S.S. Manhattan's Northwest Passage Voyage—Observations by Canada's Representative

MR. MACDONALD:

The year 1970 marks the 300th anniversary of the founding of North America's oldest corporation--the Hudson's Bay Company. Although the North has provided a romantic thread in the fabric of Canadian history throughout that period, the issue of Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic remains unresolved. Now, a new dimension has appeared in the form of modern marine technology, which may succeed in driving a final wedge through the Northwest Passage.

This event is important to Canada and to the World. There are few Canadians in a position to appreciate exactly what has happened or what is likely to ensue. However, there is one Canadian whose name has been intimately associated with the North, whose experience is perhaps Unmatched in northern affairs, and for whom the Northwest Passage retains all the magic of the early days of travellers to the East. He is Captain T. C. Pullen and we are fortunate that he is with us today.

The issue of northern technology and Arctic sovereignty came to life last summer with the voyage of the giant, icebreaking tanker, S.S. Manhattan, sponsored by Humble Oil and Refining Company. There has been a suggestion that "be it ever so humble, there's no place like the Arctic"--at least, for oil! Questions such as: Who owns the resources? What are the hazards of pollution? What are the prospects for year-round navigation? are now being asked daily. We have today an opportunity to hear some of the answers from the Canadian Government Representative on that voyage.

Thomas Charles Pullen is a native of Oakville and a graduate of Lakefield Preparatory School, the Naval Staff College, Greenwich, and the Imperial Defence College, London. For thirty years, he served in the Royal Canadian Navy prior to retirement in 1965. The uninterrupted record of service by his family in the Royal Navies spans two hundred years. The Pullen involvement in the Arctic has followed a parallel course; for example, two great uncles, serving in the Royal Navy, took part in the Franklin Search 120 years ago.

Captain Pullen's heart may be in the North, but his service has spanned the seven seas. In earlier days, his command included three destroyers and a frigate; subsequently, he was senior officer of several Canadian ships in Korean waters. More recently, his command embraced HMCS Labrador, which was the Navy's Arctic Patrol Ship and Icebreaker, Provider, the Navy's first big Fleet Replenishment vessel and Shearwater, the Naval Air Station.

It will be no surprise to you, therefore, to learn that Captain Pullen is presently a member of a firm called Northern Associates. This consulting group was formed in 1965 to bring together people knowledgeable in matters pertaining to the Arctic. In the course of that association, he has served a combination of the public interest and private enterprise in the form of the Department of National Defence, the Department of Transport, Baffinland Iron Mines, The Coppermine River Limited and, of course, Humble Oil and Refining Company. In those pursuits, he has been aboard ice-breakers in the Arctic during every year since 1964.

Not only did he represent the Government of Canada aboard the S.S. Manhattan, during her memorable voyage through the Northwest Passage, but he was also responsible to the Department of Transport for the co-ordination and control of Canadian icebreakers accompanying that great pioneer vessel. He played a critical operational role throughout the entire exercise, advising Humble Oil on matters of ice navigation, ice seamanship, route selection, and tactics appropriate to ships working as a group in heavy pack ice.

On January 26, a question was asked in the House of Commons: "What is the estimated Canadian Government expenditure in assisting the U.S.-owned oil tanker Manhattan in its navigation of the Northwest Passage?" Is it not curious how parliamentarians are preoccupied with costs, to the neglect of benefits, and with outlay, rather than returns?

To tell us about the monumental lessons and benefits from the Voyage of the S.S. Manhattan, I am very happy to introduce "a real cool captain on a very hot issue"- Captain T. C. Pullen.

CAPTAIN PULLEN:

My topic today might best be called "In the Wake of the Manhattan". I say this because ever since that great vessel returned last year her epic voyage has left behind in Canada, so it seems, a considerable measure of acrimony and uproar. But most critics, although no doubt well meaning and sincere, simply don't know what they're talking about. I have been astonished to hear and read a stream of opinions on this and related Arctic topics from people who know nothing about the subject. So, to the best of my ability, I will attempt to put the significance of last year's Arctic Tanker Test into focus. I should make it clear at the outset that the views I may express here today are my own, that they are the product of an intense family interest in matters Arctic that goes back 120 years and a personal involvement that goes back to 1955.

I won't weary you with a detailed recitation of the history of the Northwest Passage and I can only hope you have a reasonably good picture, in your mind's eye, of Canada's northern regions. At first glance our many Arctic islands and waterways appear to be haphazardly distributed. In fact, closer examination of Parry Channel, which is the deep water Northwest Passage, reveals it to be a wide straight waterway--quite distinct and no doubt about it.

It was Amundsen, that doughty Norwegian in the Gjoa, who first achieved the exploit in 1906 but only after five centuries of unsuccessful endeavour by many other expeditions. Actually, Capt. Robert M'Clure, Royal Navy, made it in 1854 but the key part of his journey had to be completed on foot. After Amundsen came Larsen, of the R.C.M.P., who made the passage in the forties, east and west, in the sturdy little St. Roch. Then Labrador, the Royal Canadian Navy's Arctic Patrol ship, under Robertson. This was in 1954. Thereafter a number of ships did it, including two nuclear-propelled submarines. Except for our John A. Macdonald they were American. Altogether 12 different vessels and 17 transits.

There are numerous variations of the Northwest Passage but essentially there are two basic routes. One is the shallow coastal route which hugs Canada's mainland. The other is the deep water route through Parry Channel already mentioned. It is the latter which concerns me today.

Until the Manhattan appeared on the scene, the largest ship to sail around the top of America had been the Macdonald displacing 9,000 tons. To put the tanker's feat into perspective, it may be of interest to note that her displacement was 155,000 tons. Being 1,005 feet long, 150 feet wide and having a draft of 55 feet, she is truly a remarkable ship and unquestionably the world's finest icebreaker.

The object, of course, of Humble Oil's test was to determine the feasibility of year-round operations by giant ships through the Northwest Passage bearing Alaskan crude to the U.S. east coast. It has become a contest, it seems, between those who believe in pipelines and those who favour tankers. In fact, it is probable that we will need, and get, both in some form. The 48-inch Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System will supply the west coast market with about one quarter of the north slope output. The balance is destined, one way or another, for the east coast. We're talking about a total output of 2 million barrels a day.

What about costs? Well, it's not easy to arrive at a reliable estimate. To provide terminal facilities for tankers off the north slope, costs are now understood to be substantially less than the 500 millions which was one estimate some time ago. Shipbuilding costs will be very much higher than for conventional tankers because of the additional steelwork and strengthening needed, plus many additional features and equipment not found in ordinary ships. A figure of 60 to 70 millions per ship might not be far off the mark. A fleet of 20 such tankers is envisioned. To this, add costs for marine insurance, east coast terminal facilities, so-called user charges by Canada, plus others. A total of 2 billions is an approximation but substantially less than the "all pipeline" solution, even assuming the latter is practicable and acceptable. At one point the tanker costs were half the pipeline costs but recently the figure has become somewhat less favourable for tankers though still very attractive.

Manhattan was the best vessel Humble could locate for their purpose and she was converted to an icebreaker as quickly as man's ingenuity could devise. This was accomplished by cutting her into four sections and distributing them to selected shipyards on the east coast so that they could work on the conversion simultaneously. This was intended to save precious days as it was hoped to sail for the north in time for a June/July test or even earlier if possible. In the event, she didn't get there until 1 September, the easiest time of the year for ice navigation and just precisely what the sponsors had striven to avoid. It had been a good try.

Captain Steward, her Master, grumbled that no one should have to endure the indignity of seeing one's ship chopped into giant portions. He also boasted that few Captains could claim to having seen the stern of his command alongside the bow and, what's more, pointing in the same direction. He also claimed, with some justification, that he commanded the longest ship in the world, one whose bow lay in Bath, Maine, and whose stern was some 400 miles distant, in Chester, Pennsylvania.

Manhattan set forth from the Delaware Capes, in one piece, on August 25th. After a brief call at Halifax, a courtesy to Canada, and a visit to Thule, Greenland, the ship entered Parry Channel on September 2nd. She reached Point Barrow in Alaska on September 20 to complete the passage. The next day she was eastbound, and after a month's testing in Viscount Melville Sound she entered Halifax harbour on November 8 to honour her Canadian icebreaker escort. And on November 12th she reached New York to mark the end of her voyage. In all she steamed nearly 12,000 miles in 80 days and made history in the process. The whole thing cost Humble Oil nearly 40 millions with Atlantic Richfield and BP putting up 2 million apiece. Canadians can take pleasure in the knowledge that, without the help of the Macdonald, the Manhattan would never have made it. It's true. What is also true is that the Macdonald would never have made it without the tanker to blast a track through the really heavy ice. So Americans, too, can take pleasure. It was a classic example of teamwork.

Altogether the Manhattan became stopped by ice on 25 occasions, requiring assistance from an icebreaker to free her by loosening the accumulated ice around her stern and quarters. But, and I am bound to emphasize, on many occasions the tanker sought the worst ice conditions for test purposes and in the process quite intentionally got herself stuck. These were planned forays, not misadventures, though this may irk those who, for secret reasons of their own, wanted the project to fail.

Achievement of the Northwest Passage as such was incidental to Humble's purpose. But this more than anything else was what caught the public's imagination. Manhattan was, and is, a test vehicle. The object of the exercise was to carry out tests in Arctic ice to achieve a figure of merit for her in various types of ice. The data thus obtained will be extrapolated to provide the characteristics of the ultimate tanker for the trade capable of defeating the ice. Whether or not Manhattan got into difficulties, by accident or design, was otherwise not meaningful.

For what its worth, I would expect the ultimate tanker intended for the transportation of oil through the Passage to displace approximately 340,000 tons, be 1,200 feet long, draw 85 feet of water and generate something like 100,000 shaft horsepower on three screws. Quite a vessel.

Much has been made of the fact that Manhattan did not fly the Canadian flag during her voyage. Here was another instance where a splendid blend of emotion and ignorance affected some people whose patriotism outstripped their knowledge of ships and the sea. I received a telegram onboard the tanker from a politician asking me to fly the Canadian flag while the ship was in, quote "Canadian Arctic waters" unquote--whatever that may mean. This telegram went on to tell me that we had enough flag trouble without American interference. Politicians surely have an obligation to instruct themselves thoroughly on matters which catch their interest and which they intend to air. Foreign ships are under no obligation to fly a Canadian flag and the fact they do so when entering or leaving, or while in a Canadian port is purely a matter of custom and courtesy. It is a well established custom but there is no binding requirement to do so. The only occasions when Manhattan flew our flag was when she lay off Sachs Harbour on Banks Island and at that she was five miles off the beach because of her great draft.

Incidentally this prompted a plaintive message from the Eskimo mayor of that little community to the effect that he had a very good harbour available for our use if we wanted. Captain Steward sent back a message that he had to stay where he was because "his kyack was bigger than their kyacks." Some kyack!

Manhattan and the Macdonald were an unbeatable team. Canadians can derive great satisfaction from the knowledge that our icebreakers were and are held in the very highest regard by Humble Oil and all the people in the tanker. From the moment when Captain Fournier of the "Johnnie Mac", as they called her, took station ahead of the northbound tanker off Frobisher Bay late in August, until the ships parted in Halifax in November, the two were inseparable. The skill and professionalism demonstrated by Fournier, and also Captain Dufour of the Louis St. Laurent, won the ungrudging admiration of all. As a Canadian on the bridge of the Manhattan, I bathed in the reflected glory of their achievements and I confess I enjoyed it immensely.

I turn now to the question of ice damage to the Manhattan. There was a deceitful little piece in the papers after her return to New York that she had damaged plating, the fact of which had been deliberately suppressed. Why would anyone want to put about such a story? It wasn't until the tanker was southbound in Baffin Bay, and deballasting so she could get into Halifax that it was discovered there was something amiss. No matter how hard the ship's pumps worked they couldn't lower the water in one of the wing tanks below sea level. Obviously there was a hole and they were engaged in the task of circulating Baffin Bay through the ship's pumps. A fruitless exercise. Later, when divers went down in Halifax it was found there was a hole big enough, as the Master put it, to drive a truck through. It was unfair to suggest a conspiracy of concealment for there was none.

There was no chance of an oil spill for the ship was ballasted with salt water. Of her 45 tanks 39 were so filled. The remainder, all of them centreline tanks as far aft as possible (about 700 feet from the bow), were immune from damage. They held about 175,000 barrels of various fuels for her use and her Canadian and American icebreakers.

This brings me to the question of oil pollution in the Arctic which is of growing concern to many people. It is my contention that the inevitability of such a thing happening there has been exaggerated. To operate effectively in the north on a year-round basis tankers will have to be built to very high standards of strength and quality. I should like to emphasize that Manhattan's underwater damage last year was in the original mild steel portion of her hull. But her ice-strengthened features were of high tensile steel and were as new when she returned. There will, therefore, be no risk of such ships being torn open or otherwise damaged by sea ice. How much more assertive can one be?

There are those who raise the matter of the Torrey Canyon (and another similar grounding of more recent date to which I will advert presently) concluding that a similar event in the Arctic would be irretrievable. But it isn't so. In the case of the Torrey Canyon she lay exposed to the whole sweep of the North Atlantic and it was heavy seas which broke up that stricken ship distributing her cargo into the water. In the Arctic, on the other hand, the damping effect of the surrounding sea ice ensures calm conditions no matter how boisterous the winds. Even supposing an accident did happen, the resulting spill would, therefore, be confined to the initial impact. But, you might think, such winds could drive pack ice onto a grounded ship and produce the same result. The possibility is there. I don't deny it. But in my view insistence on much more than "run of the mill" professional competence from ship's officers, plus much heavier construction with high quality steel will reduce the possibility of an accident and very much lessen the consequences of one in the unfortunate event. Because of the Arrow are we going to ban all tanker traffic into the Canso area? Of course not. But certain steps will have to be taken to prevent a recurrence both there and elsewhere. For Arctic service we will require much higher standards than have ever been considered anywhere else up to the present.

There is an aspect of Arctic pollution which hitherto has escaped notice. I refer to the matter of refuse disposal from ships operating in those waters. This is a situation which does not seem to pertain to temperate zones where that great eradicator, the sea, manages to absorb much of this material. But not all. The quantity of garbage, in the form of cartons, boxes, cans, bottles, plastic containers and so forth, which gets chucked into the sea from all ships up there is substantial though, I suppose, in the absolute sense it's really not that significant. All this stuff ought to be incinerated. Failing this, it should be dealt with so as to sink or be set aside for subsequent disposal down south. It bears thinking about.

Sovereignty is another matter which, in my view, is overemphasized. I don't really think this is an issue which is of much concern or interest to foreigners right now. Not long ago a suggestion came out of the foyer of the Peace Tower in Ottawa that Manhattan should not be permitted to enter the Canadian Arctic on a spring test voyage which Humble may undertake. This sort of a proposal is a disservice to Canadian Arctic development. To complete the data needed to decide whether big ships can indeed operate year-round, Humble must find ice that is level, of uniform consistency against which ship performance can be accurately measured. Last year's test did not meet such conditions. There is an area in the eastern Arctic where such ideal conditions exist. It so happens that particular location also gives access to the loading site for the proposed Mary River iron ore development in north Baffin. The performance of Manhattan in that ice will have a very significant effect on future plans for that project. This, then, is a matter of more than usual importance to Canadians. There are others. The suggestion that the tanker be denied access is, therefore, baffling. The statement last week by our Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Sharp, in the Commons that M.P.'s should welcome "and not protest" another probe by Manhattan into the Arctic next month was timely and one which I applaud.

I would suggest that anyone who is interested in this matter of Arctic sovereignty might profit from a study of a map of our northern regions. Parry Channel is revealed as a great icy way stretching 800 miles from Baffin Bay in the east to M'Clure Strait in the west. At its eastern entrance it is 50 miles wide and is 90 miles wide at its western extremity. Truly a waterway joining one sea to another, Baffin Bay to the Beaufort Sea. The islands which lie to the north of it are unquestionably Canadian. So are the land masses to the south. But it is a channel--albeit ice choked much of the time. Because of this there is a difference which makes this route rather special. A ship caught and held, even for a short time, by pack ice could be carried by wind and current into territorial waters. Icebreakers would be needed in these and other circumstances. This is where Canada should demonstrate visible and meaningful evidence of her national interest by building and stationing large powerful icebreakers there. Existing icebreakers are not big enough for these tasks. They would be able to assist ships in difficulty and patrol the route to ensure observance of whatever regulations Government sees fit to lay down.

Except for stress of wind and current already referred to the only location where foreign ships would truly enter Canadian territorial waters would be if they diverted down Prince of Wales Strait where, in the vicinity of Princess Royal Islands, they must pass within the three mile limit. But so what? Merchant ships of foreign countries, bound on their peaceful and legitimate business, have the right of innocent passage, without prior notification, through the territorial waters of another state. As Mr. Sharp said, we should welcome this developing situation.

Those who propound nuclear-propelled cargo-carrying submarines for the Northern Passage have been upstaged by the appearance of giant bulk carriers. The former are too expensive and pose too many operational problems to merit consideration at this time. The best way to defeat ice is to fly over it or swim beneath it. But the only way to move heavy tonnages is through it and bigger and more powerful Manhattans will do this.

Everyone is indignant, and quite rightly so too, over the grounding of that Liberian tanker Arrow on Cerberus Rock, named after a ship called that wrecked there in 1783. Cerberus, in Greek mythology, was a dog with three heads and the tail of a serpent who guarded the entrance to Hades. Certainly this recent accident is a hellish situation with oil spilling out in all directions. But before we get too excited and start hounding the oil companies we would do well to remember, like it or not, that the cheapest way to move bulk cargoes of oil is by tanker. We're going to have to live in the shadow of that fact. The point I wish to make is that in modern times, with well-found vessels and every imaginable navigational aid, ships still pile into rocks. Why? The answer is simple--almost always because of professional incompetence or error of judgment on their bridges. This certainly was the case with the Torrey Canyon. I wouldn't presume to offer an opinion on the Arrow. But I'm mighty curious. Surely the time has come when we might query the competence of bridge personnel in ships entering our waters, especially those carrying dangerous cargoes. Ships under "Flags of Convenience" might come under even closer scrutiny for, in some cases, if ability can be related to remuneration, the standards there may be revealing when compared to ships of, say U.S. registration. When a ship runs aground the public, the ever patient public, seems to accept the fact of grounding as inevitable and spends much energy fretting about the messy aftermath. Not only is there the mess to clean up but I reckon there should be demands to know how such a thing happened, why it happened and who was responsible. There are other questions that could be asked but that's a start.

It seems to me that Canada should take the lead in requiring the very best in ships and men destined for Arctic commerce. A degree of co-operation and co-ordination with the U.S. is indicated here. I have Alaska in mind of course. Surely such steps are reasonable if tankers and ore carriers expect to get assistance from our icebreakers, the use of our navigational aids and data from our ice reconnaissance aircraft. As for pollution control, this too calls for consideration but I really don't think its inevitability is so certain as its being made out to be.

Canadian Arctic resource development got a free ride on the coat-tails of the U.S. oil industry--let's not overlook that. Yet it is Canada that will ultimately benefit most from last year's trail blazing achievement. The example of that Mary River iron ore project is one I've already mentioned. There are others and there will be more. After all these years it was a group of aggressive Texans that proved the Northwest Passage is not invincible to commercial ships.

A lot of key decisions affecting Arctic development must be made in the coming months and years. Let's hope that in Canada "dog in the manger" attitudes on matters such as sovereignty will give way to a bolder spirit which those who went before bequeathed us. And anyway, in my view, the dog doesn't even own the manger. Not all of it.

Captain Pullen was thanked on behalf of The Empire Club by Mr. D. H. W. Bath.