American Foreign Policy

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen,--I very deeply appreciate what your Chairman has said about my father, and what many other people have said since I came here. No one who has any sentiment in his make-up could have done what I have done in the last six months--gone to Westminster and seen that tablet unveiled, and come here for your kind reception without a very deep and affectionate regard for the British people; and that I have. For myself, I think that the Chairman, in his conclusions gained from the scientific people in Canada, must have a higher degree of belief in the principles of heredity than I can possibly have. (Laughter) However, I gave him fair warning, and any damage that is done is upon his head.

Mr. Arthur Wilson Page, A.B., is a graduate of Harvard University, editor of "World's Work," and vice-president of the publishing house of Double, Page & Co. He is the son of the late Walter Hines Page, Ambassador of the United States to the Court of St. James (1913-1918), who is described on the tablet to his memory in Westminster Abbey as "The Friend of Britain in her sorest need."

I shall begin this discussion of American Policy by reading a letter from the President of the United States. It is as follows

The change of systems, which have so long prevailed in Europe, will undoubtedly affect us in a degree proportioned to our political or commercial connections with the several nations of it. But I trust we shall never so far lose sight of our own interest and happiness, as to become unnecessarily a party to their political disputes. Our local situation enables us to keep that state with them, which otherwise could not, perhaps, be preserved by human wisdom. The present moment seems pregnant with great events; but, as you observe, it is beyond the ken of mortal foresight to determine what will be the result of those changes, which are either making, or contemplated, in the general system of Europe. Although, as fellow-men, we sincerely lament the disorder, oppressions and incertitude, which frequently attend national events, and which our European brethren must feel, yet we cannot but hope that they will terminate very much in favour of the right of man.

and this is the part that I particularly call your attention to--

Should we, under the present state of affairs, form connections other than we now have with any of the European Powers, much must be considered in effecting them, on the score of our increasing importance as a Nation; and, at the same time, should a Treaty be formed with a Nation, whose circumstances may not at this moment be very bright, much delicacy would be necessary in order to show that no undue advantages were taken on that account. For unless Treaties are mutually beneficial to the parties, it is vain to hope for a continuance of them beyond the moment when the one, which conceives itself over-reached, is in a situation to break off the connection. And I believe it is among nations as with individuals, that the party taking advantage of the distresses of another will lose infinitely more in the opinion of mankind, in subsequent events, than he will gain by the stroke of the moment.

(Hear, hear)

This letter might have been written yesterday, and refer to the Europe of today, but as a matter of fact it was written by George Washington in 1791 when he was discussing the Europe of the French Revolution.

In 1801, when Thomas Jefferson was President, he saw with some misgivings the attempt of Napoleon to acquire Louisiana from Spain, and as he looked at that situation he wrote to the American Minister then in London as follows:

From the moment France takes possession of New Orleans we must marry ourselves to the British Fleet and Nation. We must turn all our atttention to a maritime force, . . . and having formed and connected together with a power which may render re-enforcements of her settlement here impossible to France, make the first cannon which shall be fired in Europe the signal for the tearing up of any settlement she may have made, and for holding the two continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes of the united British and American Nation. (Applause)

Again, in 1823, when the Holy Alliance threatened the existence of the Latin-American Republics, Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, suggested that the United States and Great Britain announce together their opposition to that policy. The matter was referred to Jefferson, who was then in retirement, and when he had read the letters from Canning he wrote to Monroe as follows:

The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation; this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer. . . America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe. She should, therefore, have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is labouring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavour should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom.

That particular part is interesting because it gives the reason of the often-quoted statement of Jefferson against entangling alliances; that is, the entanglement which he feared was with despotism, not necessarily with any geography. He goes on

One Nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lend aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free Government, and emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the one Nation which can do us the most harm of anyone, on all the earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world.

With her, then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship, and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the same cause. (Applause)

The war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war but ours. Its object is to introduce the American system of keeping out of our land all foreign powers and never permit those of Europe to intermeddle with these affairs of our nation. It is to maintain our own principles, not to depart from them. With Great Britain withdrawn from their psychology, and shifted into our Continent, all Europe combined could not undertake a war, because how could they propose to get at either enemy without superior fleets.

I have quoted these letters from Washington and Jefferson because those two Statesmen have been quoted so frequently as the authors of a policy of complete isolation. I had, as a matter of fact, another purpose beyond proving that Statesmen as well as the Bible can be quoted on both or more sides of any question. I wanted to show that even at that time, when the seeds of bitterness of the Revolution had not passed out of men's minds, the policies which actuated the American Republic and the policies that actuated Great Britain were fundamentally the same. (Applause)

I think it is worth while to elaborate a little on part of George Washington's farewell address. What he had in mind at that time was given out under these conditions:--The United States had a treaty with France, an offensive and defensive alliance which had been made during the Revolution. The French expected us to join with them in pushing their idea of liberty at the point of the bayonet in Europe. Washington held that as the French Republic had cut off the head of the successor to the man with whom we made the treaty, it .was no longer binding. His position then was that we should not go into Europe at that time and on that issue. I think the two letters of Jefferson showed that while he was hesitant about unnecessary entanglement, at least twice in his life he suggested that we marry the British Fleet and Nation. (Applause)

Now, this common purpose and this desire to cooperate with Great Britain were not at that time the product of sympathy or kinship, particularly in Jefferson's case, because he personally got on very ill with the representatives of Great Britain in Washing ton. They were founded on a more profound thing than either sympathy or kinship; they were founded on the common purposes.

I think these purposes still prevail, but I want to point out that in discussing these I am not talking about questions of trade. At that time, and since then, and for the future, there is no question that we will both bargain and haggle with each other as hard as we can on questions of trade. (Laughter) You will make conditions about pulp and paper which seriously affect magazines in the United States. (Laughter) The papers in America not long ago were worried about Great Britain's getting all the oil supply in the world, and at the same time the papers in England were equally worried that we had it all (laughter); and I have heard people who said that they were afraid that that kind of thing might lead to trouble. I think there is going on now one of the best tests to show that there is not much trouble in that matter, that is, serious trouble. Of course when some of us lose money on one side or other of the line, that is trouble (laughter) but I meant of a more serious kind. The hardest thing today in commercial rivalry is to lose; and if you can lose without irritation, that is the best test of the matter. Now, at present we are giving you one of the best examples. When the war ended we had one of the finest mercantile fleets in the world. It is now rapidly going down hill-if you can do that on the ocean. Nevertheless, while we talk about it and vote about it, we do not show any animosity. Most of us are convinced that this is a losing game, and we had better change to some other in which we will have more success, we hope. (Laughter)

The salient features of American foreign policy are the Monroe Doctrine, the free navigation of the world's important marine highways-perhaps in this we may help you more than we do ourselves. The third is the principle of Arbitration, and the fourth the Open Door and the Territorial Integrity of China. These are not all, but these are the main ones.

To begin with is the Monroe Doctrine. The germ of that certainly lay in Jefferson's letter about marrying the British Fleet at the time when Napoleon looked with covetous eyes on Louisiana. Napoleon immediately grasped the idea, and he told some of his courtiers that it was the only time that he had ever had a chance to sell anything which otherwise was going to be taken away from him. (Great laughter) After that, of course, when the Holy Alliance looked upon South America with covetous eyes it was but natural that the same formula should be gone through with again; and this time Canning suggested to the American Minister in London that we join forces in opposition to the Holy Alliance. We did not do that exactly that way; we announced it by ourselves; but all the while with the knowledge that the British Fleet approved and would co-operate in its maintenance.

The Monroe Doctrine need not have assumed the aid of the British Fleet if we had built a fleet large enough to ensure it alone, but there must have been some Scotch in some of us, for we did not build a big fleet. For some 120 years we allowed the British people to pay the money for the biggest fleet, and we saved it. At all times the British Fleet was much more powerful than ours, and we must have counted in some measure upon it. I think that even Mr. Cleveland at the time of Venezuela must have counted on at least part of the British Fleet, because our own at that time was very much smaller. This Venezuela episode gives another interesting light upon the habits of the two countries to get along with each other. Mr. Cleveland sent Great Britain an ultimatium. So far as I know, no other nation ever sent Great Britain an ultimatum and had the affair end peaceably. (Laughter) The same thing happened the other way about during the Civil War; Great Britain sent Mr. Lincoln an ultimatum over the Trent Affair, and that ultimatum, I think, is the only one that has come to Washington and had the affair end peaceably. These two periods of strain are perhaps as good proof as anything of the peculiar relation between the two countries. (Applause)

The second Foreign Policy of the United States that I mentioned had no particular name. It refers to the passage of ships freely through important waterways. The record of how this policy came about may make it clearer. In 1815 Admiral Stephen Decatur sailed into the harbour of Algiers, and made such a demonstration of the power of his guns as to convince the Bey of Algiers that it would be good practice no longer to attack American ships passing along the shores. With that advantage he went on to the other Barbary pirates. He had hardly finished convincing them when the British Squadron sailed occur again. There are people now whom you can readily get; but when things become more normal into the Bay of Algiers and endeavoured to convince the Bey thereof that he ought not to practice piracy against the British Merchant Marine. He was a little obdurate, but after some argument, in which he lost part of his city, he gave up. From that time on the Mediterranean and the Straits of Gibraltar have been free to anybody to sail, without toll and without hindrance. (Applause)

Some time later is was the custom of Denmark to charge toll on all ships going through the Danish Straits. Somewhere in the fifties the United States went to Denmark and said that they thought that was a naturally free highway, and that we desired no longer to pay toll. Almost at the same time the British Government said much the same thing. The result was that the Baltic is also now free for anybody to sail without toll. (Applause)

Now, this policy, always operated in co-operation, has had a rather signal example lately. When Mr. Childs, the American Ambassador to Italy, sat with Lord Curzon opposite the Turks at Lausanne, one of the things they discussed was whether or not the Dardanelles was a naturally free waterway. The Turks were not convinced it was, to begin with, but they finally agreed with Lord Curzon and Mr. Childs in the end, that it was. (Laughter)

The establishment of the Monroe Doctrine and establishment of the doctrines of free waterways has been a continuous chain of co-operation. At the same time we have had forty or more arguments about trade, but those things are not of the same importance, nor on the same plane.

The American Representative at Lausanne had another principle which he was interested in, and that was the Open Door. If you ask the average American what the the Foreign policies of his country he will tell you-the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door. Now, the Open Door as applied to China was first suggested by Secretary Hay to the various powers, in a circular note in 1900. As usual, Great Britain was the first to give assent to it. This, it seems to me, was the germ from which the recent Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments sprang. This Conference was a wedding of the two fleets and nations for the maintainance of the Open Door to the Territorial integrity of China; in other words, the status quo of peace in the Pacific -a kind of Monroe Doctrine for China. This time it was announced in conjunction with Great Britain, and not by ourselves alone. In speaking of this Treaty in this way I am not forgetting that is a four-power and not a two-power treaty; but France has not the special interest in the Pacific which the United States and Great Britain have; and until this recent Treaty there was some doubt in the minds of at least some Americans whether Japan was as interested in the Open Door and the Territorial Integrity of China as we were. (Laughter)

The other great policy is that of Arbitration. I suppose there has been more arbitration between the United States and Great Britain and Canada than in all the rest of the world put together. (Applause) It began very early, and has been almost continuous.

In other words, then, in the Monroe Doctrine, in the establishment of free waterways, in the subject of Arbitration and the Open Door in China, and in almost all things which we stand for, we have had the active and continuous co-operation of the British Government. (Applause) I am speaking from our side of the line. I think the British Government has also had continuous and active co-operation from our side. (Applause)

Now, why is this? It is for the same reason that Admiral Sims was correct when in 1910 he prophesied that if the British Fleet were-attacked by Germany the United States would not stay out of the fight. (Applause) By that he did not mean that the United States was under any obligation to fight Great Britain's battles, but he had read history enough to know that in any general war in which Great Britain participated she would probably be found fighting for the principles which underlie American Foreign Policy (hear, hear) and consequently we should, for our own reasons and for our own good, be found fighting on the same side. The prophecy is as good for the future, and for those same reasons, as it was when he made it. (Applause) If we should find ourselves in a good war involving these common principles we should rather expect that we would be joined by our friends and neighbours. This habit of common action was what underlay the British expectation that we were going to join in the last war, not that we owed it to Great Britain but that it looked as though it was our kind of a war, and we should have been there, and it was our kind of a war, and that is why we went. (Applause)

In the following sentence which I quoted from Jefferson, he was a true prophet not of 1823, but of 1918, speaking of Breat Britain, "We should most sedulously cherish the most cordial friendship, and nothing would more tend to knit our convictions than to be fighting once more side by side in the same cause." In the general lassitude from high endeavour which has come since the world has been very tired after the war, I think the people have in some cases felt that the prophecy has not been as noticeable as it might have been. I believe, however, that there never has been in peace times as much cooperation between the United States and Great Britain as there has been since the end of the war. What has the United States done since then? With other people, not a great deal; with Great Britain, quite a lot. As I said, the American and British Representatives co-operated at Lausanne. The difficult negotiation of funding the debt owed to the United States has been accomplished between the United States and Great Britain, and as yet with no one else.

In talking over this matter in England this summer I found a certain number of people who felt that this negotiation was not altogether an unmixed blessing; but there is one aspect of it that will far outlast this feeling. If the money which the United States lent the British Empire was for other people, why did we not lend it direct to the other people? It may have been that Scotch sense again. (Laughter) Perhaps we felt that Great Britain was more likely to pay, and more likely to maintain her covenants absolutely than other people. If so, we were quite right. It was perfectly good judgment. And if the judgment was founded on that reputation, that is a very good reputation for Great Britain to have. (Applause) If Great Britain pays under these circumstances she will under almost any other.

Now, that has already had one effect. If you have read the interchange of notes between the British Government and the United States you will notice that certain other nations have difficulty in discussing this reparation problem, because it is hard for them not to put the debt in it. It is quite easy for Great Britain to discuss reparations without including the debt, because she has arranged to pay the debt. That makes reparation between the United States and Great Britain very much easier than it otherwise would have been; and I think this is somewhat useful, and some mitigation of the unmixedness of the blessing which my friend referred to. (Laughter)

In discussing these things which have happened between the United States and Great Britain since the war, I think the Washington Conference was not unlike the Monroe Doctrine in certain ways. I do not mean that it was suggested in London, as the Monroe Doctrine was, but certainly it was not a surprise to London. When Secretary Hughes announced as his programme the equality between British and American Navies, Mr. Balfour immediately rose and accepted it in principle. If Mr. Balfour had not accepted in principle I think Mr. Hughes would have been the most surprised man. (Great laughter) In other words, that was not a bargain; we were not arguing about the main principle; we were cooperating upon the main principle. (Hear, hear) In other words, the most of the foreign relations of the United States since the war has been with Great Britain, and these relations have been both constructive and friendly. We may not have gotten on as far with you as we should like, and you may not have gotten on as far with us as you should like, but that has been altogether the direction in which we have been going, and I feel certain that the habit of getting on with Great Britain in international affairs has grown immeasurably since 1914, and I hope I have shown that it was a fairly healthy habit before that. (Hear, hear)

There is another matter which, though not theoretically a problem between the two countries, in reality was so. I am a little nervous about mentioning it for it is Ireland. (Laughter) I do not think that you can realize how grateful Americans are to the British Empire for finally settling the Irish question. (Great laughter) Not only have we most of the principles of our international policy in common with you, but when you have an internal pain it seems to be contagious with us. (Laughter) At every election, and between-times, the grievances of Ireland resounded from cart-tail and soap box, and we could not elect a sheriff or a dog-catcher in any part of the United States without their being attended by the curse of Cromwell and the Battle of the Boyne. (Great laughter) A black-and-tan fight in the county of Kerry would lose a man votes in the Bronx; and the fact that an Irishman died in jail in Dublin had a powerful effect on the elections in Boston. Perhaps the British Empire does not feel that the Irish question is altogether settled, and we still have a few Irish twinges ourselves; but for the mitigation of its acuteness we give you our heartfelt thanks. (Laughter) The Irish pain, I hope, will gradually disappear, and as it does it will make it still easier to get the habit of working together.

But there is still another common problem-how to deal with the aspirations for self-government of dependent people. What Egypt wants Porto Rico also desires; what India asks the people of the Philippines will also demand. How shall we govern, lead, educate and instruct those people, is a common problem; and the failure of one nation will make the task of the other well-nigh impossible, just as the success by either one will greatly strengthen the hands of the other.

I agree with the many people who have pointed with pride to the undefended boundary between Canada and the United States. I agree that in this world it seems to have been quite an achievement for two people, big enough and near enough each other to fight, not to have done it. But this is, after all, negative. The positive thing is that we have gone forth together with mutual confidence to establish principles which we believe in; that we have the habit of working together for good things; and that this habit is more active today than it ever has been, (applause), and if we are brothers, or cousins, or related to each other in any other way, I conceive this to be all the more remarkable and beneficient, for it means that if we have acquired, maintained and improved this habit, with every facility for knowing the worst about each other, there is very great hope in the future. (Loud applause)

Horn. N. W. ROWELL expressed the thanks of the Club to Mr. Page for his fraternal address.