China Today

MR. KARN:

Today we are pleased to welcome as our guest speaker the first of three Ambassadors for Canada who are serving our country with distinction and who have generously agreed to honour us with addresses this season. And what could be more appropriate on this eve of the Chinese New Year, which ushers in "the year of the snake", than hosting our most recent Canadian Ambassador from Peking.

Mr. John Small has just returned to Ottawa after several foreign postings extending over a period of 26 years, the most recent of which was to the People's Republic of China. None of these locations required him to struggle with a snow shovel, which is what he was doing when I located him one evening in January.

To be required to exchange life in that beautiful modern brown brick Embassy on the outskirts of Peking, complete with spacious gardens and swimming pool, for a language training course in mid-winter Ottawa is almost similar to the Chinese custom of rotating certain members of the privileged community to the rural communes for reconditioning of the mind as well as the body at given intervals.

And yet stark contrasts have been his cup of tea for several years. Born in Ch'eng-tu, China in 1919 of missionary parents, he obtained his B.Sc.A. degree from the Ontario Agricultural College in 1942 and Bachelor of Arts degree in political science and economics from the University of Toronto in 1949. During the war years he served with the R.C.N. in the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, Normandy, and Australia, being discharged as Lieutenant in 1946.

In 1949 he joined the Department of Trade and Commerce, and after five years at The Hague moved over to External Affairs--in their Far East division. Chinese language studies were required to refresh his memory and then he was off to Hong Kong and later Karachi.

Canada made him her permanent representative to O.E.C.D. in Paris for four years and then appointed him High Commissioner (later Ambassador) to Pakistan and concurrently Ambassador to Afghanistan. From 1972 to 1976 he served as Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, and concurrently Ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for the past two years. We wonder what he did in his spare time.

Those of you who, like myself, may have been privileged to enjoy the excitement of visiting in China in recent years, and perhaps meeting the late premier Chou En-lai and enjoying his warm hospitality, must marvel at the awesome political strength and infinite wisdom of those who rise to lead 900,000,000 people, united in purpose, and dedicated to improving the quality of life of all. You can well understand the significance of the Chinese custom of venerating the snake for his wisdom and goodwill. Many appear in marble and stone in the Palace Museum--formerly called the Forbidden City.

There is also much of the material wealth and life style of ancient China which can be studied by the visitor. Here is a piece of stone which I took from a quarry at the foot of the Great Wall, that magnificent defence monument to Chinese engineering capability, 6,000 kilometers in length, built over two thousand years ago--to repel the invaders and thereby improve their quality of life even then. As for the 1970's, do not forget that China ordered three Concorde supersonic aircraft at about the same time that Canada cancelled her order.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are interested in what the future holds for that vast republic on the opposite side of the globe. It is a distinct privilege to introduce Mr. John Small to talk to us about "China Today".

MR. SMALL:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your invitation to speak to this distinguished audience today and for your warm welcome.

In accepting, I did so with some hesitation because it is now four months since I left Peking and events in China have a habit of leaping ahead once they begin to move and moved they have in recent weeks. I am reminded of some remarks on the situation in Cyprus a few years ago when a keen observer commented that "anyone who claims to understand the situation can't be in possession of the facts". Well, at times it may seem that way with respect to China, and the facts as we are aware of them often seem bizarre, if not incomprehensible from this distance.

What I propose to do in the next half hour is to provide you with something of the atmosphere in China today and, hopefully, sufficient signposts along the way to help you to reach your own conclusions. The experts have been wrong so often where China is concerned that it would be presumptuous of me to claim to have all the answers or to purport to know what will happen next. As the reactions of visitors to China tend toward the extremes -pro or con--I shall try to provide a balanced perspective and, hopefully, some useful insights into the way thins are done in China by the Chinese people.

The death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung last September ended the forty-year era during which he dominated the course of Chinese communism. The passing eight months earlier of Mr. Chou En-lai, until then the People's Republic of China's only premier, was an event of commensurate importance since, over the years, it had fallen to him to implement Chairman Mao's line on domestic and foreign policy. As the Chinese authorities are now saying, he did this "creatively". In other words, he improved on the Chairman's policies whenever this was necessary--as it often was.

One of the things Premier Chou En-lai sought to do shortly before he died, probably with Chairman Mao's approval though this is not entirely clear, was to set up the succession to Mao Tse-tung and himself. Had he outlived the Chairman he doubtless would have succeeded him as the head of the Party. Beyond that, it was clear in January, 1975, that he intended the then senior Vice-Premier, Teng Hsiao-ping, to succeed him as Premier. As we all know, Chou's carefully balanced structure for the succession began to fall apart one month after his death when Teng was publicly attacked. It crashed in ruins when Teng was ousted from office just two months later.

The new Premier, Hua Kuo-feng, moved swiftly with military support after Mao Tse-tung's death. Within a month, he arrested the Chairman's wife, Chiang Ching, and the other three prime "radicals" ("leftists" or "idealogues"), Chang Chunchiao, Yao Wen-yuan and Wang Hung-wen. The latest indications from China suggest that there is strong support for the return to office of Teng Hsiao-ping and it seems likely he will be rehabilitated for the second time in recent years. The only doubts remaining relate to timing and the capacity in which he will serve in the future.

I have related, sketchily, this fragment of recent Chinese °°' history to illustrate the processes by which politics are pursued in the People's Republic of China. Throughout the more than half-century history of the Chinese Communist Party there have been a series of "line" struggles for leadership and, until his death, Chairman Mao invariably out-manoeuvred and bested his adversaries. In the absence of leadership conventions of the North American variety, aspirants to the top party position in China until now have had to combine political astuteness with support from a combination of civilian and military factions, with the latter often being decisive.

In effecting the most recent changes Hua Kuo-feng, who combines in himself the Party Chairmanship and Premiership, followed the traditional pattern by obtaining the support of the majority "moderate" or Chou En-lai faction, and that of the military. The "radicals" who lost the struggle for power did so because they lacked this type of support and had lost, with Mao's death, their trump card. Chairman Mao in the Cultural Revolution of 1966-7Q had had his last fling at ensuring the endurance of his values and priorities but in doing so had divided China's leadership. In the years which followed, the struggle between the "moderates" and the "radicals" became intense and resulted in the triumph of the former following Mao's departure.

What was it that set these two groups apart? Essentially it was means rather than ends, for both groups comprise convinced communists and want the type of state that this implies. The radicals sought through manipulation of education, the media and cultural apparatus to impose narrow, ideologically visionary concepts of revolution and egalitarianism. They emphasized class struggle and mass mobilization to achieve doctrinal objectives. The "moderates" sought realistic solutions by pragmatic and less ideologically oriented means. They emphasized stability, productivity and economic expansion.

With the "moderates" now in control it seems likely that their practical economic policies will be pursued. What is less certain is the caste of characters who will be directing and implementing them. As mentioned earlier Teng Hsiaoping seems destined to return but when and in what capacity are unknown. As Chou En-lai's chosen successor he will not be inclined to accept less than one of the most senior posts. This obviously creates difficulties for Hua Kuo-feng since he now occupies the top party, governmental and military positions as, respectively, Chairman, Premier and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Ensuring Teng's cooperation seems vital to achievement of stable government in the future. Should the two men agree to work together harmoniously a long step on the road to stability will have been taken. If, however, Teng were to challenge Hua's primacy the present atmosphere of uncertainty would remain, with adverse effects in the political, economic, social and military spheres.

With this cloud of political uncertainty hanging over China's leaders, the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China seems destined to remain on its present course. This means an anti-Soviet stance balanced by maintenance of essentially friendly relations with the United States. Sino-Soviet state relations could improve marginally but the ideological quarrel, on present indications, seems destined to continue while the current leaders control both countries:

Chinese relations with the United States can never be completely normal while the latter continues to guarantee the separate status of Taiwan. The authorities in Peking have been prepared to wait patiently, especially to give the new American government time to settle in. They may become impatient, however, if President Carter fails to show any movement on the question of Taiwan. For their part, the Chinese refuse to abandon their ultimate lever, armed force, to reclaim Taiwan as a province of the People's Republic of China. At the same time, the United States is bound to protect Taiwan by virtue of its security treaty with the Nationalists all of which leaves neither side with much room for manoeuvre. Whatever happens, China needs a basically friendly or at least benevolently neutral United States as a counterweight to what it perceives as a greater threat to its land frontiers from the Soviet Union. Similarly, China will endeavour to remain on good terms with Japan for such strategic, but also for historic and practical economic, reasons.

Another cardinal aspect of China's foreign policy is its identification with and support for the developing countries or Third World. The leaders of the People's Republic have arbitrarily divided the world into three categories: the First World, comprising the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union; the Second World, comprising the industrialized developed countries, including Canada and its European, Japanese and Australian friends; and the Third World, comprising the rest, i.e. the developing countries. It is axiomatic that if an issue divides the First or Second Worlds from the Third, the People's Republic of China will be on the side of the last. One does not need to look far for the reasons why the People's Republic insists on identifying with the developing world: it is itself in a developing phase and it has a shared history of foreign domination and exploitation by what it terms the "imperialists" and the "colonialists". This terminology is not unreasonable since the acts of aggression against China in the 19th and 20th centuries were perpetuated by what were then unabashedly imperial and colonial powers.

Canada, as a colony well into the 19th century and as an emergent independent country after 1867, cannot be termed an imperialist or colonialist power. Nevertheless, although we have escaped the ultimate approbrium of being either an imperialist or super-power we tend to be tarred with the same brush or classified among the "running dogs" of imperialism. This terminology has softened recently and may be heard less in the future. We will, however, continue to be lumped together with the developed Second World and considered beyond the pale of either the Third or the "socialist", i.e. communist, world. Contradictory as it may seem, this does not inhibit the development of good and useful relations with Canada. Canada gained considerable credit with China when in 1970 we agreed to recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and simply took note of China's claim to Taiwan, rather than to recognize or deny it, and thereby created the formula through which the log-jams on recognition of the People's Republic and its United Nations membership were broken. While the immediate effect of this has diminished, Canada is, nevertheless, regarded by the Chinese authorities as a relatively progressive member of the Second World, a useful trading partner and a source of scientific and technical know-how.

I cannot leave China's foreign policy without a brief reference to its distant past. The People's Republic of China is sometimes termed aggressive, irrational or xenophobic. But if Chinese reactions to foreign encroachment are to be understood they must be recognized as the end result of a long history stemming in recognizable form from Han Dynasty times, or roughly the period of the Roman Empire, to the present day. Nearly two thousand years ago, following the ebb and flow of conquests and defeats, the Chinese rulers concluded that a policy of suzerainty over border regions suited their needs better than the costly process of military conquest. There thus came into being a ring of surrounding states which maintained their political integrity while deferring to Chinese influence and culture. Since those times the Chinese have regarded threats or perceived threats to peripheral states as a threat to China itself. Hence, the violent reaction to the approach of United Nations' forces to the Chinese frontier in Korea, to American involvement in Indochina and, more recently, to the Indian absorption of Sikkim. If one adds to this historic strategic concept China's enormous economic problems and its consequent relative military weakness, it becomes plain that the People's Republic of China has no territorial ambitions beyond its own frontiers. And if one should question its attitude toward the Paracel and Spratly islands in the South China Sea, it should be noted that these have long been claimed by China and that some evidence exists to substantiate such claims.

Turning to the domestic scene in China, there is a single stark statistic that stands out from all the rest and which determines the parameters of Chinese domestic and, in a general sense, foreign policies. This is the figure for China's population: 900 million souls, give or take a few million. To grasp the enormity of this figure it is only necessary to realize that the People's Republic reproduces Canada's population every 15 months and will reach the staggering total of one billion before 1985--something to think about! Indeed, according to Tong Hsiao-ping when, as senior VicePremier he was acting Premier during Chou En-lai's terminal illness, this was what the Chinese leaders spent more time and thought on than any other single subject. Speaking to a Canadian visiting delegation, he said the problems involved in solving the basic food, clothing and housing needs of the Chinese people were his and his colleagues' prime economic priorities.

As you know, the areas of Canada and China are approximately the same, with Canada marginally larger. There is another geographical likeness between the two countries in that only a small proportion of the land mass in each is arable and cultivated. In Canada the figure is a little under 10%. For China it is between 10 and 15%. There the likeness ends, however, for our relatively small population and our economic philosophy which permits unlimited imports of food, clothing and materials of all sorts, contrasts sharply with China's 900 million and its autarchical economic concept which demands the highest possible degree of self-sufficiency.

Given these realities, it is remarkable how successful the government in Peking has been since 1949. Look at the facts. When the People's Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1st, 1949, the new regime inherited a prostrate economy; inflation was rampant; the currency was worthless; the population as a whole was poverty-stricken with a high proportion living at the margin of starvation; many diseases were endemic and epidemic in proportions; administration was corrupt and inefficient; industry, such as it was, was at a standstill; crime and prostitution were rife. Within a remarkably short space of time new administrative structures were in place and basic honesty had replaced corruption; inflation was halted; a new and stable currency was in circulation; crime and prostitution were controlled; universal education and public health services were instituted, agriculture reorganized, land improved, irrigation expanded and reforestation launched; employment, food, clothing and adequate shelter were provided for all, and a strong, stable, centralized government was in control in Peking. Taken together, this was a remarkable list of achievements by any standard.

One can argue endlessly about the means employed to achieve all this but it is pointless to do so. China had come through a century and more of corrupt, divided and feckless governments with their concomitants of physical invasion and foreign domination, as well as an ego-shattering external challenge to its centuries-old culture. Government had always been at best autocratic or paternal, at worst venal and oppressive, but never democratic. That the new communist government in Peking was not democratic in our sense of the term was of no import to an exhausted and ravaged people who had, in any event, never experienced that form of government. To the mass of Chinese at the time, anything new had to be better than the old.

When Chairman Mao declared on October 1st, 1949, that the people of China had stood up, that was no less than a statement of fact. After decades of internal and external oppression, which incidentally contributed to the tightly knit character of the family in China, the people of China were able to raise their heads in pride under the leadership of a government which spoke for the nation at home and abroad.

This does not mean that everyone in China agreed with or accepted the new government. Chairman Mao himself customarily set the number of dissidents at 5 % of the populace. In today's terms that would represent forty-five million people or twice the population of Canada. But substantial as this number seems, it should be considered within the perspective of the total population. Forty-five million submerged and dispersed through 900 million becomes much less significant or alarming for any government ensconced in Peking. From 1949 on, then, the new Chinese government could count on the mass support of its people, tired as they were of corruption, domestic and foreign exploitation, civil war, and general mismanagement. They were therefore not inclined to quibble over--even if they thought of--the niceties of this or that policy, whether democratic or otherwise, as long as peace was restored and a decent living was assured. And this in general is what they got.

Of course, there have been ups and downs. To quote Chairman Mao again, "A revolution is not a dinner party." Chairman Mao's revolution has included an unending series of campaigns aimed at furthering the revolution itself and, incidentally, at modernizing the country and raising the living standards of its people. In a modest way the latter ends have been achieved. A family in either the city or countryside now has from one to three rooms, depending usually on the size of the family, in a solid brick dwelling. Everyone has a job of some sort. It may be menial or insubstantial but there are few able-bodied unemployed in China. An eight-hour workday is enforced. Basic commodities like cooking oil, rice and cotton are rationed but no one starves or goes without clothing or shelter. The cost of living has remained stable for nearly three decades and some prices have fallen. Nearly every child receives primary education; most, secondary education and an increasing, but in percentage terms small, number receive higher education. A public health network spans the country and is available to all at minimal cost. An infrastructure of communications and telecommunications is constantly being expanded.

Conditions, of course, in China are still not ideal and the Chinese are the first to point this out. Their society, while much fairer than before 1949, is far from the egalitarian ideal projected by the idealogues. Chairman Mao himself, not long before he died, pointed out that the eight-grade wage system was still the norm in industry. There are something like twenty-eight cadre levels. City dwellers, mental and industrial workers remain far better off than their country, manual and agricultural counterparts. Higher level cadres enjoy a variety of privileges in addition to higher pay, such as better suit material, better housing, or an official car with curtained windows. Labour efficiency is generally low and low wages combined with a paternalistic system have sapped the legendary industry of the Chinese worker. The educational system, though nearly universal, is appallingly weak. Besides the disruptions of events such as the Cultural Revolution, which cost at least five years of higher education, students are still being chosen for university on their ideological rather than their academic credentials. And the curriculum of the customary three-year university course is normally about halved by time spent on physical labour and political activities. There are, however, signs that these deficiencies may be about to be tackled as a consequence of the disappearance of the "Gang of Four".

Granting these weaknesses in the Chinese system, one should not be unduly critical. The chaotic situation which existed in 1949 was overcome in remarkably short order, and a stable government and economic structure were installed which have on the whole worked well for the Chinese people in the conditions which have existed in their country. We need not be carried away, as some Canadians are, to the point where Chinese solutions are regarded as panaceas for all ills in all countries. They are not. As things are now, most of China's methods and the philosophy behind them would not be acceptable to most Canadians in the environment and conditions that exist here. For example, under present conditions all students at the end of their studies are assigned their life work without choice. However, Chinese concepts and methods generally have been effective in Chinese conditions. They have laid the foundation for onward progress to better things. The soon-to-be population of one billion can never expect a one-car, let alone two-car, garage for every household. But then, for how long into the future can we expect to have such luxuries with the price of fuel rising and the quantity available diminishing at present rates?

It is clear that China's current leaders are more inclined to pursue the pragmatic policies of Chou En-lai than would have been so if the "radical" faction had gained control or even maintained the influence it had while under the protective wing of Chairman Mao. Doak Barnett, of the EastWest Center and the Brookings Institution, has suggested that "what seems to be emerging is a civilian-dominated but military-backed collective group, predisposed toward pragmatic problem solving." This seems to me to neatly summarize the kind of regime that exists in China today and what we can expect from it in the immediate future. While pursuing Chou En-lai's long-range economic policies designed to mechanize agriculture and produce a strong, modern, socialized country by the end of this century, they will continue to be influenced by Chairman Mao's ideology while adapting it to current needs and using his thoughts selectively to justify their actions. The Chinese populace clearly welcomed the change of pace and method adopted after the arrest of the "Gang of Four". Provided the leadership problem mentioned earlier can be settled amicably, the stability thereby achieved should permit the pursuit of domestic and foreign policies which can be welcomed generally by Canada and her friends.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The appreciation of the audience was expressed by Mr. Leland H. Austrian, Secretary and a Director of The Empire Club of Canada.