Imperial Naval Strategy

Mr. President and Gentlemen

You have been kind enough to invite me to address you on Imperial Naval Strategy. You will admit

that the naval strategy of the British Empire is a very large question, much -too large to be dealt with fully in a single address. All I can do is to try to throw out one or two leading ideas connected with the subject.

I am addressing the Empire Club, and I need make no apology for discussing the naval problem of the whole Empire. I shall, however, discuss that problem, as a Canadian citizen of the Empire; as a Canadian who is anxious that his country should pay her own way in the Empire; as a Canadian who desires to see his country bear her part in the Empire's affairs by developing her own individuality, by exercising chose faculties and qualities which are her special characteristics, and by guarding against her own special dangers.

The first and most important fact connected with the strategy of the Empire is that in the course of the last decade it has undergone a revolution. It formerly was European; it now is world-wide. It formerly was pelagic; it now is oceanic. It formerly had to do with forces and countries which were remote from all parts of the Empire except the United Kingdom; it now has to do with forces and countries which in some cases are much closer to the self-governing Dominions than to the United Kingdom.

That is a very abstract way in which to put my case, and I hasten to express myself in concrete terms. Ten years ago the men who managed the foreign affairs of the British Empire had to consider two principal centres of armed force which were formidable and which might be unfriendly. Both were in Europe. One was France and the other was Russia. Each of these countries had a navy which was believed to be formidable, and they were in alliance. The German navy was negligible, and so were those of all the other countries in the world. The great danger which the men who managed the British Empire had to guard against was a naval war with one or both of these countries.

Now, with the exception of the Russian squadron at Port Arthur, the navies of these two powers were in Europe. You have only to look at the map of the world to see that, in a large way, Great Britain was interposed between these powers and the British Dominions overseas. Part of the Russian fleet was in the Black Sea and part of the French fleet in the Mediterranean; the British picketed these forces by keeping up a very powerful fleet in the Mediterranean. Part of the Russian forces were in the Baltic and part of the French forces were in ports like Cherbourg and Brest which front on the Atlantic; the Channel Squadron and the Home Fleet faced them. As a French statesman said a while ago, Great Britain had the fleets of Europe in a mouse-trap. It would have been very difficult, as a military operation, for a hostile fleet to have got past these watching fleets in the Atlantic to do anything which would seriously injure Canada, or South Africa, or Australia. Even the Russian fleet at Port Arthur was picketed by a British fleet at Hong Kong and Wei-hai-wei. That is what I mean by saying that the problem then was pelagic. It had to do with comparatively confined seas rather than with vast oceans, with fighting in narrow waters rather than in great areas; with operations in the Mediterranean, the English Channel, the North Sea, instead of in the Atlantic or the Pacific.

The last ten years have seen this state of affairs disappear in a most wonderful manner. The Russian navy has virtually ceased to exist. The French navy has fallen behind; and in addition France has become the friend and almost the ally of the British Empire. But three new great centres of naval force have appeared; and only one of them is in Europe; the others are outside of Europe. The German navy, which was inconsiderable in 1900, in 1910 is exceedingly powerful. The same thing can be said of the American navy; it is a question for technical men to decide which is the stronger. Then, Japan has a strong and very efficient navy, and is increasing it as rapidly as she can. It is not my intention to inflict upon you tedious tables of statistics; it is enough to state that these navies are very strong indeed, and that they are pressing sharply on Great Britain. The Mother Country has to spend enormous sums in increasing her navy and even so her lead is being cut down.

Of itself this would be a remarkable change; three new powers, instead of the two old ones, now are the Empire's rivals in the matter of naval strength. But the most interesting thing has yet to be considered. The American navy has its base on the western shore of the North Atlantic Ocean. The Japanese navy has its base on islands in the Eastern part of the North Pacific. In a military sense the American navy is between Canada and Great Britain; I mean that the American fleet could place itself off the Canadian coastline by a shorter voyage than that taken by a British fleet from the Mother Country. As for the Japanese navy, Canada lies between Japan and Great Britain. Japan could place her fleet on the coast of British Columbia in fifteen days and on that of Australia in sixteen days. It would take Great Britain two months to place an equally large fleet at Hong Kong.

The more you reflect, the more you will realize that this is an absolutely new fact in the history of the British Empire. Hitherto, the only sea forces able to meddle seriously with it have been European sea forces, and such forces could not reach any important part of the Empire until they had fought or dodged the sea forces of the United Kingdom. Britain, as I said a moment ago, stood between all other sea-powers and the outer Empire. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa developed behind this shield which kept the storms of war aloof, from them. But now, for the first time in our history, there are two very strong sea forces actually nearer to our Dominions than Great Britain is. The American fleet is nearer to our Atlantic coast line than the Royal Navy is. The Japanese fleet is nearer to our Pacific coast line than the Royal Navy is. The Japanese fleet is nearer to the Australian coast line than the Royal Navy is.

That is the first leading idea which I wish to lay before you. The British Empire -as a naval power is facing a problem absolutely new. Formerly the navies which it had to consider were on the other side of narrow seas, like the English Channel, or the Mediterranean. Today some of the navies which it has to consider are on the other side of vast oceans. That is what I mean by saying that its problems are now oceanic.

Next, there is the fact that at this juncture the United Kingdom has a very big and serious European problem on its hands. For the fourth time in modern European history there is in progress a movement which we may describe briefly;as an attempt to organize Western Europe into, if not one State, at all events into one system of States. Three hundred years the Spanish Monarchy reigned over Spain and Portugal, over a great part of Italy, over Austria and Hungary, over a considerable part of Germany, and over Holland and Belgium. It tried to incorporate England in this system. Two hundred years ago France under Louis XIV. tried energetically to organize Western Europe under French leadership; at one time she controlled Spain, and commanded the resources of Western Europe from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Rhine; while she kept Germany in a condition of impotence and pressed very hard on Holland. One hundred years ago France again, under Napoleon, made the same attempt. At one juncture she controlled the coasts of Europe, with one or two exceptions, from Dantzig on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic; if Napoleon had not been fought so energetically by Great Britain with her sea-power, and if he had not been in too great a hurry, the effort might have succeeded. Now, you know perfectly well that Great Britain in the past invariably resisted .all such attempts. The defeat of the Armada was her contribution to the failing of the Spanish dream, Marlborough's victories, shattered Louis XIV.; Nelson and Wellington helped to destroy Napoleon. It is the fixed belief in England that a country so small, with a population so inferior in numbers to that of Europe cannot afford to see Western Europe link itself together in one great State or system of States under a common leadership. For three hundred years she always has backed the weaker powers which were resisting the stronger powers. She helped Holland and France against Spain. She helped Holland and Germany against Louis XIV. She helped Germany, Austria, Russia and Spain against Napoleon.

For nearly a hundred years after the fall of Napoleon Europe remained in a condition of balance; there has been no country so over-poweringly strong as to take charge of the rest. But now Germany is taking up the old course. First Germany itself became a great power, with Prussia as its core, as the active, energizing factor. Now we are faced with the possibility of seeing Western Europe organized in one system of States with Germany as the organizing, directing, energising core of the whole. Austria-Hungary has been drawn into the German orbit. So has Italy. Suppose that France, already handled very roughly, and badly outnumbered, were to be drawn into the system? Then we should see the old dream, thrice shattered, at last realized, except that the virtual capital of Europe would be Berlin and not Madrid or Paris.

I shall not say to you that this process of organizing, of spreading German influence, which is under way in Europe, is certain to lead to war. I am perfectly aware that great countries are increasingly reluctant to fight. But I shall make two remarks. One is that in the past history of Europe every such attempt to organize Europe into one great State meant wars, and very big wars; I may supplement this by reminding you that the earlier phases of the present German movement saw three wars, one of them very big. My other remark is that at present nations .are fairly willing to arbitrate on matters of comparatively minor importance, but as yet show no willingness to arbitrate on questions of first-rate importance, such as this question whether Germany is to take charge of Western Europe and be its general manager, and perhaps be over-lord of the world. In this connection I must make one more remark. There exists a profound difference between the spirit of Germany and the spirit, I shall not say of Great Britain, but of all English-speaking nations. With us English-speaking folk the feeling is that the individual is the all-important thing, and that -the State exists for the individual. The German theory is that the State is the all-important thing and that the individual exists for the State and is to be allowed only such rights and privileges as do not conflict with the needs of the State. The evidence is that the German is quite as contemptuous of our theory as our people are of the German theory. You see that there is in Europe a conflict of ideas as well as of interests.

What I mean by this disquisition upon high politics is that the situation in Europe is very delicate, and that at all events there may be a big war into which Great Britain may be drawn.

Germany is building a very big navy. As I have already said, I shall not go into statistics, but the general fact is that the German navy is not quite as strong as the British navy, but that it is so large that to keep its forces on the spot superior the British navy has been compelled to draw in its outlying fleets. In 1904 Britain had a powerful fleet of battleships in the Pacific; today she has none. Some years ago she had a very large fleet in the Mediterranean; today it is about half its former strength. Thus there now are very few British battleships away from the shores of Great Britain, and on those shores there are a great many. I must mention another circumstance to you, and that is that for the moment the German fleet is picketed more strictly-than ever were the fleets of Great Britain's rivals before. It is penned up in the North Sea; there are only two ways out of the North Sea, one by the Straits of Dover and the English Channel; the other by the passage between Norway and Scotland, broken as that is by the Orkney and Shetland Islands. Great Britain keeps one big fleet in the English Channel and another about the Orkneys, and thus has the North Sea shut up. If there were no other big navies in the world, the situation would be very satisfactory.

But here is where the grand problem is. There are two other great navies in the world. One is on the coast of the United States. One is on the coast of Japan. The British navy has boxed the German navy up in the North Sea by leaving these two other navies unwatched. Suppose that the British Empire were to have friction with one of these other powers; it would be necessary to send a fleet to watch that power's fleet; and then British superiority in the North Sea would decline, and might disappear. There is reason to believe that the Germans calculate that sooner or later Great Britain will be forced to send to some distant ocean a detachment so large that the remainder left in home waters will be inferior to the whole German navy, concentrated in one striking force. I have seen it stated that the German calculation is that Great Britain ultimately must place forty percent of her force in the Pacific, so that the real German problem is to overmatch, not the whole British fleet, but sixty percent of it. That is the second governing fact in Imperial Naval Strategy.

With regard to the American fleet, I must enroll myself among those who do not expect an Anglo-American war. My reasons are not wholly sentimental. For one thing, ever since the Spanish American war of 1898, American policy has taken a turn which on the whole makes for agreement with Great Britain. For another thing, a real, determined Anglo-American war would mean nothing less than this-that both would be ruined. They would be so weakened as to be unable to resist other great powers, and the leadership of the world would go to some non-English-speaking country; perhaps to a non-Caucasian one. I think the consciousness of this fact is penetrating the political mind of both countries. I leave out, accordingly, any account of the American navy as a probable centre of hostility.

At present Great Britain and Japan are in alliance, but the alliance expires in 1915 and it is understood that it is not likely to be renewed. I shall not discuss politics further than to observe that after 1915 Japan will be free to pursue her own policy and that her policy might clash with that of Canada, or with that of Australia, or with the interests of Great Britain in the Far East. The fact is that Japan at the present moment is irresistibly strong in the Pacific. She has an army of 1,200,000 excellent soldiers and plenty of merchant ships in which to send them across the ocean. She has a large and efficient navy. Great Britain has only three or four armoured cruisers in the Pacific. We can hardly expect the British Empire to acquiesce permanently in this state of affairs. Sooner or later it must have an answering armed force in the Pacific. That is the German calculation. But the German calculation is that the United Kingdom must drain her strength by supporting that force. Suppose that we, the people of Greater Britain, were to club together and supply it!

In this connection I may notice the argument which one hears from -time to time, that if Canada were to detach herself from the Empire the United Kingdom would still be obliged to maintain the same naval force; and that therefore Canada imposes no burden on the United Kingdom. Whatever may have been the case in former periods, it is no longer the case now. It is the need for keeping strong in the Pacific which constitutes the real difficulty of the United Kingdom; that need is imposed on the Empire because it has three white communities established on the Pacific-Canada, Australia and New Zealand. If there were no such communities, if the interests of the Empire in the Pacific were confined to the trade of the United Kingdom with the Far East, the problem of the mastery of the Pacific would assume an entirely different shape. That is our problem. We have added it to the other difficulties of the British Empire.

Now observe this fact. For us a fleet in the Pacific should be sufficient. We have no idea of invading any Asiatic country, and so do not need a large army for that purpose. All we desire, if we clash with a Pacific power, is to keep its armies from being ferried over to attack us; and the best way to do this is to keep a fleet strong enough to forbid any such enterprise. Of course, if our fleet were defeated and if an Asiatic army were to land on our shores, it would come to land fighting. A well-organized militia should be sufficient provision against that contingency.

Next, we are in this position. If we people of Canada, Australia and New Zealand sit still and do nothing, when the need for this British fleet in the Pacific arises, the Royal Navy, the navy of the United Kingdom, must supply it. To do so would be to weaken very seriously the fleet which the United Kingdom must keep opposite Germany. The German calculation once more, yoga see.

Suppose, next, that Canada, Australia and New Zealand were to take the position that they would take care of the situation in the Pacific by establishing there a joint British fleet of their own. I do not wish to go into details, but I may say that a very formidable squadron of four great battle-cruisers, with a liberal allowance of medium-sized cruisers and torpedo craft, could be kept on foot for some twelve or fifteen million dollars a year; or about one dollar per head of the people of the three British countries concerned. I do not say that such a fleet would overmatch that of Japan; but it should be strong enough to hold its own, given good leadership and good fortune, for some time, pending the arrival of reinforcements from Great Britain, and the demand on Great Britain would be smaller than under the present circumstances.

Observe, please, that the one joint fleet would equally serve the interests of all three British Dominions which border on the Pacific. If each were independent and were to look to itself exclusively, it would be obliged to have a fleet of much the same size. If they unite, the one fleet would forbid an attack on British Columbia as well as au attack on New South Wales. Thus there would be economy in combination.

Now then, suppose that this united Imperial Pacific Fleet were to be set up by the countries of Greater Britain. What would be the effect on the general strategical situation I have been describing? Surely it would be this-that the British Navy proper, in Europe, would be freed from the dread of having to send a great detachment to the Pacific and perhaps to be obliged to send that detachment at a most inconvenient and dangerous moment. It could turn its attention, with less in the way of pre-occupation, to the task of observing, the situation in the North Sea. Thus the German calculation to which I have alluded would be upset, and the authorities who are pushing on the building of the great German fleet would be deprived of the hope that some turn of events in the Pacific would suddenly reduce the superiority of the British fleet in European waters. Moreover, if Great Britain's relation with Germany should become serious at a moment when the Empire was on thoroughly good terms with Japan, as is the case now, we might send a welcome reinforcement. The Pacific would become a reservoir of strength instead of a source of weakness to the Empire.

Thus the people of Greater Britain, by guarding their own special interests, could solve the great dilemma of Imperial naval strategy.

Canada is establishing a naval force of her own. She is doing it mainly, indeed almost altogether, on the Atlantic coast. I do not wish to undervalue the need for guarding our immensely important Atlantic coastline. But I wish to point out that the situation on the Atlantic is fairly well taken care of. Broadly speaking, the German fleet is the only European force we need to consider and it is shepherded into a corner as I have described, so that only casual raiders could annoy our Atlantic coastline. A few comparatively small and cheap cruisers could deter such vessels from haunting our waters. But our real danger is the defenceless condition of the Pacific. I therefore urge that Canada should put her real effort into the establishment of a joint Imperial fleet in that great ocean.