A Legacy From the United Empire Loyalists

Mr. President and Gentlemen,-

I have called the subject of what I am about to say, "A Legacy from the United Empire Loyalists," and by this I mean that legacy-that precious legacy-which they have left to their descendants and others in Canada, namely, an Empire united under the British Crown. . Now I am aware that the majority in this room know all about the United Empire Loyalists, but a few of your guests and others may not, so I will mention that the many United Empire Loyalists' Associations throughout this Dominion have this common origin.

In 1775, in Boston, when war was felt to be impending between the American Colonies (not the United States) and the Mother Country, a numbers of British Loyalists, at the suggestion of the English Governor and the Commander-in-chief,- General (later Viscount) Gage, formed themselves into an association as "Loyalist Associators desiring the unity of the Empire."

These men, and those who held their principles, fought and bled and endured bitter persecution in the cause of Imperial union throughout the long years of the revolutionary contest between 1775 and 1783, and when 'the fortune of war went against them they neither could nor would live under any other flag than that of Great Britain. (Applause.) They came in their thousands into the British Provinces of North America, some returning to England.

They practically founded Upper Canada under Colonel Simcoe, its first ' Governor, who had commanded the "Queen's Rangers" in the wara corps which saw hard fighting and suffered severe losses in that contest:

Their example, influence, and traditions, handed down in Canada through now more than a century of time, have been at all events among the most potent, if not the most potent, of the factors which have kept this Dominion through adversity and prosperity, staunch in her loyalty to the British Crown and unchanged in her preference and affection for British institutions. I am satisfied that it is of the utmost consequence to the prosperity and happiness of Canada that their example, their history, and their traditions should be kept alive in this country from generation to generation.

When these United Empire Loyalists arrived in Canada in 1784, so keen a sense was entertained by the Governor and his Council in Quebec, of the debt owing to them for their services, that he conferred upon them a most exceptional mark of honour.

By an Order in Council of 9th November, 1789, it was directed that they, and also their children, "born or to be born," should receive grants of public lands; and further that their names should be inserted in an official roll, in order that their posterity might be discriminated in the parish registers, the rolls of the Militia, and other public archives as "proper objects for distinguished benefits and privileges." This Order of the King in Council forms the Charter of the United Empire Loyalists today, and one of which they are justly proud. No public honour or reward, no hereditary title has an origin more pure, or forms a distinction more creditable to those who conferred, or to those who received it, than this.

If you will turn to the names of those in the Council who united with the Governor in conferring it, you will see that the members of it consisted of Whigs as well as Tories, of Roman Catholics as well as Protestants, of French as well as British. You will see also, in history, that the Loyalists of those days held various political views, were of various creeds, and of various nationalities.

It is interesting to mention here that five sons of Flora MacDonald, so celebrated in story in connection with her loyalty in the Stuart risings in Scotland to Prince Edward, fought, as well as did her husband, in the American Revolutionary War, in various Loyalist corps.

But these United Empire Loyalists to whom I have been alluding, and who fought upon battlefields in the old British American Colonies, now the United States, are not the only United Empire Loyalists. There were those Loyalists who, in 1775-6, fought against the American Revolutionary army at the siege of Quebec; there were those who fought in the war of 1812-14; and, to come to later periods, there are those who insisted, a decade or so ago, in being sent to fight for the unity of the Empire in South Africa and who gained distinction there. To all these Canada is equally grateful, and has evinced her gratitude in monuments erected to their memory in various parts of the Dominion, including that in the Queen's avenue (commonly known as University avenue) in this city.

But, gentlemen, the inheritance which the United Empire Loyalists have handed down to us can, when war breaks out, only be maintained by force of arms, and this leads me to touch upon a few points-for more than this I cannot do-connected with the defence of Canada.

At the Imperial Conference on defence matters in 1909, the representatives of Canada, as well as of other portions of the Empire, agreed upon the acceptance of two specially important and comprehensive principles.

That without superiority at sea the Empire could not be maintained.

That it was the duty of each self-governing colony to provide for its own territorial security.

The first principle I need not dwell upon, for practically it is admitted by thoughtful men to be an axiom.

With regard to the second principle, I am inclined to add this to it; that in the case of Canada, her territorial security in war cannot be provided for, if an enemy on her southern border obtains the command of the Great Lakes. If an enemy does that, then although the unity of the Empire may not be irrevocably destroyed-because the fleets and armies of that Empire may be finally successful in the war-yet Canadian soil will be occupied; and the amount of loss to life and property which Canada and Canadians must suffer will be heavy indeed. Who, can measure it?

Now as to the importance of sea-power to Canada, in which I include power on the waters of the Lakes, which are, in all essentials, seas; power on the inland waters of Hudson Bay, and power on the St. Lawrence, I doubt if it is half sufficiently realized. Remember that Canada. is, for some three fourths of her vast circumference, "water girt." On her western border lies the Pacific Ocean; on the north, the Arctic Ocean-with Hudson Bay entered through Hudson straits; on the east the Atlantic Ocean; and on' the south, for about half its long extent, those great Lakes which are really fresh water oceans.

Kipling thus alludes to them, "Fresh water has no right, as it does here, to roar in between vast headlands that run out for leagues into haze and sea fog." And both Mahan and Roosevelt dwell upon the fact that the operations on them in 1812-14 were of the same nature as those on the ocean; and that the flotillas which met upon them then, though not large navies, were still fleets.

By nature Canada seems destined to be a naval power; further than that, it has been said that her possible and greatest future seems to be that in time; from her central position between the Atlantic and Pacific, "she may become the body of, what has been called that great octopus, British Sea-Power." But, gentlemen, this she can only become if she remains together with the Mother Country, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa that is, on both Eastern and Western seas---one "United Empire."

Some occasionally say that the future of Canada is to become an "independent" nation. They do not reflect apparently that Canada is now in that position, and completely independent, in fact as, well as theory. The free preference of a free people for a constitutional monarchy, instead of a republican form of government, is not dependence; sharing in the expense of an imperial policeman, in other words, of an imperial navy and army, is not dependence; voluntary partnership with others is--riot dependence. Remember that, if Canada were outside the British Empire, she might be absorbed by some other nation, aggressive and more powerful. Canada, as part of the Empire, needs the battleships of the fleet of 'Great Britain to secure the supremacy of the seas and maintain her interests at a distance from her shores, and that great battle fleet has a claim to her material support, but, for the reasons I halve given above, I welcome also the commencement of a Canadian navy. It is a fitting continuation of Canada's work of defence in the construction of her great transcontinental railways, the improvement of her water communications, and the organization of her land forces.

And I welcome it also for another reason. We know that in war, time is of paramount importance. The report of the Imperial Defence Conference of agog contains this true assertion: "The condition's of modern warfare make it probable that great military and naval events will immediately follow, even if they do not precede a declaration of war"-as a matter of fact they will probably precede it.

Has any British Government ever bound itself, will it ever bind itself, can it be fairly expected to ever hind itself-if engaged in war with even one, not to say two, great naval powers-to give assistance without fail to .. Canada within even several weeks after a declaration of scar? If her war vessels did arrive off the mouth of the St. Lawrence within a few weeks, is it to be fairly anticipated that they could then steam ups the St. Lawrence 'through the narrow easily destroyed canals and pass narrow reaches, commanded from a hostile shore? Is it not the naval policy of Great Britain, and in a strategical sense the right policy, that where she, when war breaks out, can send her fleet must depend upon where the most decisive blow can be struck in the interests of the Empire as a whole. This may not be in, or even near, Canadian waters. I am not a naval man, but these are not questions for Canada to blink; they should be faced, and they point to this, that for the security of the territorial waters of Canada, a Canadian navy is required, that is, a navy whose primary duty is to defend her waters, although if circumstances permit, it can be employed on any sea for the maintenance of the Empire. We often hear that the great danger to the efficiency and expansion of that navy will come from political exigencies and political pressure and interference. Let us hope not. For if it were to become the plaything of politics, that would be fatal to it. Let us hope also that all the efforts of the members of the Empire Club will be exerted to prevent that calamity.

To turn now to some lessons which the last great war in defence of the Canadian frontier, that of 1812-14, has taught us. Two of these stand out with a prominence which is startling, viz.: the importance of ascendancy on the Lakes, and the necessity to look to the safety of certain cities upon their borders, such as Montreal, Kingston, and Toronto, as well as Quebec.

I will read you what has been said on this head by some widely accepted authorities. Note first what the great Duke of Wellington has said: "Naval superiority on the Lakes is a sine qua, non of success in war on the frontier of Canada, even if our object be solely defensive." That is a weighty dictum.

President Madison of the United States has said and left it as a message to his people: "The command of the Lakes ought to have been a fundamental part of the national policy from the moment the peace of 1783 took place." This message has apparently been borne in mind by his people.

Note also what Captain Mahan of the United States navy has said: "From Lake Superior to the first rapid on the St. Lawrence, the control of the water was the decisive factor in, the military situation. Mackinac, Detroit, Kingston, Montreal; these four places, together with an adequate development of naval strength upon the Lakes, constituted the essential elements, that is, were strategic points, of a controlling nature, in that situation."

General Armstrong, the United States Secretary of War in 1812-14, writes of American successes in Upper Canada at certain spots : "These only wounded the tail of the lion; Kingston, or a point below it, such as Montreal, seized, all above perishes because the tree is girdled."

Read also in Cruickshank's documentary history of the war what Colonel (afterwards Sir John) Harvey, the hero of Stoney Creek, wrote from the Niagara frontier in 1813: "Our position, as long as our fleet on Lake Ontario is triumphant, is a secure one. Should any disaster, which God forbid, befall that, we have no longer any business here, or in this part of Canada; that is, it Would be necessary to retire upon Kingston and defend that point and Montreal to the last."

Sir James Yeo, of the Royal Navy, also writes to Lord Bathurst in 1813: "Every military operation or success depends entirely upon whoever can maintain the naval superiority on this lake" (Ontario).

Now these are opinions of very able and very experienced men, both British and American, both naval and military, and such opinions should receive earnest attention.

I will also ask you, in reading accounts of the war of 1812-.14, to note (1) that at its opening Great Britain was in the ascendant on the Lakes. Brock was thus able to cross to Detroit and also cross to Lake Erie when an early success attended British arms. (2) That supineness in 1813 as to defence of the Lakes entailed all the disasters of that year. (3) That in 1814, defeat on Lake Champlain paralyzed the British land operations.

I am quite aware that we are told occasionally that the circumstances of Canada have so enormously changed since the last war that lessons from it no longer apply; that the network of railways which now cover Canada makes her comparatively less dependent on water communication for movements and concentration of her troops than she was in that war. I know also that there are other portions of the Dominion requiring defence, such as the Pacific coast, British Columbia, and the West, Hudson Bay and Straits, and her extended land frontier of hundreds of miles. I admit all this to be true, and I would rejoice should this Dominion determine, in order to meet the difficulties of her defence problem, to introduce some form of universal military service.

But I see nothing in all this to alter the fact that, if an enemy's vessels obtained supremacy upon the lake waters, they could bombard the cities upon their banks, destroy the railways running past them, and probably occupy those cities and Central Canada; that the Dominion would be then cut in two; the West cut off from the East and communication of the Western Provinces with the Atlantic and Great Britain severed; and Canadian trade paralyzed. The Canadian lion would then be wounded, not in its tail, but in its body, and possibly mortally.

I will also ask you to think of this. It is practically unanimously agreed upon by military authorities that a mere passive defence must be a comparatively weak one. An active defence is the best, indeed the only good, form of defence. How, on the southern lake border, can Canada carry out an active defence if she cannot cross the water? She will be in the position of being able to do little damage to an enemy. She must fight at a great disadvantage, like a man with one arm bound. An enemy who is supreme on those waters can choose his point of R attack.

But it will probably be said-and it has sometimes been said--by those not gifted by nature with the temperament of the U. E. Loyalists: "We cannot, under the circumstances of Canada, stop an enemy from acquiring paramount ascendency on the Lakes." I will only point out to these that relatively in its population, armed force, shipping, wealth, and all other resources, Canada is now "far stronger with regard to any enemy than she was in a 1812-iq., and it must be remembered that the whole male population of Canada, French and English, was in those days armed and trained under the then Militia law of 1808. In scientific warfare several changes have been introduced since that period (which I cannot detail here, but which should probably be in her favour, in defensive war, provided--a very important provision-that the necessary weapons, and engines, and material for war are available on the spot when war breaks out; that the necessary works exist; and that the necessary naval and military forces are ready to act in close co-operation and can immediately mobilize.

These allusions to the southern frontier of Canada make it desirable that I should emphasize the fact, that

I have not in my mind the idea that the present cordial relations between Canada and the United States are likely to be disturbed. This does not form the groundwork of my remarks, but I hold that defence matters must be considered, irrespective of considerations of this kind.

Every Government, that of Canada as well as that of the United States, has its own duties to perform, and one of these is to prepare in time for the defence of the National Territory at all points, no matter against whom.

Governments are trustees of the life and property of the people and must guard their wards' interests even from closest friends.

A weak southern frontier is against the interests of peace; it has been in the past a fertile source of trouble between the two nations on each side of the Lake border, for it acted as a temptation to the so-called patriot raids of 1837 and the Fenian raids of 1866.

America, that is, the United States, is not the only power which, under certain national combinations, might succeed in pushing up the St. Lawrence and landing an expedition on Canadian soil. One hears of the "Rush-Bagot" Convention regulating the naval strength between Great Britain and America upon the Great Lakes. Its abrogation has occasionally been suggested, but this would probably be .a political blunder, which would ultimately cause great expense in fortifications and armaments to both parties to it.

With regard to that Convention, what may be fairly said is this, that the Americans have been alive to the lessons of the war of 1812-14 and to the dictum of their President Madison with respect to the Lakes. They have, with the consent of the Governments of Great Britain and this Dominion, taken such defensive measures by the establishment of naval militia training stations, by organizing naval militia, and by arrangements for rapidly converting, if necessary, selected freight and passenger vessels into fighting ships. The safety of their own territorial Lake border opposite' the Canadian one may be said to be secure. What has been carried out at Chicago in this way may be gathered from an article published in the Chicago Tribune of January 30, 1898-at the time of the Spanish-American War. I cannot give the details of the article here, but have placed it in the appendix to Canada and Canadian Defence. Whatever measures under the letter and spirit of the "Rush-Bagot" Convention have, right or wrongly, been permitted to one party to it, is open, under that Convention, to the other.

The security of the territorial borders of Canada, even the unity of the Empire-that legacy left to us from the U. E. Loyalists, and it seems desirable that the people of the Dominion should realize this-may depend upon whether Canada follows on her own shores of the Lakes and her own, water frontier, the lead and example of America.