Belgian Policy in the Congo
- Publication
- The Empire Club of Canada Addresses (Toronto, Canada), 2 Feb 1961, p. 207-220
- Speaker
- de Their, His Excellency Jacques, Speaker
- Media Type
- Text
- Item Type
- Speeches
- Description
- The Congo as one of the main problems of international affairs; one of the most dangerous spots of the Cold War. Belgium's position as the country to blame and at the United Nations, used by some governments "as a scapegoat to cover up their own manoeuvres to extend their influence over this large area of Central Africa." The purpose of the speaker to "denounce the errors and the lies and to dispel the legends by recalling the facts." A historical and political review of the situation in the Congo, and Belgium's reluctant participation in it. The proclamation of independence by the Congo on June 30, 1960. Consequences of this sudden decision. The dilemma faced by the Belgian government. The financial situation in the Congo, and the deterioration since the political tension in the Congo in 1959 and 1960. Accusations against Belgium, and the speaker's response to them. Belgium's stand today, and further accusations. A review of the current situation and what it means to the people of Belgium. Confidence in the verdict of history for Belgium, when emotions have calmed down and there is a change to consider objectively Belgium's record in the Congo.
- Date of Original
- 2 Feb 1961
- Subject(s)
- Language of Item
- English
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- Full Text
- BELGIAN POLICY IN THE CONGO
An Address by HIS EXCELLENCY JACQUES DE THIER Belgian Ambassador to Canada
Thursday, February 2nd, 1961
CHAIRMAN: The President, Alexander Stark, Q.C.MR. STARK: Today the word, "Congo", is on everyone's lips. We read daily of the turmoil and the confusion and the continuous disturbances; and we sympathize with the suffering and distress that is the lot of so many people in that puzzling country. We wonder, too, if we know enough about the two sides of the story to judge it fairly and impartially. Today, to throw new light on this perplexing situation, we are honoured with a visit by the Belgian Ambassador to Canada, His Excellency Jacques de Thier.
Our guest was born in Belgium in 1900. He was trained as a lawyer, studying at the University of Liege and becoming an Advocate at the Liege Bar in 1923. For a few years, he was attached to the Prime Minister's Cabinet in Brussels; and after passing diplomatic examinations, he was appointed Attache to the Belgian Legation in Berlin in 1932. Subsequently he served in Athens, Teheran, Spain, Washington, New York, and for four years immediately prior to his Canadian appointment, was named Ambassador to Mexico. On July 4, 1958, he was appointed to his present high post as Ambassador to this country. In addition, for the past four years, he has been a member of the Belgian delegation to the General Assemblies of the United Nations.
Our guest has been awarded many honours, including the Commander Order of the Crown and the Officer Order of Leopold. He is a member of the Royal Ottawa Golf Club and the Country Club of Ottawa. He is married and has three children.
It is with great pleasure that I present to you His Excellency Jacques de Thier, Belgian Ambassador to Canada, who will address us on the subject, "Belgian Policy in the Congo".
MR. DE THIER: I wish to thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak on Belgium's policy in the Congo. So much has already been said on the subject that you may be tired of it. Unfortunately, the Congo remains one of the main problems of international affairs, one of the most dangerous spots of the Cold War. Besides, Belgium is blamed for all the troubles of this unfortunate country and, at the United Nations Organization, she is used by some governments as a scapegoat to cover up their own manoeuvres to extend their influence over this large area of Central Africa.
Backed by a powerful anti-colonial and communist propaganda, fiction blends with history; and a great deal of confusion prevails in many people's minds about the Congo.
You may have heard this definition of a diplomat: "An honest man whose job it to lie abroad for the good of his country." My task, I assure you, is exactly the opposite: it is to denounce the errors and the lies and to dispel the legends by recalling the facts.
Belgium became a colonial power without looking for it, almost unwillingly. The Belgian people, who had acquired their own independence only forty-five years before, were not in the least interested in the colonial undertakings of the second half of the last century. But their King, Leopold II, was a man of genius, and the establishment of the Belgian Congo was his work. He had paid great attention to the endeavours of the explorers of Central Africa and, with the help of Stanley, he created the "International Congo Association", to further the exploration and development of the Congo region. After a few years, in 1885, this Association was recognized as an Independent State under the personal sovereignty of King Leopold at the International Conference of Berlin by the main Powers of the time. They thought they had, through this device, removed the Congo area from power politics and insured the maintenance of peace in Central Africa.
When one considers the Congo, one should keep in mind that this region was, at that time-only seventy-five years ago-one of the most backward and unhealthy areas of the world. It was inhabited by primitive tribes speaking different languages and fighting among themselves. They could neither read nor write and had no means of transportation besides the canoe. They did not know the wheel nor the plough. All kinds of diseases and the slave merchants took a great toll among them.
With the help of missionaries, doctors, administrators, and engineers of different nationalities, with the help also of Belgian, British, and American capital, King Leopold undertook to develop and civilize this immense area. It soon appeared that the needs were enormous and the task too heavy for one man, however able he may have been. His administration of the Congo State aroused criticisms and King Leopold, realizing that the development of this African area required more powerful means, proposed that Belguim take over the Congo. In 1908, that is fifty-three years ago, the Belgian Parliament accepted, not without apprehension, the offer of King Leopold. The Independent State of the Congo had lasted almost twenty-five years.
The administration of the Congo was an enormous undertaking for a small country like Belgium.
The Belgians had no experience, doctrine, or prejudice in colonial matters; and they endeavoured to tackle the problems in a realistic way. They started at the basis. They organized means of transportation and communication; they built houses, hospitals, primary schools, and churches -in short, all the essential requirements for a wild region which opens itself to modern civilization.
Fortunately, the Congo has abundant natural resources, and their development provided the necessary financial' means. Concessions were granted to private companies which invested large amounts of capital in the Congo. Anxious to prevent these companies from exploiting the resources of the country to their sole profit, the Belgian Congo Administration kept for itself, as a price for the concessions, an important part of the capital of these companies and appointed its own representatives to their Boards of Directors. Thanks to the income of the shares which were its property and to the taxes raised on the whole profit made by the companies, the Belgian Congo Administration received a very large part of the benefits and used them for the needs of the Congo.
This system of development of the country through big companies, jointly owned by the State and private capital, has given excellent results and was mainly responsible for the economic success of the Congo.
Having overcome the inevitable difficulties of the beginning, the Congo had become an important supplier of raw material and was in a position to bring a substantial contribution to the Allied effort during the last war. The uranium which was used to make the first atomic bombs in the United States, was produced in the Congo.
Before its independence, the Congo was the first world producer of cobalt and industrial diamonds, the second of palm oil, the third of uranium, the fourth of tin and the fifth of copper, immediately after Canada.
As a result of this economic prosperity, the Belgian Congo Administration was able to raise considerably the standard of living of an important part of the Congolese population. Its average income was one of the highest in Africa, and only in Ghana were there more children going to school than in the Congo.
During almost fifty years, this economic and human progress went on peacefully, without political troubles. Neither the Congolese nor the white residents exercised political responsibilities. The political power rested in the hands of the Governor General, who received his instructions from the Belgian Government in Brussels.
A few years ago, however, the Belgian Government, knowing that this paternalist regime did not meet the needs of a more developed population, had taken steps to give the Congolese higher education and a share in the administration of the country. Two universities were created, one in Leopoldville, another in Elizabethville. Municipal elections, in which the educated Congolese participated, took place in the cities, and African mayors were appointed in African districts. It was only a first step-more important reforms were to come. In 1958, the Belgian Government had sent a special committee to the Congo to study the situation and submit a programme of reforms. But the "winds of change" blew faster and, in January 1959, the bloody riots which broke out in Leopoldville shook the Belgian people and the world.
Of course, the Belgian authorities had known before that all had not been going well in Leopoldville. The native districts, swollen by the constant arrivals from the country of young people looking for jobs and adventures, had become more and more a source of troubles. The recession, which affected more a raw material producing country like the Congo, had increased the number of unemployed. The contrast between the comfortable way of life m the white districts and the poverty in some sections of the African districts had created ill-feeling against the whites. The expectation of a new statement of policy by the Belgian Government had recently increased the tension. And, last but not least, the growing demand for independence in the rest of Africa, the accession of Ghana to full sovereignty, the political reforms in the French African territories, the Conference of the African people in Accra, and the anti-colonialist propaganda from many parts of the world, including countries of the West, had impressed and inflamed the population of the Congo.
On January 13th, 1959, according to schedule, the Belgian Government proclaimed its intention to set up in the Congo a democratic regime able to exercise the prerogatives of sovereignty and, to quote the words of King Baudouin, "to lead the Congolese toward independence without dangerous delay, but also without inconsiderate haste." General elections would take place before the end of the year to form municipal and regional councils. Then, provincial councils in each province and a general council (future House of Representatives) as well as a legislative council (future Senate) at Leopoldville would be set up, the majority of their members being elected by the members of the new municipal and regional councils.
This programme did not satisfy the Congolese. New riots broke out. Nationalist leaders asked for immediate independence, and some of the main political parties abstained from participating in the municipal elections which took place in December 1959.
Determined to try everything to arrive at a satisfactory agreement, the Belgian Government decided to call a meeting in Brussels between representatives of the Belgian authorities and the main political leaders of the Congo, to lay down the structures of the new state which was to attain soon its independence.
To this meeting in January 1960, known as the "Round Table Conference", the Congolese came decided to obtain independence--if not immediately, at least within a very short time.
They refused to discuss any other matter before this point had been settled. It seemed to the Belgian Government that it would have been wise to postpone the proclamation of independence for four or five years to install the new machinery of the State and give some training to those who would have to make it work. But this argument was to no avail, and it was then that the Belgian Government took the momentous decision to agree, as a compromise, that Congo independence would be proclaimed less than six months later, on June 30th of that year.
From then on, the discussion was relatively easy and the Round Table Conference ended in a friendly atmosphere, having adopted sixteen resolutions outlining the steps to be taken to organize the new State on a democratic basis and build a new framework for the future relations between the Congo and Belgium.
At the request of the Congolese, the Round Table was followed by an economic conference to inform them of the various aspects of the economic problems of the Congo and establish new forms of co-operation between the two countries.
The programme adopted at the Round Table for the organization of the new State was executed according to schedule before the date set for the proclamation of independence. A House of Representatives was elected by universal suffrage, and a Senate was composed of members designated mainly by the Provincial Assemblies. The first Prime Minister, Lumumba, head of the party controlling the greatest number of seats, was appointed by the King of the Belgians; and the head of the State, Kasavubu, was elected by the two Houses meeting together. The presence of these two main political leaders and rivals in the same government had been welcome as a good start for the new State. Immediately after the celebration of Independence, a treaty of friendship, assistance and co-operation was signed between the governments of the Congo and Belgium. From then on, the new State was in a position to operate with the help of Belgian technicians, government officials, judges, army officers, engineers, physicians, professors, who were to remain in the Congo as long as they would be needed by the new Government.
The proclamation of independence, on June 30th, 1960, ended the Belgian colonial regime in the Congo.
The sudden change of the Belgian policy in the Congo, the decision to recognize its independence almost without delay, came as a surprise to the world.
Faced with a unanimous aspiration and demand for immediate independence from the leaders and crowds of the Congo, the Belgian Government was confronted with a dilemma: either grant independence in an atmosphere of goodwill and friendship and be ready to assist the new State with technicians and capital, or use force to maintain its rule and delay the accession to independence. In that case, in view of the general unrest which prevailed in the country, the possibility of waging a colonial war had to be envisaged.
To use force was against the feelings of the Belgian people. It was not suggested by any political party. On the contrary, the Opposition (the Socialist party) took part in the Round Table Conference and approved its resolutions. For centuries, the Belgians themselves had struggled against foreign domination. It was repulsive to them to impose a harsh rule on others, and it would certainly have been denounced by international public opinion as a new "crime" of colonialism.
To use force on a large scale in the Congo would have raised difficult problems. Events have shown that the army, composed of African soldiers and Belgian officers, could not be relied upon. Troops should have been sent from Belgium, and fighting between white and black soldiers would probably have broken out. The use of force would certainly have produced hostility and hate against Belgians and deteriorated, or even ended, all possibilities of further co-operation between them and the Congolese.
The Belgian Government did not ignore the risks involved in granting independence to a country which was not ready for it. But this solution offered the only hope of a peaceful transformation of the colonial regime into a friendly co-operation between the two countries. In choosing this solution, Belgium did not give up her responsibilities; on the contrary, it signed, with the new Congolese Government, a treaty of friendship and co-operation, which provided for financial assistance from Belgium and for the maintenance of Belgian civil servants and technicians in the Congo as long as the new Government would require them.
Belgium was faced with two evils and chose what seemed to be the lesser of the two. Unfortunately, the hope which the latter warranted did not come true. Events have taken a turn for the worse, in a way not anticipated even by the pessimists and, by a tragic irony, and probably with help from outside, they have produced what the Belgian Government had wanted most to avoid: the use of force with all its terrible consequences.
Belgium left the new Congo State in a basically sound economic situation.
Its natural resources are potentially enormous. It had a public debt of only $1,000,000,000 but, on the other hand, possessed modem equipment resulting from the important investments made by Belgium. Following the first ten-year plan alone, Belgium had spent almost $1,000,000,000 in the Congo.
The new State has also inherited a portfolio of shares of private companies operating in the Congo. These shares, as we have seen, belonged to the Belgian Congo Administration.
During the last years, exports exceeded imports by about $100,000,000 yearly. The Congo is, therefore, not only well equipped, but has abundant sources of income.
However, the political tension which troubled the Congo in 1959 and 1960, has deteriorated its financial situation. New funds which normally would have entered the Congo, remained abroad; and funds already there were transferred outside. This had created a serious crisis for the Treasury of the Belgian Congo Administration, and a foreign exchange control with a ceiling for the expatriation of capital had to be established.
Under normal circumstances, these temporary difficulties would have been overcome as soon as the political tension would have eased.
Thus the Congo was endowed with the economic means required to become a prosperous nation.
On July 5th, a few days after the celebration of Independence, an important development, the revolt of the Force Publique, started the catastrophe. The soldiers, demanding promotions and a general increase in pay, jailed their Belgian officers and took over the arms and ammunitions depots. It was then that Mr. Lumumba and several members of his Cabinet, unable or unwilling to quell the rebellion and to restore order, accused the Belgians of fomenting the disturbances and, through radio broadcasts particularly, roused the Congolese people against them. Meanwhile, mutineers were attacking whites, plundering their homes, ill-treating and humiliating men, and raping women. These appalling scenes caused many whites, including Canadian missionaries, to flee the Congo. Faced with the inability of the new Congolese Government to restore order, the Belgian Government sent troops from Belgium to protect the lives and properties of its own nationals and of other white people.
The situation has continued to deteriorate ever since. Mr. Lumumba denounced what he called the "aggression by Belgian troops"; he declared void the Friendship Treaty with Belgium, broke off diplomatic relations, and called on the United Nations to help expel Belgian troops. Belgium, Which had sent them with the sole purpose of restoring order, withdrew them gradually as the United Nations Forces took over. Following the departure of many whites, public services and economic activities were considerably reduced, and chaos prevailed. President Kasavubu and Premier Lumumba were unable to agree on a common policy. Acting within the limits of his constitutional powers, Mr. Kasavubu dismissed Mr. Lumumba and had him arrested as he refused to submit. Meanwhile, followers of Mr. Lumuba took control of the Oriental Province and claimed to have established a government in its capital, Stanleyville, stronghold of the former Premier. They have also taken over control of the province of Kivu after kidnapping members of its government, and their troops have recently invaded the north of the province of Katanga.
The leader of the Katanga government, Mr. Tshombe, has always refused to recognize the authority of the government of Leopoldville. Advocating a federal system, he does not accept the idea of a centralized State. He has maintained order in most of his province and kept the Belgian technicians in his service. As a result of this policy, economic activities are almost normal in Katanga.
Today President Kasavubu and his government have, in fact, no authority in several provinces of the Congo, and the whole country is threatened with civil war by the followers of Mr. Lumumba, strongly supported by the communist States and some Afro-Asian countries.
Belgium has not ceased to be blamed for the Congo's evils. She was criticized for giving independence to the Congo too early, but those who make this point forget to mention that nationalist fervour and anti-colonial propaganda had inflamed the Congolese and that the use of force by Belgium to maintain a colonial regime would have been branded as a crime against human freedom.
It is interesting to note in this connection that, in a resolution adopted at the last General Assembly of the United Nations by a great majority of members, the United Nations stated that lack of preparation in political, economic, social, or educational fields, can never be taken as an excuse to delay independence.
Belgium is blamed for not having prepared the Congolese for independence. But it is ignored that, when Belgium took over the Congo, only fifty-two years ago, it was still one of the wildest and least developed areas of the world. Nor does one consider the achievements of the Belgian Administration in the field of primary, technical, and higher education. One quotes small figures of university graduates in the Congo and does not mention the fully-equipped university in Leopoldville, where hundreds of young Congolese receive a university education of a high academic level. One does not mention either the 644 medical assistants who have studied medicine for four years after high school and would be rated as medical officers in many countries.
Belgium is accused of "having sucked the Congo dry", to use the expression of a Canadian newspaperman. However, little attention is paid to the enormous investments made by Belgium in the Congo and to the advanced economic infra-structure built and left by the Belgians in this territory.
A few weeks ago, for example, a Canadian expert, member of the United Nations Forces in the Congo, Mr. J. P. Fournier, stated, during a visit in Montreal, that the infrastructure left by the Belgians for aviation was remarkable and could be compared with the best in our countries.
Seldom mentioned also is the programme for economic and financial assistance of exceptional magnitude offered by Belgium, accepted by the new Congolese Government, and later rejected by Mr. Lumumba. This assistance included an annual grant of $100,000,000, or twice the total amount of the Colombo Plan.
Belgian experts were criticized for leaving the Congo immediately after Independence, but no mention was made of the circumstances which made many of them go: the mutiny of the Congo Army and the following troubles. Nor is it mentioned that hundreds of them remained in the country and kept most essential public services working under difficult and dangerous circumstances.
Lately, Belgian experts were blamed for returning to the Congo. But, one does not add that they were called back by the Congo authorities.
Belgium was suspected of encouraging autonomous movements and provoking the secession of Katanga. However, it was Belgium who created the unity of the Congo and advocated a central form of government, fearing that federalism might result in ultimate disintegration. In defending this position in its discussion with the Congolese leaders, the Belgian Government dissociated itself from Mr. Tshombe, head of the Government of Katanga, and already before Independence, one of the champions of Federation.
One forgets that, before Belgium took over, there was no real Congo State, no Congo Nation, but only rival tribes with a long tradition of tribal warfare. The only common bond in the Congo was the Belgian Administration, and it was, therefore, not amazing to have seen the revival of tribal hostility after the Belgians departed.
Today, Belgium is not taking any stand in the conflict between Congolese authorities. She respects the sovereignty of the Congo and considers that the internal regime of this country must be determined by the Congolese themselves.
Belgium has further been accused, not only of lack of co-operation with the United Nations representatives in the Congo, but also of being sometimes an obstacle to the fulfillment of their mission.
In fact, the Belgian Government approved the intervention of the United Nations in the Congo and wants its success. It is Belgium's wish that the Belgian technicians still in the Congo work in harmony with the representatives of the United Nations Forces there. Their purpose should be the same: the restoration of order and the consolidation and development of the new independent State.
Belgium has, for example, withdrawn her troops from the Congo in conformity with the resolutions of the Security Council. As we have seen, these troops were sent to the Congo after the mutiny of the Force Publique, only to protect the fives and properties of the Belgians and other white people. It was never intended to maintain these troops there, and they were withdrawn as soon as the United Nations Forces were able to operate in the Congo. Mr. Hammarskjold pointed out that this withdrawal, completed in five weeks, could not be considered a failure for the United Nations. This United Nations success could not have been possible without the co-operation of the Belgian Government.
However, it is natural that Belgium, which has special interests in the Congo, does not always share the views of the United Nations Secretariat, which acts on behalf of the community of nations or, at least, of the majority of those who support its action.
The United Nations representatives have, on various occasions, complained about the presence of Belgian technicians in the Congo or their return to that country. They have suggested that all technical assistance from Belgium should be granted through the United Nations.
The Belgian Government has not been favourably impressed by the discriminatory attitude of the United Nations towards Belgians. Further, it considers that it is up to the Congo Government to decide whether or not they want to give up their right to accept technical assistance from another country. As far as the Belgian technicians are concerned, they are in the Congo at the request and in the service of the Congolese authorities. They are no longer Belgian officials, but Congo officials. Last November, there were about 2,000 Belgian technicians in the Congo against 165 United Nations technicians. The Congo needs the Belgian technicians, and the United Nations cannot find the men to replace them. Canada, for example, has not been able to supply the French-speaking teachers which UNESCO is endeavouring to recruit for the Congo.
To demand the withdrawal of Belgian technicians would be unrealistic. It would considerably increase the chaos prevailing in that country and ignore the wishes and the sovereignty of the Congo Government. In fact, the Belgian technicians who are performing duties in the Congo are rendering precious services, not only to the Congolese people, but also to the United Nations.
As you may well imagine, the situation in the Congo has deeply shocked the Belgian people. They are dismayed by the crumbling of their work in the Congo; they are hurt by the unfounded criticisms and accusations directed against them.
Belgium's work in the Congo had its defects and its shortcomings, but, on the whole, it was a remarkable achievement of assistance and civilization in one of the most primitive and underdeveloped regions of Africa. It was also a great contribution to the peace of the world, since, for more than half a century, Belgium maintained order in an enormous territory always threatened by tribal warfare and the ambitions of outside Powers.
The time has not yet come to draw definite conclusions from Belgium's venture in the Congo. But we are confident that, when emotions will have calmed down, when the world will be in a position to consider objectively Belgium's record in the Congo, we shall have little to fear from the verdict of history.
THANKS OF THE MEETING were expressed by Mr. John L. Bonus.