Détente in Africa

In 1957 Ghana was the first black African state to become independent and it was quickly followed by a spate of others. Their mood was angry. They quickly rallied round slogans like "Africa for the Africans" and were inspired by calls like Tom Mboya's "Europeans scram out of Africa", or Nkruma's "We are all Africans, the rest of the world is not", or Toure's "We prefer poverty in liberty to riches in slavery".

In 1960, Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of Great Britain, in his now famous "Winds of change" speech, warned South African Parliamentarians to take account of the wave of black nationalism sweeping across Africa. To this his host, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, more or less instinctively replied:

The tendency in Africa for nations to become independent and, at the same time, the need to do justice to all, does not only mean being just to the black man of Africa but also being just to the white man of Africa.

For South Africa the winds of change quickly developed hurricane force, not only sweeping down Africa, but from all corners of the world. The early sixties saw a massive increase in demands for trade sanctions and boycott movements proliferated. South Africa was fiercely attacked for not falling in with decolonization.

For some years there was a kind of terrorism with bombings, wire cutting, sabotage and murder. In many circles there was a feeling that a violent overthrow of the white regime was just around the corner.

In the early sixties South Africa sat tight. The government suppressed the local risings (Mr. Vorster was then Minister of Justice and Police) and after most of the ring leaders were trapped in the Rivonia raid near Johannesburg, the whole movement collapsed. Many leaders received lengthy jail sentences. Others fled the country to carry on their activities against South Africa from overseas.

Towards the middle sixties conditions in South Africa returned to normal and everything once more was quiet and peaceful. Economically 1964-65 were boom years with important trade expansions. African nations were beginning to experience the problems of independence and the high hopes of a renaissance in Africa -were beginning to fade away slightly. When Mr. Vorster took office in 1966, it did not take him long to introduce his outward policy. One of the objectives of this policy was to cultivate a sense of Southern African regionalism. In 1961 South Africa was forced to leave the Commonwealth and this helped to make it much more Africa orientated. The Prime Minister later put it this way:

Have we not in the past had an incorrect premise in that we saw ourselves not only as coming from Europe but actually saw ourselves as belonging to Europe? After attaining this office, I asked myself that question very seriously and tonight I have not the slightest doubt in stating clearly and underlining the premise that as we sit here, and as we live here in South Africa, we are of Africa just like any other country of Africa.

He also took a strong stand against violence and began to stress South Africa's strategic importance due to its geographic position in the Indian Ocean.

Other events also gave a boost to the outward policy: suddenly three independent black countries were thrust into the midst of South Africa, namely, Lesotho in 1964, Botswana in 1966 and Swaziland in 1968. This was new to South Africa but it illustrated that independent black states could exist very close to the Republic and that very good relations could be established.

In the meantime the South African government was constantly expressing its willingness to co-operate, technically, scientifically and economically, with African states and to render assistance wherever possible.

On the surface there was not much positive response to the outward policy and the hostile attitude was still adamant. Yet there were some encouraging signs. In 1967 diplomatic relations were established with Malawi and this was raised to ambassadorial level in 1971 after a visit by Mr. Vorster in 1970. Shortly afterwards President Banda was the first, and so far the only, head of an independent African state to pay an official visit to South Africa. This was followed up by a return visit by South African President Fouche to Malawi, where he made an appeal to "join forces to combat the real enemies of Africa--poverty, ignorance and disease".

At the same time good relations were established with Madagascar, and South Africa embarked on some large scale schemes for technical assistance. But a new government came into power and terminated all contacts. Similarly Ghana, under Dr. Busia, advocated a=policy of dialogue, but the government that succeeded him reversed the policy.

A more lasting movement towards dialogue came from President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast in 1970 when he announced that he intended calling a meeting of African leaders to urge direct talk with South Africa. For this he received some support from leaders like Senghor of Senegal, Bongo of Gabon and Bokassa of the Central African Republic but also met with fierce opposition from the OAU (Organization of African Unity).

In April 1969, thirteen African governments had a conference at Lusaka, capital of Zambia, which can be considered as a kind of détente with the whites of Southern Africa. The manifesto they issued became a very important African document which was subsequently endorsed by the OAU and the United Nations. It contains some very positive elements, for instance:

It rejects violence or, perhaps closer to the truth, it prefers negotiation to confrontation. "We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence." (Article 12)

It accepts the whites as a permanent part of Africa: "We believe that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of Southern Africa are Africans, regardless of the colour of their skins." (Article 8)

It provides for a transitional period, provided their ideals or goals are unconditionally accepted and the administrations "struggle towards these difficult goals". (Article 6) "We recognize that at any time there will be, within every society, failures in the implementation of these ideals. We recognize that, for the sake of order in human affairs, there may be transitional arrangements ..." (Article 3)

On the other hand, it found that in the Republic of South Africa there is an "open and continued denial of the principles of human equality and national self-determination" (Article 6) to which the African nations can "neither surrender nor compromise" (Article 12). The demands on South Africa amounted to a complete rejection of its separate development policy and a surrender to a black majority rule which, in the eyes of the whites, means a black take-over. Hence the South African government rejected the manifesto and, in a sense, threw out the baby with the bath water.

Collapse of the Portuguese Empire

The withdrawal of Portuguese power from Africa created a completely new situation in Southern Africa. The question immediately posed was: What would happen to Mozambique, Angola and Rhodesia? Consequences were also seen for South West Africa and South Africa's internal policies.

The influence of the creation of a Marxist regime, right on South Africa's doorstep, was described by the Minister of External Affairs in an address to the Foreign Affairs Club, London, in September, 1975, as follows:

We regarded the events in Mozambique as a challenge. It was seen as an opportunity for South Africa to prove that we, as is the position in the case of our relations with our other neighbouring states, are prepared to and can live together with our neighbours. Our interest is in stable and orderly government, not in the colour of the government. We have made it clear that we believe it is in South Africa's and Mozambique's best interests that the existing economic links between the two countries should be maintained. These are very important for Mozambique . . . and the Mozambique leaders, in so far as they have revealed their attitudes, give every indication of taking a pragmatic and sensible approach on these matters.

The principle of non-intervention was firmly established and strictly adhered to in Mozambique.

Detente is not a new policy but merely an extension of the outward movement. The main issues of détente, as Senator Worrall describes them, are:

The normalization of inter-state relations in Southern Africa specifically and in Africa generally, the resolution by peaceful means of the outstanding international problems of the region, and the recognition in regional association terms of the inter-state relations which already exist among the several states and territories of Southern Africa.

In his now famous Senate speech on 23 October, 1974 Mr. Vorster said:

I believe that Southern Africa has come to the cross-roads. I believe that Southern Africa has to make a choice. I think that the choice lies between peace on the one hand and an escalation of strife on the other. The consequences of an escalation are easily foreseeable. The toll of a major confrontation will be high. I would go so far as to say that it would be too high for Southern Africa to pay ... But there is an alternative way. That way is the way of peace. The way of normalizing of relations, the way of sound understanding and normal association. I believe that Southern Africa can take that way. I have reason to believe that it is prepared to take that way. And I believe that it will do so in the end.

To this President Kaunda of Zambia promptly responded by calling Vorster's speech the "Voice of Reason" for which Africa had waited so long. From this moment onwards, diplomatic activities were stepped up very considerably.

The liberation of the Portuguese colonies greatly inspired Black Africa to increase its efforts to force Rhodesia to accept majority rule, and the general feeling was that the Smith regime would not be able to last much longer.

African countries never recognized the Rhodesian government and always referred to it as a "rebel regime". Its two neighbours in particular, Zambia and Tanzania, were in the vanguard, openly advocating the use of force to overthrow the white minority rule. President Kaunda of Zambia often pleaded with Great Britain to use force, offering his country as a basis for attack. Both Zambia and Tanzania provided bases for what they called "liberation movements" and the Rhodesians called "terrorists". Zanu and Zapu continuously pounded upon the Rhodesian border areas but the Rhodesians were able to hold them at bay.

South Africa's policy towards Rhodesia, both before and after UDI, was always, very consistently, one of noninterference. In 1966 Dr. Verwoerd, then Prime Minister, expressed this policy in no uncertain terms: "We do not allow interference in our own matters, and, if we do not allow such interference, then we should not interfere in those of others."

On boycotts and sanctions Verwoerd took an equally strong stand: "Under no circumstances, be it under pressure or under force, will we participate in either boycotts or sanctions."

In more recent times official statements stressed strongly that a settlement is a matter to be worked out by the Rhodesians themselves.

In November, 1974 when there were rumours about Vorster twisting Smith's arm, the Prime Minister, in his own characteristic way, explained the situation as follows:

The truth of the matter is that South Africa and Rhodesia talk to each other. The truth of the matter is that we give each other advice. The truth of the matter is that we bring the realities of the situation to each others' attention and discuss them in depth. But Rhodesia is just as much a part of Africa as we are ... I want to make very clear tonight that Rhodesia is not a subordinate of South Africa. The Rhodesian government makes its own decisions.

However, South Africa, like all other Southern African states, was gravely concerned about the Rhodesian situation as a major element of strain, which could easily escalate into a conflagration. Mr. Vorster therefore, encouraged by President Kaunda's positive reaction, as well as other developments in Africa, took a strong initiative in trying to assist in getting a peaceful solution. By diplomatic action he and Kaunda, as the prime movers, tried to co-ordinate five Southern African states in an endeavour to bring about a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem.

Dr. Muller, the South African minister of foreign affairs, speaking in London, September 1975, referred to this exercise as follows:

Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of the new determination to co-operate in an endeavour to find solutions to regional problems is the association of South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Botswana in the efforts to encourage and enable the various parties in Rhodesia to get together for constitutional talks ... Discussions between the various participants took place in Cape Town, Pretoria, Lusaka and Salisbury, and made very good progress.

The outcome of these discussions was not only the release of Mr. Nkomo and several other black leaders who had been detained, but also the so-called Bridge Conference where a South African luxury train was drawn on to the Victoria Falls bridge in such a way that half of it was on Zambian and the other half on Rhodesian territory. The object of this conference was to give the parties, i.e. the Rhodesian government, representing the whites, and the African National Council, representing the blacks, the opportunity to express publicly their genuine desire to negotiate an acceptable settlement. After the conference the parties were to meet again in Rhodesia in committee or committees until a final conference could again be convened to ratify the committees' proposals. The governments of South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique indicated their willingness to ensure that the agreement would be implemented.

At the Bridge Conference, for the first time, Mr. Vorster, President Kaunda and Mr. Smith met in person.

Unfortunately, however, the conference broke down due to a split in the African National Council. This was a severe disappointment, but since that time negotiations have been actually started and are at present being conducted between a faction of the ANC under the leadership of Dr. Nkomo and the Rhodesian Government.

This detente exercise drew a reaction front the OAU. On the one hand they were interested in a peaceful settlement, but they were sceptical about South Africa's participation and wanted the negotiations to be conducted through the OAU itself, or, at least, by OAU approval and on the general lines of the Lusaka manifesto. Meeting in Dar es Salaam, April 1975, the ministers of foreign affairs of African states discussed this at length and gave limited approval to the four black presidents to continue the dialogue with South Africa in an effort to solve the Rhodesian problem. This was subsequently approved by an OAU summit in Kampala.

The significance of these diplomatic moves is: that a southern region, with its peculiar problems, exists; that the problems should be solved by negotiation rather than confrontation; and that dialogue, even with South Africa, is an important instrument in detente. At the Dar es Salaam conference several ministers, like those of Zambia and the Ivory Coast, spoke out strongly in favour of dialogue with South Africa. As an example of this position, Mr. Usher, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivory Coast, can be quoted. Later his attitude, with the full endorsement and support of his president, was very extensively reported in the Ivory Coast press. He said, inter alia:

South Africa is an African country and the whites of South Africa are Africans . . . the social structure in South Africa is an internal affair, the South African government must therefore, in its own interests, promote this policy of absolute neutrality in Africa while achieving the conditions for internal peace, i.e. dialogue locally with all the layers of its population to instill respect for the human being and his dignity and respect for freedom and equality between all the inhabitants.

The failure of the Victoria Bridge Conference has cast a shadow upon the Rhodesian situation and the detente movement but a new ray of hope has appeared by the negotiations at present being conducted between Mr. Smith and Dr. Nkomo. But whatever the outcome of the constitutional talks may be, a firm basis for detente between South Africa and several Southern African countries has been established and is steadily growing. A common interest, common goals and an inescapable interdependence has been established, and positive results have been achieved.

Another example of the positive results is the South African withdrawal of its police force from Rhodesia. They had been in Rhodesia since 1967, as South Africa had at the time reported to the UN, to "deal with terrorists of South African origin en route to South Africa for the purpose of committing subversion." When this threat disappeared and the banned African National Congress of South Africa was no longer allowed to operate against South Africa from Zambian territory, the force was withdrawn last year. They never had been there, according to the South African viewpoint, to help Smith against terrorist attacks.

South West Africa is an international problem of long standing with many facets and I do not wish to go into detail. I only want to lift out one aspect in order to illustrate how people, or nations, can agree on principle but violently disagree on the implementation, thereby harming the principle.

Everybody agrees on the principle of independence and self-determination. African states, the UN and most other countries, however, seem to qualify its implementation by the following:

1. The boundaries of the ex-colonies are inviolable.

2. Self-determination must take the form of some kind of an expression of the wishes of the majority of the adults of that particular country. This majority can be identified only by the democratic practice of a one-man-one-vote count of the population. Having thus established "a majority", that majority is vested with the power of government. It is officially recognized by other governments and the country is deemed "independent".

The South African approach is different. They put more emphasis on the ethnic group or people and not so much on the individual. The nine different groups, some of them hundreds of miles apart, speaking different languages and belonging to different culture groups, were all politically organized internally to a certain extent. Representatives from these groups were then brought together, meeting in a constitutional conference, thrashing out a constitution of their own liking. South Africa only acts as referee, but all options are open. Mr. Vorster, on 5 November 1974, said: "I do not think it is unreasonable to say to the outside world that we ask them to do what we ourselves are prepared to do, namely to stand to one side to give those people an opportunity to decide on their own future, to seek their own salvation and attain their own self-determination."

If one views the South West Africa situation objectively, one must come to the conclusion that there no longer are important matters of principle involved. The gap between the South African approach on the one hand, and the OAU and UN approaches on the other hand, has narrowed to such an extent that it can now be handled by dialogue and detente. This was mainly possible because of a consistent change in outlook, on the South African side, about the ultimate destiny of South West Africa. Years back, before the winds of change started blowing across Africa, South West Africa was looked upon as a possible fifth province of South Africa and a closer political union was established. At a later stage it was thought of as a possible separate development situation with independent homelands.

Now self-determination has been freed from any preconditions on the part of South Africa. To argue further about South Africa's legal or illegal position is futile. The fundamental problems are independence and self-determination. On independence everybody agrees. On self-determination, it is only a question of method. The South African Government's method certainly has sufficient merit to justify serious consideration.

Angola became independent on 1 November, 1975. There is no recognized government, but three contestant groups are fighting one another for supremacy. Russia, through Cuba, massively intervened, supporting the MPLA ("Popular Movement"), a minority group. The other groups have western sympathy but little support. These are the salient facts.

South West Africa and Angola have a common border along the Cunene river. As a result of an agreement negotiated with the Portuguese Government in January, 1969, South Africa is at present engaged in building a dam, the Calueque dam, on the Cunene, 15 kilometres inside Angolan territory. This is part of a very extensive irrigation and hydro-electric development scheme with the object of providing water and power to the Ovambos, who constitute the biggest population group in South West Africa, as well as to other places in the country.

The security situation in the vicinity of the dam, however, grew increasingly unsettled, with the launching of periodic terrorist attacks. In August, 1975, South Africa approached the Portuguese High Commissioner in Luanda with a request to help ensure the safety of the workers at Calueque but nothing came of the request.

In August the workers were endangered by fighting between contending factions in Angola and refused to continue their work. Consequently, South Africa sent a small unit of troops with the intention of holding discussions to re-establish order so that the workers could return. However, discussions proved impossible because the platoon was fired upon. In the course of the resulting exchange of fire, the South Africans occupied Calueque. South Africa immediately informed the Portuguese authorities, as well as other governments and the United Nations, of this development.

In the meantime, sporadic murders and terrorist action into South West Africa continued. Even Chief Elifas, head of the Ovambo government, was murdered. Terrorist concentrations and military build-ups took place in Southern Angola. Conditions became chaotic with thousands of Portuguese refugees pouring into South West Africa. Already some 12,000 refugees have crossed the border and South Africa has spent $5 million to accommodate and help repatriate them.

Under these circumstances the South African army retaliated by driving the forces bent on subversive action against South West Africa far back into Angola, destroying their bases and capturing large amounts of weaponry many of the weapons still in their crates. The FNLA ("National Front") group under Dr. Savimbi, representing the majority of the Angolans, naturally welcomed the South Africans but South Africa took great care not to get involved seriously in the civil war. Having driven the subversive forces far back, the South African forces returned to the border areas, creating a line of defence between Angola and South West Africa stretching from the Atlantic ocean to the Zambian border.

According to a statement by the permanent representative of South Africa in the Security Council on 26 January, 1976, from which I have drawn much of my information and which I recommend to you for serious study: "South Africa has played a limited role in Angola in the hope that, inter alia, it would secure for the Angolans the time to achieve a settlement for themselves around a conference table, or failing that, an opportunity for the OAU to find a political solution without outside interference."

As is well known, the OAU did meet in Addis Ababa to discuss the Angolan situation but failed to produce any solution. Exactly half were in favour of recognising the Russian-sponsored MPLA as the legitimate government and the other half favoured a national government by all groups. On one point, however, they agreed, namely in condemning outside involvement by both the Russians and Cubans on the one side and South Africans on the other.

In opening the Parliament on 23 January, the State President stated the South African policy as follows: "South Africa has no territorial ambitions in Angola. It believes that the people of that country, like other peoples, have the right to decide their own future and choose their own government themselves without armed pressure from outside."

On 27 January the South African Ambassador, Mr. Botha, addressing the Security Council, made the following statement: "To avoid any controversy in this respect and to make it easier for any government in Angola to avoid a conflict over this matter, I propose that the Security Council should assume responsibility until such time as a government in Angola can handle the situation satisfactorily."

Referring to Russian and Cuban intervention, the Ambassador contended that it was for the Security Council "to appraise itself forthwith of the facts. I propose that the only effective way to do so is for the Security Council to take the necessary steps in accordance with the charter to go to Angola and establish for itself who is posing a threat to peace in Angola, South Africa or Soviet Russia or Cuba. My government would welcome an on-the-spot investigation and will lend the Council its willing cooperation in the matter. I challenge our accusers to do the same."

To all this the Security Council's reply on 30 January was another condemnation of South Africa from A to Z, and an expression that the Council was "gravely concerned at South Africa's brutal repression of the Namibian (Angolan) people and its persistent violation of their human rights as well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, and its aggressive military build-up in the area."

Since I left South Africa last week, I have heard over the radio and TV that Lobito, Huambo and probably the entire Benguella railway line have fallen to the MPLA, which really means to the Russians and Cubans. This is a vast area and possibly means that most of the Angolan territory is now under MPLA military control.

As far as I am concerned, from this point onwards, it is pure speculation. You in Canada, since you have recently been in close, personal contact with Cuba, will be in a better position to cast more light on certain aspects that are unknown and dark to me.

But personally I am worried. What the Russians and Cubans plan for Africa, I do not know. Again I can only speculate. If they overrun Angola, as they apparently have done, they may create a strong MPLA government. If it is a stable reasonable government I think South Africa will accept the situation, as it has accepted the Mozambique situation where a purely Marxist regime has been established right on our borders. After all, a government for Angola is their concern, not ours. To what extent their government would be a puppet of Moscow is also their affair, about which South Africa can do precious little.

But there are other possibilities. Dr. Savimbi and his FNLA and other groups in Angola representing the majority of the population may, as they have said, continue with a guerilla warfare which will keep that unhappy country in a state of conflict for an indefinite period. Even more ominous possibilities may escalate into a real threat to peace. The Russians and Cubans may build up SWAPO for attacks on South West Africa and then they are sure to clash seriously with South Africa. As I know my country and my people, South Africa will fight and fight bitterly and I think the world will be surprised at the black support they may have.

This will also be a situation in which Canada and many other western countries will be involved directly since they recognize SWAPO as the only representative of the South West African people. The grave consequences of this situation, I think, you will easily appreciate. It may well be a repetition of the current situation in Angola where a super power supports a minority group up to the point where it can form a government. How this can be construed as self-determination and true independence is beyond my comprehension.

As far as detente is concerned, I am sure South Africa has gained much more than it might have lost. It has come out openly and forcefully on the side of Africa. It has illustrated that it belongs to Africa, that it sides with Africa and that it is prepared to sacrifice for Africa.

A strong common interest has developed, namely that African states, including South Africa, should be allowed to get along with their own affairs, without the interference of outside parties.

There still are differences in outlook between African states. There are deep-rooted problems of black-white human relations, but none are so insurmountable that they cannot be overcome by dialogue, by negotiation and by mutual respect. President Kaunda of Zambia has given a great new motto to Africa and the world: "The Voice of Reason". Let us pursue this voice: Ex Afrika Semper Novis.

Finally, only the South African internal position remains as a serious obstacle to detente.

South Africa is constantly being accused of discrimination on the basis of race and colour.

To this accusation I must plead both guilty and innocent. South Africa does discriminate on the grounds of race. I have said earlier that a particular way of life, with elements of discrimination, has frozen solid over the entire South African multi-racial society, due to a peculiar contact situation, over centuries, between widely divergent ethnic and racial groups.

But the old human relations pattern is no longer good enough for either whites or blacks in South Africa. This is realized and accepted by the government and, what is very important, it has been built into the official policy. In October, 1974 our Ambassador at the UN, addressing the General Assembly, put it in no uncertain terms when he said:

We do have discriminatory laws, and it is precisely because of this that the greatest misunderstandings occur and our motives are most misrepresented. But that discrimination must not be equated with racialism. If we have that discrimination it is not because the whites in South Africa have any "Herrenvolk" complex. We are not better than the black people: we are not more clever than they; what we can achieve so can they. These laws and practices are a part of the historical evolution of our country . . . I want to state here today very clearly and categorically: my government does not condone discrimination purely on the grounds of race and colour. Discrimination based solely on the colour of a man's skin cannot be defended. And we shall do everything in our power to move away from discrimination based on race or colour.

Speaking on the same topic, in London last September, our Minister of Foreign Affairs said:

I have on several occasions in the past said that South Africa's foreign relations and our internal policies are inter-related. Normalization of our relations with black Africa will come more easily as our internal policies evolve and as we move away from discriminatory practices which are based on deep-rooted, inherited attitudes . . . The South African Government is committed to move away from discrimination based on race or colour.

The Prime Minister himself, other ministers, church leaders, academics, businessmen and a wide variety of leading whites are continuously hammering on the necessity for human dignity in black-white relationships. We who live in South Africa can see how the white society is gradually responding. But discrimination cannot be eradicated in one grand sweep.

Further, discrimination by itself is a complicated concept. Argument is often based upon a belief that "all men are equal". All men are not equal. In fact, no two men are equal. This concept needs clarification by adding qualifications like "equal in the eyes of the law" or "equal opportunity" and many more. There are many differences between individuals and groups in any society and there are many natural discriminations. They all need to be examined, sorted out, put into perspective. This is a matter for dialogue and negotiation.

In this respect it is interesting to note that the constitutional conference in South West Africa has included in its "Declaration of Intent" the following important paragraph: "That we are resolved to devote ourselves to the promotion of and respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without discrimination merely on the basis of race, colour or creed."

The very first of the four committees they set up for in-depth study, was one on discriminatory practices based solely on race and colour, relating to remuneration, pension schemes, general conditions of employment, legislated minimum pay scales and related matters. The committee was also requested to include in its work a study on the abolition of the "pass-laws" and the introduction of an identity system for all South West Africans.

Similar kinds of approaches and studies are daily conducted along a wide spectrum in South Africa.

The important point is that white South Africa has taken a stand in principle and is now working on the practical implications. This is being done at different levels and the Prime Minister has often said that he was prepared to discuss it with any African leader who is genuinely interested in the welfare of Africans, black or white.

The whole question of human relations should be lifted well above the hot level of emotion and put right into the cool atmosphere of the "Voice of Reason". It should not be an obstacle in the way of, but rather a solid base for detente.

Our distinguished visitor and speaker was thanked, on behalf of the audience, by Mr. Ian D. C. McPhail, a Director of the Empire Club of Canada.