil; with outposts back and forth across the border.

At the same time, the British Expeditionary Force of six Divisions was being successfully transported to France with a speed, I think, that certainly surpassed that of the World War, and with a speed and efficiency surprising to most people who hadn't followed the recent developments of the British Army.

We have on the Western Front a stabilized situation existing since the 1st of October, with both lines behind the fortified fronts of the West Wall and the Maginot Line.

The nature of the Maginot Line is pretty well understood. It has been built for some years and consists of a tremendous line of fortifications, particularly strong directly on the German frontier.

The West Wall is not generally so clearly understood, and this map attempts to give a simplified explanation of it. As you know, the Germans, before they built the West Wall, had established some fortifications all the way from the Dutch border to Switzerland. Those fortifications still exist. Although they are not to be compared with the major forts of the West Wall, nevertheless, they have to be reckoned with, and it is wise to include them in any map. The French advance was cautious, and if you look you will see why it was cautious. It would have been foolhardy in the extreme to have repeated the tactics of the World War, when some 325,000 Frenchmen died in the first few months, following the Foch doctrine of "Attack! Attack!" If they had followed the same tactics there would have been a heavy loss of life, and very wisely the French did not attack. There are forts across the entire area, and numerous pill-boxes between the Rhine and the Moselle. Then there are occasional very light fortifications, mostly field fortifications, between where the Rhine flows into Holland and the North Sea.

So much for the war on the Western Front. Let us now look very briefly at the war in Finland.

As I said before, the war opened on two fronts, and the German victory in Poland changed the war to one front. I think it is quite conceivable that the war in Finland will change the war back to war on two fronts. I do not think that the importance of the Finnish-Russian fighting can be over-emphasized. It is directly connected with the larger war in Europe and certainly will develop--before very long the extent of the German and Russian rapprochement, and it may involve, sooner or later, the Scandinavian Peninsula.

Going over the war to date, the Russians, obviously over-confident, tried to over-run the Finns with the same tactics that subdued Estonia and the other Baltic States. When Finland refused to be overawed, they sent bombing raids against Helsinki, and immediately followed that up with advances against the Karelian Isthmus. The initial advances were obviously made in much too small force to be effective. They didn't use any more Divisions than they had stationed in Leningrad military area, in this section here, and the Finns were able to hold the Russians off, and make some slight advances, using their famous ski warfare, and guerilla tactics. They penetrated down in this area almost to Rovaruenu which is connected with the only Finnish railway line to Sweden. I think you probably read in the papers this morning that the remnant of the Russian Forces, perhaps two Divisions, had retreated from the extreme advance point, and they are now retreating still further and apparently are going back to the Russian border.

The Finnish tactics are to cut the lines of communication with ski troops and guerilla warfare, and to gradually wear down the Russians with the extreme cold of the northern winter and surround and destroy them, and they have achieved some outstanding successes, cutting up very badly the 44th Russian Division brought up from the Polish front, and normally assigned to the military district in the south on the Rumanian border, and brought up here, and despite the fact it was a regular Division, apparently supposed to be made up of good troops, the Finns have defeated them in a rather brief time.

So the war, in Finland is becoming a sort of stalemate, with the Finns having won spectacular successes in the six to seven weeks of war, and with volunteers from Sweden, Norway and other countries rushing across the Swedish frontiers, and with Allied supplies reaching the Finns and Russia mobilizing more forces-how many there are now, we don't know-I think the superiority of Russian strength is at least two to one in Divisions and man power. I don't think it is nearly fifty to one. I don't think they would dare take that many troops from other sections, from the Rumanian frontier, and if you remember the figures I tried to give of the maximum effectiveness of the Russian army, you can easily see it couldn't support the millions of men in the north that you probably read about. Nevertheless, they can meet the Finns, very definitely with a two or three to one superiority, and in time that will tell.

We have, therefore, the stalemate there. Sooner or later we will have a definition of just how close to Russia Germany is. There have been reports that Russia has already asked for some German aid in Finland. Whether that is true or not, I do not know. Certainly there is no evidence of any German aid going as yet. It is, I think, of high importance to the Allies to counteract that with all sorts of vigorous measures. As you look at the map of Europe you see that it is altogether important to the Allies that neither Germany nor Russia gains a foothold on the Scandinavian Peninsula.

So much for the war on land. This very graphic British Admiralty chart shows, I think, at once the strength and weakness of the British Empire, and particularly the British Isles. The tremendous amount of traffic going to the little islands is envisioned on this chart and it shows why Germany immediately struck through a submarine and mine campaign against the little islands. It is a war in which the superior strength of Britain is being reduced by the enemy through attacks with submarines and mines and tactics of surprise.

Two facts are outstanding about this war. First, the British adopted the convoy system immediately on the start of the war, which proved the most effective antidote to the submarine campaign in the last war. The second most effective weapon against the submarine was the laying of mines which also proved most effective in the last war. The British have now announced the laying of a tremendous mine barrage down the east coast of England to act as a shield against submarine operations. As you will remember, there was a small mine field laid across the North sea in the World War, in which some American forces participated, and it proved a very effective weapon to the German submarine campaign, and helped to break the back of it during the closing days of the war. I think the two measures taken-the adoption of the convoy system and the laying of the mines are two evidences of the ability of the British to cope with the submarine menace and provide an answer to it. Today the German submarine campaign has not met with too much success from their point of view. The average loss has been about 6,100 tons a day, including German vessels scuttled, as compared to an average of about 21,000 tons a day in the height of the German unrestricted warfare during the World War. So far the shipping sunk has just passed the million mark in tonnage. That sounds like a good many ships sunk.

This German chart, purporting to show the results of one year of unrestricted U-boat warfare during the World War, is I think very graphic, depressing and effective. It is in vivid contrast to the sinkings to date during this war. You can see, with each of these little symbols representing a sunken ship, how many were sunk at the height of the unrestricted submarine campaign during 1917-1918. At the present time, the total sinkings, as I said before, is about a million tons of shipping, which is a small drop in the bucket of the worlds shipping of sixty-four million tons, and over thirty thousand vessels.

I think it is safe to say if the German submarine and mine campaign is to achieve the success achieved in the World War, the rate of destruction has to be at least tripled and maintained at that increased tripled rate for a long time to come. There is no evidence that it can be done. I am not going to deal very closely with the actual battles between fighting fleets. We haven't time. As you know, Germany must attack with the same tactics against British naval vessels as against merchantmen. She cannot hope to fight against the British fleet and therefore adopts the tactics of the hit-and-run, of surprise, of submarine and surface raids.

I think the first four months of the war have been distinguished by a number of events, chiefly in the cockpit of the North Sea. There was, of course, the sinking of the Royal Oak. And there was the scuttling of the Graf Spee, which was at once a moral defeat as well as a material one.

To return to the air. There has been a continual struggle over the North Sea between air power and air power and between sea power and sea power, always in an effort to secure control of this important area. The German air operations so far have been sporadic and relatively ineffective. They have not launched their full strength in the air since the Polish campaign, nor have the British launched their full strength in the air. Each side is holding itself more or less in reserve. I think the most important development of the first four months has been in the factories, rather than in the air, each side striving to build up their plane production capacity as rapidly as possible.

Finally, with this background, let us look at the course of the war tomorrow, and the courses of action open to both sides: This general map of Europe, if closely examined, I think will give us a key to some of the possible developments that either side may try.

First, what are the courses of action open to the Allies? On land, they have, of course, the choice of offensive or defensive on the Western Front. As I said, they are faced with the tremendous zone of fortifications, the West Wall, and, of course, with no intention whatsoever of violating the neutrality of Belgium or Holland or Switzerland. I think the Allies' obvious course is to remain on the defensive. I cannot see a major offensive from the point of the Allies on the Western Front in 1940.

Because the North Sea has always been the cockpit of the struggle for superiority at sea, the struggle there may be expected to continue more or less as it has started. It is obviously to the Allies' advantage to tighten the blockade against Germany-a blockade that becomes more and more effective as time goes on and tends to throttle the flow of vital supplies into Germany.

I cannot see a major offensive launched by the Allies in the air during 1940, at least not during the next few months. It is obviously in the interests of the Allies to let time play, to let time build up their manufacturing capacity and increase their strength vis-a-vis Germany.

There is, of course, the possibility of the establishment of another front, either in Finland, or the Balkans. Again, that depends more upon political possibilities. It depends on the action that Germany takes, rather than upon the action the Allies take. Certainly, the Allies are not going to violate the neutrality of any of the small nations. Therefore, we must watch both Germany and Russia.

Now, what are the courses of action open to Germany? She has one alternative that perhaps has not been sufficiently considered. There is a possibility that she will stay put, as she is. I don't think it is a probability; I don't think that it is the most likely course of action that Germany will take, but it is a possibility. A great deal depends on whether or not her leaders believe she can secure enough supplies from Russia or these areas that cannot be blockaded, to enable her to last out a long war. I don't believe they think so but that possibility must be considered.

Aside from the war of waiting and the war of attrition, what else can she do? She can launch a considerable offensive at sea and in the air, but remain on the defensive on land. That probably, if started, would be directed principally against Britain in the air with an intensified submarine campaign against neutral shipping and British shipping also. Undoubtedly neutral shipping has suffered as much as British shipping. The ratio of neutral losses is higher than during the last war.

But I think it is more in keeping with the German mentality, more in keeping with the German feeling that the army is still the backbone of German military strength, and it is more reasonable to assume, as Lord Lothian said when speaking in Chicago recently, that Germany will launch an offensive, a general offensive on land, in, the air, and on the sea.

What, then, are the courses of action open on land? One, of course, I have referred to already, in Finland. I hardly think that Germany will become deeply involved with aiding Russia in Finland, unless she feels that Russia's advance across Finland in the north was imperilling Germany's sources of iron ore supply in Northern Sweden. On the other hand, the Allies cannot afford to allow Russia or Germany to gain a foothold in the Scandinavian Peninsula. That might prove very serious to the blockade. I do not think that Germany would attempt an aggressive move in this direction unless it were a move of desperation.

Germany cannot hope to gain a decisive victory, though she might long endure, in a war of attrition.

There is the other way to the east and the Balkans. Again, I think this would be a policy of desperation if Germany took this course. They would do exactly what they had hoped to avoid-open up another front, a way for the Allies to get at Germany through the Balkans. However, if the Germans were convinced that the Balkans were withholding supplies vital to them, if they were not getting enough oil from Rumania, it may be that in a Ynoment of desperation they would advance down through the Danube Valley to the east.

However, I think it is far more likely, if Germany attacks, that she would finally attack in the west. This map shows in rough pictorial form the possible courses of action open in the west. First, an invasion through Switzerland, through the valley of the Rhine. This would be a '.terrifically difficult route, hardly likely to be tried. The other route would be through the famous Belfort Gapguarded by the famous fortress of Belfort--the only fortification that did not succumb in the Franco-Prussian war. It is also one in which a couple of divisions could probably hold off an army. There is little possibility of any invasion 'across the Rhine.

Going to the north and west there is another less unfavourable terrain gate. This area, however, is guarded by the heaviest fortifications of the Maginot Line. In this area, from the Moselle to the Rhine, we find the original Maginot Line, and the strongest part, and certainly any attack in this direction would cost the invaders very heavily.

Going to the west there is another possible course of invasion but this would involve violating the neutrality of Luxemburg. Another still further west course would be down through Dutch Limburg, with a sweeping movement across the Albert Canal, and on through Belgium, and toward the Channel Coast.

Of course either of these movements or all of them would involve the reduction of the Belgian defences, which have been very materially strengthened since the war began and are much stronger than during the last war. The fortifications of Leige and Namur have been modernized and there are strong fortifications along the line of the Meuse, and the former vulnerable line is now fortified with anti-tank guns and pill boxes.

Although in a terrain sense, the Lowlands are still the most inviting approach into France, the Belgian defences and the extension of the Maginot Line along the Belgian border make any such invasion extremely difficult.

This final slide shows more graphically than any of the others the almost unsurmountable terrain difficulties that the Germans have to face if they invaded France without violating the neutrality of any states that are now neutral. Leaving the Maginot Line out of consideration altogether as a tremendous initial obstacle you come against successive terrain obstacles. There are no less than five river lines between Paris and the German frontier, any one of which is easily capable of defence, and any one of which, even if the Maginot Line were penetrated-which is something it is difficult to believe could be done-could be consolidated for defence work.

Summing up, the most likely possibility for 1940, as far as Germany is concerned, is possibly the war of waiting, a continuation of the war as at present. I don't say probably-it is possible. It is more likely that there will be a German air and sea offensive, and it is still more likely there will be a co-ordinated German offensive by land, air and sea.

These things are still in the field of speculation. We can be sure of one thing. The war in 1940 will continue to be a war of nerves and political diversions, as well as perhaps a war of major military operations. And, all things considered, nothing has occurred, in my opinion, in the first four and a half months of war to change the opinions as expressed by many competent observers before the war commenced, that time eventually will work against Germany.

Voltaire said that a good speaker was one who knew when to stop. Well, I hear you, Voltaire! (Applause)

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Baldwin, what a splendid survey you have given us of the present status of the war in Europe and Finland! Your address has been an excellent description of the campaign in these countries to date and the possibilities of the future. Your clear analysis of the situation is of great value to us in interpreting events, along with the statistics and the excellent review of the armaments on land, in the air and in the navy. In fact, the subject matter that you have given to us is too extensive for me to say more at this particular time, than to say this, that we are indeed grateful to you for this excellent address, and I extend to you on behalf of the Empire Club, our keen appreciation and thanks, Mr. Baldwin. (Applause)